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The exploitation of Black labor is the cornerstone
of the prosperity of Western capitalism. From slavery’s
inception, violence has been used to sustain not only the
economy but also the ideological superiority of a dominant
race. In order to ascertain the status of violence on
Blacks, constitutional issues are examined giving
particular attention to police brutalization. It was
determined that Blacks are currently caught in the
contradiction of being victimized by crime and further
abused by their designated protectors.
These theoretical assertions are tested through the
case study of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This
constitutional city has been a citadel of violence towards
Blacks throughout its history. The limited efforts to
thwart such has lent tacit approval to police violence.
Philadelphia was the target of two unprecedented federal
suits involving police brutality and the forerunner of
innovative techniques to address that concern. However,
negligible results of such litigation and the absence of
clear guidelines governing police actions led to the
unscrupulous manner in which MOVE was forced from their
homes in 1978 and again in 1985. It was concluded that the
reluctance of the courts to prosecute violators, coupled
with the expansion of police discretion, is that lawful
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The countless atrocities committed against Blacks
from slavery to the present era have yet to witness
systematic prosecution of the perpetrators and atonement to
the victims. Racism, as a consequence of the political
economy of capitalism, has fostered a negative portrayal of
Blacks which warranted a tradition of physical oppression.
The police, as an agent of the repressive apparatus of the
state, have been given full discretion in the use of force
in the apprehension of one suspected of wrong doing. The
ideological goal, maintenance of the status quo coupled
with racism, has precipitated a historical legacy of police
abuse, i.e., the excessive use of unnecessary force. Since
police misconduct has been one of the major concerns to
Blacks throughout the Diaspora, these excesses are no
longer considered “alleged” but accepted as fact.1
The purpose of this study is to examine the present
status of police oppression and/or abuse of minorities,
legal sanction of such systematic abuse, and the
1U.S. House, Committee on the Judiciary, report on
Hearings in New York City on Police Misconduct, testimony
by Rev. Daughtry, p. 501.
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effectiveness of grievance measures when such abuse occurs,
i.e., civil litigation, lawsuits, and grass root efforts.
It is hoped that this work will add to Black political
studies in police relations and form a basis in the area of
police brutality for organized activity outside the
confines of the system.
The present executive in office, Ronald Reagan, has
based his platform on economic activity in the United
States to the extent that freedom is equated to material
well being. The new polity is guided by the needs of a
corporate—dominated economy which, by necessity, defines
all other relationships. Therefore, one’s politicalness,
i.e., “capacity for developing into beings who know and
value what it means to participate in and be responsible
for the care and improvement of our common and collective
life,” is determined by one’s place in the economic order.
Citizenship thus becomes an economic equation based on
employability as opposed to one’s birthright in order to be
a true part of the polity. This era has thus witnessed the
depoliticalization of the poor through anti-inflation
strategy of decreases in social spending and increase of
capital intensive production, i.e., computer technology.
The Reagan administration would like us all to
experience “collective amnesia” by relinquishing the past
and starting anew to recapture equality through the
3
elimination of barriers to equal opportunity.2 The
subsequent attack is on “. . . civil rights because of the
recognition of the linkage between it and human rights or
welfare resource objectives of Blacks and other
dispossessed peoples of color.”3 Chisman holds that the
present ideology is a breeding ground for fascism in which
the call for law and order, accompanied by violent
suppression, are the means to further the interest of
business by inducing a social climate favorable for
exploitation.
This present trend is ahistorical as it negates the
evolution of societies and dismisses injustices of the past
thereby abrogating responsibility for the corrections of
such wrongs. Secondly, it is a frontal attack on the
liberal paradigm which insinuates redress of grievances
regardless of one’s economic or social status. Finally, if
the economy is determinate, the theoretical basis that has
been critiqued and dismissed by liberals and conservatives
alike becomes relevant in explaining present political
phenomenon, i.e., historical materialism.
2Sheldon Wolin, “Contract and Birthright,”
Political Theory Vol. 14, no. 2 (May 1986) :183.
3Ronald W. Walters, “Federalism. ‘Civil Rights’ and
Black Progress,” Black Law Journal 8 (Fall 1983):232.
4Robert Chisman, “Subjective Factors in the
Reelection of Ronald Reagan,” Black Scholar, Vol. 16, no. 1
(January/February 1985) :147.
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The ideological use of racism has historically
served to provide enormous rates of profit return through
the institution of slavery by utilizing Africans as
property to finance the underpinnings of this society. In
order to justify and continue the exploitation of Blacks,
subordination was made legitimate in the Constitution, thus
consolidating the political apparatus of capitalism.
Finally, oppression required physical control of that
segment of the population upon which the wealth of this
country rests, through the police as the repressive tool of
the state.
Methodology
In this study, the dualistic role of the state as
protector of individual rights and as repressor is tested
through a case study of Philadelphia/MOVE. The
researchable problem is the investigation of police
brutality as a consequence of the violent function of the
state for system maintenance. The hypothesis is that the
politico—legal structure has sanctioned violence towards
Blacks through its reluctance to protect, prosecute
violators, and minimal provision of redress to victims.
Descriptive-historical examination of the origin and nature
of violence is presented and its legitimation is inferred
through inductive analysis. The legal parameters are drawn
from an examination of federal litigation and legal
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codification that is then illustrated by the Philadelphia
experience. MOVE, although an aberration, is recapitulated
as climatic to the legacy of abuse and an exemplification
of police excesses resultant from an absence of restraints
on operations and use of weaponry. The synthesis of this
holistic analysis of legitimated violence on minorities in
America culminates in the present trend towards
nullification of protections from expanding police power.
Due to the dialectical nature of police work as
enforcer and protector of the law, conceptualization of
brutality is problematic. Throughout the literature the
terms “misconduct,” “brutality,” “abuse,” and “excesses”
are used interchangeably to refer to police officers’
overzealous behavior during law enforcement. As a result,
the police give cursory acknowledgment to its existence
thereby delimiting a professional definition and offer a
barrage of justifiable terminology such as “police
discretion,” “self—defense,” “resistance to arrest,” and
any general failure to respect authorities. The premise
indicates that since the majority of the victims are Black,
in proportion to the general population, there is little
need for concrete codification of this phenomenon.5
Subsequently, the challenge to social scientists is to
5Albert J. Reiss, “Controlling Police Use of Deadly
Force,” Annals of the American Political and Social
Sciences 452 (November 1980):122—43.
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devise indices to ascertain necessary and excessive uses of
force. As of now, the concept of deadly force, i.e., use
of weaponry to kill assailants, is the primary indicator to
make that distinction. However, this delineation
obfuscates the different degrees of brutality that range
from abusive language, unwarranted search, seizure and
arrest to and inclusive of death. For purposes here, the
referents of abuse will be as follows: physical abuse
during apprehension, brutalization of persons unrelated to
criminal activity, questionable use of firearms, and
torture of persons in custody.
Such violence as directed towards minorities has
been allowed to exist and continue by the economic system
of capitalism. The writer hypothesizes that police
brutality is sanctioned through legal mechanisms that
ideologically appear to provide punitive and preventive
measures to end systemic abuse. The extent to which police
brutality is sanctioned is determined by nonpolicy, i.e.,
the absence of clear guidelines to regulate police
behavior, to prosecute violators, and to provide redress to
victims. Sanction becomes a measurable variable through
the identification and categorization of requisites that
are examined as to their respective influence on police
violence. The mechanisms that were measured by their
punitive and preventive properties are: United States case
laws, nature of litigation to prosecute violators, and the
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status of municipal liability. The extra legal indices to
check police behavior are police internal affairs and
organizational efforts by the community.
The examination of the legalities involved in the
phenomenon of brutality and the logic used to avoid
systematic prosecution seemed to indicate that the police
are virtually immune from being reprimanded. The
justification offered centers on the nature of their work
and the lack of legislation to restrain enforcement
officers. It was then surmised by the writer that there
was a need to explore the manner in which violators have
been protected through examination of United States case
laws. Particular attention was paid to Title 42, U.S.C.
1983, which compensates victims for “deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and law.”6 The status of municipal liability
and responsibility, i.e., respondeat superior, the third
mechanism, can also be inferred through U.S.C. 42.
The rule of law for police brutality is as outlined
through litigation indigenous to Philadelphia, Rizzo v.
Goode7 a case in which local citizens charged Philadelphia
with police brutality and United States v. Philadelphia8
6”Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen
the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers
Misconduct,” Yale Law Journal 87 (1978):447—52.
7Rizzo v. Goode 423 U.S. 362 (1976)
8United States v. Philadelphia, 482 F.Supp. 1248
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which exemplifies an attempt by the then United States
Attorney General to bring an abuse charge against the city.
These cases serve to make Philadelphia an ideal case study
to test the hypothesis through the functional requisites of
the given mechanisms. Philadelphia has had a high number
of alleged police incidents and was one of the first cities
to create a civilian review board to investigate
allegations, and to establish a number of police community
organizations to improve relations.9
Also, Philadelphia gave birth to one of the most
notoriously famed police officers, later commissioner and
eventually a very popular mayor of the city, thereby
crystalizing the relationship between City Hall and the
police. A major question under scrutiny is whether or not
Frank Rizzo condoned the police’s abusive behavior towards
Blacks by his analogies of the latter with crime. His
continual defense of the police and his denial of police
records to investigating federal officials had apparently
resulted in an increase of brutality. The inextricable
relations of Rizzo/police misconduct and the political
infrastructure were substantiated through brutality charges
and extensive investigations by the government. Finally,
the Philadelphia police received international attention
(E.D. Pa. 1979)
9The Police Advisory Board was dissolved in 1969 by
Mayor Tate.
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for the manner in which it forced MOVE members from their
10homes in 1978 and 1985.
Furthermore, the police actions toward MOVE
exemplified the contradicting restraints, which the Black
community exists under in Philadelphia. Although
unrepresentative of daily police violence within the Black
community, it did exemplify the extent to which the
repressive apparatus will employ deadly force to silence
dissidents. Regardless of the fact that MOVE ingested
inordinate amounts of garlic and other items, built a
pilibox on top of their home, used profanity over a
bullhorn, and carried weapons, the police were not
justified in its use of military tactics in a democratic
urban setting. Certainly, since the sixties, police
agencies have increased their military might and displayed
esprit de corps with the fire department to support its
repressive tactics. A greater emphasis is placed upon the
manner in which the legal system channeled the MOVE members
to prison and commended the officers who openly abused
Delbert Africa on national television. If these officers
were not prosecuted, what is the fate of the Black person
abused in private? The police’s handling of the Delbert
Africa incident is indicative of their tactics to clear
10The following comments are based on personal
observations, interviews, and reports on MOVE activities by
journalists.
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themselves of the charge of police brutality.
In examining the structures designed to address the
problem of police abuse one must bring into focus the
community; for, the extent to which the mechanisms are
utilized for eradication or redress, is largely determined
by the area residents. In order to gauge the prevalence of
police violence and if, in fact, MOVE is a part of this
concern, a survey.was conducted, the purpose of which was
to extract the views of Philadelphians on police abuse,
Rizzo and MOVE in relation to the methods used in their
apprehension.
Probability sampling was used to estimate the
viewpoint of the community at large through an area
cluster.~~ In devising the sampling scheme, voter
registration lists that provide: wards, divisions, ethnic
breakdown, and party affiliation were used.’2 Philadelphia
has sixty—six political wards, each sixth ward was
systematically chosen and the rest discarded. The third
and twenty-fourth wards housed MOVE members and the latter
was disqualified on the basis that the opinions of those
residents have been codified through journalistic pursuits.
“Earl R. Babbie, Survey Research Methods (Belmont:
Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1973).
12 .Information provided by Voter Registration
Division for the City of Philadelphia, 13th and Filbert
Sts., Philadelphia, PA 19107. Latest data compiled
November 16, 1987.
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The remaining eleven wards were compared in order to
identify four wards with a majority of Blacks to whites
(excess of 80%) and vice versa. The rationale in using
ethnic distinction is that Philadelphia is a race-oriented
city with areas reflective of one dominant ethnic grouping.
The importance of race in opinions and political behavior
was evidenced by the last mayoral election in which the
city was practically split in half by race.’3 The location
of the four areas represent distinct neighborhoods in the
city which correspond more so to ethnic as opposed to
economic status, the location of each area was determined
by a political map. Out of the eight wards, area
duplication was found; ergo, the map was further used to
identify two distinct sections of the city and the
statistics isolated areas with a high disproportionate
ratio of Blacks to whites. Beginning from the first ward
down, the first and sixth wards were selected.’4
WARD BLACK WHITES AREA
1 787 10,899 South Philadelphia
6 9,210 157 West Philadelphia
To determine the desired number of respondents, the
number of divisions made up of approximately six hundred
131n general the Black precincts supported the




registered voters, eighteen for the sixth ward and twenty—
one divisions in the first ward, was divided into total
population of each ward. It has been found that five
households per block would reflect the overall consensus;
therefore, five was then divided into the ward population
to get a desired number of respondents which was 111 for
the first ward and 152 for the sixth ward.
Prior to distribution, a pretest of the
questionnaire was given to five randomly chosen residents
of each area, based on their response and comments, the
final questionnaire was then drafted. Five households on
twenty—five blocks were chosen in each ward and surveyed by
taking the questionnaire to each home. Self—addressed
envelopes were given to those respondents that needed more
time to complete them. The findings are based on a 70
percent return date, which were tallied by questions. A
conversion program was used to retrieve percentages.
Multivariate analysis, i.e., simultaneous examination of
more than one variable was used in order to interpret data
more efficiently. The normal information solicited was
age, sex, education, ethnic background, and political
affiliation. The respondents were questioned on the
existence of police abuse, the extent, and the strata of
the population most affected. The perception of MOVE is
the major criterion in gauging how the group was treated by
officials. For example, one respondent referred to the
- 13
group as terrorists, therefore the procedures used were not
- extreme based on the connotations of terrorism. An attempt
was then made to parallel the means used to silence the
group to their actual infractions by questioning
respondents as to why MOVE was forced from their home in
1978. The follow—up was on the nature of infractions as
they relate to the tactics used in terms of being too
extreme, wasteful of city funds, too weak, or if the police
and fire officials acted appropriately under the
circumstances. The next two questions focused on the
manner in which Delbert Africa was apprehended. The major
problem here was response, based not only on memory of
incident, but their initial opinion of televised account.
Further clarification was inferred on whether respondents
believed the officers involved should have been prosecuted.
The construction of the survey stemmed from
accounts of the incidents and information gathered on
Philadelphia. Certain predisposed generalizations were
made on type of responses based on areas and recent
election returns. However, the majority àf the responses
did not conform to any preconceived notions and served to
add a new dimension to the interpretation of the incidents.
Data Collection
The major source of information on specific cases
of abuse, the role of city government and of course the
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MOVE incidents is the media. The compilation of periodical
accounts by the writer, encompasses a thirteen year span of
events in Philadelphia involving Blacks. Interest in this
area was spawned in an effort to infer a causal
relationship between Rizzo and police violence through
recapitulation of events that came to fruition with MOVE.
Rizzo’s antics and activities were more than
adequately covered by the Philadelphia newspapers; however,
shifts in the press’s stance towards Rizzo are evidenced.
For example, the Bulletin was pro-Rizzo during the
seventies when the newspaper was published under the
auspices of Walter Annenberg, a friend of the former Mayor.
When Rizzo was Commissioner he befriended the press and was
portrayed as the epitomizing suppressant of crime. The
views of the major dailies will be juxtaposed to the one
hundred year old Black paper, the Tribune, which presents
the minority perception of the Rizzo regime.
As of this date only two works have been published
15on MOVE, Burning Down MOVE is a detailed journalistic
account of the 1985 siege of the MOVE home. Harry offers a
comprehensive analysis in “Attention MOVE” of that incident
and she holds that it was a planned, concerted effort by
15Margot Harry, “Attention, MOVE! This is
America!” (Chicago: Banner Press, 1987) and John Anderson
and Hilary Hevenor, Burning Down the House: MOVE and the
Tragedy of Philadelphia (New York: W. W. Norton & Co.,
1987)
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the police and the federal government to annihilate the
group. Further, it gave rise to questions about the
accountability of Black elected officials to their Black
constituents. The periodical accounts of MOVE
characterized them as “savages” as justification of police
excesses. It thereby became necessary to supplement data
by interviews with MOVE members, television, and radio
accounts to present a total viewpoint. Actual trial
experience is imperative in establishing a factual base.
The trial of the three officers involved in the beating of
Delbert Africa was witnessed by the author and the
proceedings from MOVE trials were examined.
To devise a format upon which police brutality in
Philadelphia could be substantiated, the accounts and
records of organizations aimed at combating police violence
were analyzed. The compendium of the grass root efforts
were housed within the police component of the Public
Interest Law Concern of Philadelphia (PILCOP). The
strategy and results of their activities were fully
examined through their publications, personal records and
interviews of the coordinators.
Limitations of the Study
The major problematic ~in the study of police
brutality is ontological which makes finding an acceptable,
theoretically based definition, an arduous task. Although
16
brutalization can be operationalized, its indices are still
subjected to definition by situational exigimes. Violence
by police is viewed in police studies as isolated,
fragmented phenomena that unfortunately occurs in the
dispensing of law enforcement. In this sense, the role of
violence as an integral part of the capitalist system to
oppress people of color becomes obfuscated.
Due to an absence of theoretical coherence, the
nature of policing itself still awaits questioning. The
current trend is towards technological sophistication of
methods to repress, professionalization that further
isolates the police, and expansion of criminal justice
services, all of which are increasing the problem as
opposed to curtailment. Also, the rising level of vice in
the Black community makes such a query appear frivolous on
face. Crime and the nature of the criminal is readily used
to justify such activity; therefore, when the innocent
become targets of abuse it is seen as anomalous, easily
rectified by monetary award. The problem thus becomes
making this study relevant to the average lower-to-middle
income person in that no one is immune from police
violence.
Disorder in the social milieu will worsen as
capitalist production becomes more technologically
advanced. The police as a tool of the state to maintain an
environment conducive to exploitation are becoming more
17
powerful which is sanctioned by the people in their call
for law and order. An empirical analysis of rates of
brutality, crime, and levels of employment would have
further illuminated the deterministic relationship of
violence to the economy. Yet, history has evidenced
periods of high yields of profit accompanied by massive
oppression; however, this work is only a small effort
towards recognition of the trend towards a police state.
Literature Review
Violence towards Blacks as an integral part of the
capitalist economy has a legacy unsurpassed by any ethnic
group. Prior to the thirteenth century, economic relations
between Europeans and other nations were based on trade,
with the discovery of cotton and sugar these relations were
altered to conquest for the purpose of exacting laborers to
harvest crops. It was during the era of European expansion
that the African society was underdeveloped, i.e., robbed
of all resources needed to cultivate and nurture a self—
supporting community accompanied by the relegation of
16Blacks to an ideological inferior status.
Physical abuse of Blacks was preferred in that they
were attributed animalistic characteristics in which brute
‘6See Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (New
York: Putnam, 1980) and Walter Rodney, How Europe
Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, D.C.: Howard University
Press, 1974)
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force was needed for control. It is unnecessary here to
detail the sadistic atrocities committed during the
transportation of Africans to the “new world,” seasoning in
the West Indies and slavery which would not have survived
“. . . without an overt, brutal policing mechanism designed
,,17not just to protect whites but to dehumanize Blacks.
The point that needs to be made here is the depth of
legitimization of such practices to the extent that any
comumon Caucasian could violate a Black person with little
concern for reprisal. Reminiscences of such condoned
practices are exemplified by lynchings throughout the
Reconstruction era and the twentieth century. Official
abuse can be inferred from inaction of officers such as
exposing a victim to mob violence, prior knowledge
of lynchings, [and] failure to remove persons to [a] safe
place.”18 The Jim Crow era up to the aftermath of the
sixties witnessed the enforcement of laws by white citizens
supported by the local police forces. Drake and Cayton
noted that “. . . policemen and other ‘civil servants’
often resorted to enforcing segregation as the most
convenient way of keeping the peace.”19
17 •, .Terry Jones, The Police in America: A Black
Viewpoint,” Black Scholar, Vol. 9, no. 2 (October 1977):23.
18Julius Cohen, The Screws Case: Federal
Protection of Negro Rights,” Columbia Law Review 46
(1946) :108.
19st. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, Black
Metropolis, Vol. 1 (New York: Harper, 1945), p. 107.
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It has been argued that violent acts have been
representative of another dimension of slavery. Berry
purported that violence against Blacks has been the
resultant need of a segment of whites to “. . . preserve
their belief in the inferiority of Blacks” for the
maintenance of “social and political subordination of an
historically outcast group by any means, including
violence.”20 Eighty percent of the 3,830 people lynched
between 1889—1940 were Black. During the 1950s—1960s, of
the 6,000 people killed by police, 45 percent were black.
If the killings of Blacks are totaled over the last few
decades “. . . they would amount to a massacre.”21
The colonial model as expounded by Tabb is best
suited to theorize the current existence and purpose of
repression in the Black community.22 This model compares
the colonization of the Third World to the United States
ghettoization of Blacks as they were prevented from moving
23into other areas. The cities became labor reservoirs and
20Dr. Berry in Charles H. Jones, Jr., “An Argument
for Federal Protection Against Racially Motivated Crimes:
18 USC 241 and the Thirteenth Amendment,” in Harvard Civil
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 21 (Summer 1986):697.
21 I, •T. Jones, Police in America, p. 23.
22William K. Tabb, The Political Economy of the
Black Ghetto (New York: W. Norton & Co., 1970).
23See also Allan Spear, Chicago, The Making of a
Ghetto, 1890-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1969)
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reflected the shape of a class society in that the
boundaries of ethnic—economically homogeneous neighborhoods
grew progressively sharp. The cities are also
representative as the hub of industrialization thus
profiting from closer proximity to its workers. The
capitalists merely relinquished a portion of their function
in socialization of the reproduction of labor to municipal
government because the latter “. . . could accomplish the
same result, at public expense, far more efficiently and
more legitimately than (they) themselves.”24 This function
of institutionalized racism made it possible for the
dominant power to manage a community which was
underdeveloped and made dependent on the society it created
for sustenance. The paradox of the Black community is that
it is administered by outsiders, the inhabitants are denied
control and are excluded from full participation in the
system; yet, they are still forced to finance their own
oppressive police force, welfare system,25 and also to
lend their approval to laws which potentially
contribute to [their] alienation.26
24 . .Sidney Harring, Policing a Class Society——The
Experience of American Cities 1865-1915 (New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 1983), pp. 10—11.
25Wi1li~ K. Tabb and Larry Sawer, ed., Marxism and
the Metropolis: Perspectives~in Political Economy (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 102.
26Thomas Clifford III, The Political Machine: An
American Institution (New York: Vantage Press, 1975),
p. 28.
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The capitalist class is backed by high levels of
violence but emphasizes nonviolent cooperation through
other institutions, i.e., education, welfare, health,
recreational, and public works. The failure of social
services in general is that “. . . they operate in
conjunction with and in support of the major economic and
,.27social forces of society. It is more legitimately
functional, however, to control the labor force through
ideological socialization and it is when such mind control
meets its limitations that repressive means are instituted
and used.
Historically, the interests of the workers have
become identical to those of the capitalists, even to the
extent of physically defending the latter’s economic
endeavors through war. Today there exists little
delineation between employment and social contexts for
commodjfjcatjon has become the level of consciousness, in
which one perceives life. Through consumption of
commodities one’s being is actualized, television becomes
reality in which fantasy becomes the preference.28 The
27Harring, Policing a Class Society, p. 31.
28Conspicuous consumption by Blacks is equal to
that of some nations. Charles Hamilton has termed the
process as a conduit which millions of dollars go through
Blacks communities. Stokeley Carmichael and Charles
Hamilton, Black Power (New York: Random House, 1967),
pp. 16—18.
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media is also utilized as an ideological weapon, note the
increase in police series and other specials aimed at
workers who do not want to cooperate.
Fanon notes the role of the educational system,29
traditional moral reflections, and the work system which
instill honesty that is rewarded with a medal after a
lifetime of service. “(T)hese aesthetic expressions of
respect for the established order serve to create around
the exploited person an atmosphere of submission which
lightens the task of policing considerably.”3°
Role of Police in Capitalist Society
The basic problem identified by the colonial model
is that the Black community as an integral part of the
political economy of capitalism is ideologically and
socially isolated. The result is a disgruntled Black
community struggling against the impoverished subordination
thrust upon them for the most part and realization of
themselves as full citizens. Poverty and resultant crime
served as the cause and effect of police presence in the
ghetto; however, it has been found that regardless of the
economic level, Blacks are affected by fear and despising
29Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New
York: Grove Press, 1968), p. 38.
30 See Martin Carnoy, Schooling in a Corporate
Society (New York: David McKay, 1977).
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31police.
Marx found that “. . . the capitalist state
‘employed the police to accelerate the accumulation of
capital by increasing the degree of exploitation of
labor.’” The police perform a critical function in
reproduction of capital--the repression and disciplining of
the working class, resulting in “. . . more work with less
resistance.”32 The police also serve as a wedge to
separate those in power from the exploited. As an
intermediary agent of the government he “~ . . does not
lighten the oppression nor seek to hide the domination; he
shows them up and puts them into practice with the clear
conscience of an upholder of the peace; yet he is the
bringer of violence. . .
Within a conservative nation—state, the police are
obligated to “combat ‘internal subversion’ . . . and act,
wherever required, as the coercive agents of the existing
social order, particularly in periods of strife and open
class conflict.”34 The police have a “hired gun” function
to repress workers’ movements against capital. In essence,
31 ,, •T. Jones, The Police in America, p. 25.
32 .Karl Marx, Capital, ed. Frederick Engels, vol. 1
(New York: International Publishing, 1977), p. 742.
33Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, p. 38.
34Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society
(New York: Grove Press, 1968), p. 38.
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the police serve not only to protect property interests of
capitalists but also supervise subclasses to ensure
continued exploitation and control.35 Although the state
as an instrument of the capitalist class utilizes the
police as a repressive tool, they are not free to do
anything they wish; for this assumption would negate the
role of class struggle and the state’s constant effort at
legitimization.
Crime
Poverty and crime are inextricably linked
throughout the literature. The supposition is that Blacks
are more inclined to criminality due to their disadvantaged
economic position. The instrumentality of crime in police
studies is two-pronged: justification of police presence
and authorization of subsequent physical abuse. The origin
of crime and its applicability to police repression in the
manner in which a suspect is handled is the foundation of
police brutality studies.
Most historians view crime as the cause of police
institutions; however, crime and disorder are effects of
the haphazard development of capitalism. The unfettered
material quest produces not only impoverishment, decay, and
turmoil, but a series of sociological and psychological
dysfunctions as one becomes alienated from humanistic
35Harring, Policing a Class Society, p. 14.
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values and identifies more with the acquisition of wealth.
Technological sophistication of the productive
processes has precipitated a whole range of social problems
unique to contemporary urban society.36 The level of
societal derangement has become contingent upon the
organization of labor such that the nature of man reflects
automated machines as the latter becomes more humanistic.
This is the basis of Marx’s philosophy and its
transformation into revolutionary theory. The value of the
worker is only realized in the product created, thus work
becomes a means of existence as opposed to the
actualization of one’s own mental and physical abilities.
The feeling of misery from one’s alienation in production
coupled with exhaustion leads the worker to only experience
freedom in the satisfaction of natural instincts. Thus the
more the worker produces, the less one has to consume: the
more value that is created, the more civilized the product,
the more barbarous the worker.37 Alienation of labor in
the productive process and society has created frustration
and anxiety with reality causing subjective excesses
36Manuel Castells, The Urban Question: A Marxist
Approach (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977) discusses the
dialectics of overurbanization as a threat and stabilizer
of capitalism.
37J. B. Bottomore, ed., Karl Marx: Early Writings
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1963), and Herbert Marcuse, “The
Foundation of HIstorical Materialism,” in Studies in
Critical Philosophy, ed. Herbert Marcuse (Boston: Beacon,
1972)
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evidenced in the call for law and order and a return to
38religion.
In addition to alienated labor, capitalist
production has also formulated dual societies represented
not only by extreme poverty and wealth but the distinction
of race. Racism among police officers is the underlying
foundation of violence. The reaction of most academicians
to this charge is to offer explanations as opposed to
39denial. The consensus suggests that police merely
reflect the values and sentiments of society at large and
40are no more prejudiced than their fellow citizens.
Studies have been conducted to identify the extent
of racism and its effects on law enforcement. Lipset
inferred extreme “conservatism” by the rate of membership
in organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan, John Birch
Society, and the Fraternal Order of Police endorsements of
ultra-right candidates.4’ Reiss found in an attitudinal
survey of police that as many as three—fourths of the
officers made negative comments about Blacks but did not
38 ,, •Chisman, Subjective Factors, p. 18.
39Adriane Kinnane, Policing (Chicago: Nelson Hall,
1979)
40Pierce, “Brutality Reduction,” p. 49.
41 • • ,ISeymour M. Lipset, Why Cops Hate Liberals, in
The Police Community, ed. Jack Goldsmith (Palisades:
Palisades, 1974), pp. 185—87.
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treat them uncivily in observed interactions.42
The sociological and psychological force of racism
impugns Blacks as subhumans, that need to be monitored by
police as in a colonial situation. The inhabitants of the
Black areas are portrayed as the “. . . quintessence of
evil . . . insensible to ethics; . . . the negation of
values . . .“ the logical conclusion being dehumanization
• • • • • ,,43or to speak plainly, it turns him into an animal.
The ideological crime-fighter role thus becomes the most
important of police in maintenance of the status quo as it
has a “civilizing effect.”44
Crime has become a euphemism for the ghetto by
academicians who began pointing out the high rate of crime
among Blacks as compared to whites. Gordon argues that
crimes are perfectly logical responses to the structures of
institutions in which capitalist society are based. Ghetto
crime is thus committed by people choosing the profitable
economic opportunities available to them.45 Black crime
implies a commentary on the dangerous nature of Blacks
42Albert Reiss, The Police and the Public (New
Haven: Yale, 1971), p. 147.
43Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York:
Grove Press, 1968), pp. 41-42.
44Harring, Policing a Class Society, p. 15.
45David Gordon, “Criminal Behavior and Class
Conflict,” in Blacks and Criminal Justice, eds. Charles E.
Owens and Jimmy Bell (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1977),
p. 169.
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which makes them responsible for their own problems of
crime, disorder, and police brutality.46 This argument
typifies the “white man’s burden theory” which allows
whites to feel superior to Blacks who need guidance and
supervision since they are incapable of being responsible
for themselves. Therefore, “. . . it’s incumbent upon
whites to govern the social apparatus and social
interaction between Blacks and Whites if they both should
have their best chance of survival.”47 It also leads one
to believe that Blacks accept crime in their communities
and work against its reduction particularly through the
protection of criminals.48 The aforementioned is an age—
old belief about the Black community. Jackson, writing in
response to this charge in 1903, noted “. . . the dominant
race of this country is largely responsible for whatever
criminal tendencies the colored race has inherited . . . “
and that it is necessary to protect some Blacks from the
throes of whites before due process can be adjudicated.49
Police Brutality
The connotation of Blacks with crime coupled with
46John Cooper, The Police and the Ghetto (New York:
Kennihat, 1980), pp. 6, 15.
47Cooper, Police and the Ghetto, p. 21.
48Ibid., p. 17.
491da Joyce Jackson, “Do Negroes Constitute a Race
of Criminals?” Colored American Magazine 12 (1903) :252.
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the police officer’s role in protection of property of the
dominating interests has led to rampant police abuse which
often
serves as the ultimate weapon for keeping the negro
in his place. . . . They may do it merely by
turning their backs on private lawlessness, or by
ItLore direct involvement. Trumped up charges,
dragnet roundups, illegal arrests, the “third
degree” and brutal beatings are all part of “white
supremacy. “50
The objective here is to move towards concretization of
legitimate police violence on Blacks through analyzing its
manifested indices of: police discretion, apprehension of
suspects, interrogation, and deadly force.
The tension between the police and Blacks was
evidenced in the 1960s when police action precipitated
rioting in Black areas.5’ “The talk of revolution in the
ghetto further isolated Blacks from the normal white
community, and made it more of an object for the new
program of domestic control.”52 In labeling the ghetto,
agents for social control shifted emphasis from civil
rights to institutions of law enforcement. The same force
that aggravated conditions to the point of revolt were
assigned the task of preventing further social outbreaks.
50wallace Mendelson, Discrimination (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1962), pp. 143—44.
51For indepth discussion see Report of the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam,
1968)
52Cooper, Police and the Ghetto, p. 9.
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The police responded to the sixties with stricter
enforcement and rougher treatment of Blacks.53 Means to
deal with crime and increasing alienation of Blacks were
accompanied by increases in police budgets for improved
technology and manpower. This solution along with other
social programs provided further social mobility of whites
through provision of employment and intensified the
subjugation of Blacks.54
The environment for police brutality is exacerbated
by the negative perception of police by Blacks. The police
are basically mistrusted in the ghetto because they are
perceived as having failed in their basic responsibility of
protection.55 Blacks are prone to regard crime as a result
of police inefficiency or ineptitude as opposed to social
conditions.56 The effect of prejudice is that Blacks
become “sensitive,” “defensive,” and “develop strong self—
protective reactions” resulting in antagonism toward
police. As social conditions worsen, such as unemployment,
Blacks are being pushed into increasingly hostile responses
53 See Richard Kania and Wade Mackery, Police
Violence as a Function of Community Characteristics (1961—
1970) in United States,” Criminology 15 (May 1970) :27-48.
54 See Francis Fox Piven, Regulating the Poor: The
Functions of Public Welfare (New York: Vantage, 1971).
55Jerome H. Skolnick,~ “The Police and the Urban
Ghetto,” in Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban Society,
ed. Arthur Niederhoffer (New York: Anchor, 1969), p. 20.
56Kinnane, Policing, p. 107.
31
with the police on the other end reacting with renewed
hostility.57 The challenge thus becomes that a large
proportion of complaints are from ethnic minorities and
economically marginalized groups who are already
underprivileged. This segment of society becomes trapped
in a contradiction of victimization of crimes thus needing
added police protection and abuse by their protectors.
Block conducted a national survey in 1966 and found that
Blacks demanded increased police protection in direct
correlation with increased protection from the police. He
also found that fear of crime in Black areas has little
effect on support for police.58 Police brutality is now
routine and so rampant that the concern of the average
officer to growing public criticism has not been to curtail
his use of violence or find ways to avoid violence but to
concentrate on not getting caught and not being subject to
punishment if he is caught. Until the use of force is
clearly defined, police brutality will not move beyond its
present impasse and the desire to eliminate it will remain
an impotent concert.59
57 T. J. Curry and Glen D. King, Race Tensions and
the Police (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1962), pp. 39—
43.
58 ,,
Richard Block, Support for Civil Liberties and
Police,” in Police in Urban Society, ed. Harlan Hahn
(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1971), p. 122.
59 I, • I, •Egon Bittner, Self—Defined Dessert, in Policing




Police misuse of authority to abuse citizens should
be a major crime issue in a democratic political system,
yet it is treated as a mere consequence in the adjudication
of justice. Police brutality is defined as a judgment that
one has not been treated with full rights and dignity
afforded to citizens of a democracy.6° “The legality of
official violence is often a matter of judgment by
prosecutor, grand jury and the judiciary.”61 Police are
authorized to use force while making an arrest and are
acting in an official capacity if: they are not
unreasonable, make provisions to comply with law, and only
utilizes force after all other means have failed.62
The analytical problematic of police brutality is
the result of the nebulousness of police functions. The
role of the police can be viewed as a distributor of “non—
negotiably coercive force” in that the officer decides when
the use of force is necessary and within the confines of
60 . ~,Albert Reiss, Police Brutality——Answers to Key
Questions,” in the Ambivalent Force: Perspectives on the
Police, ed. A. S. Niederhoffer (New York: Holt Rinehart &
Winston, 1976)
61Elton Long et al., American Minorities: The
Justice Issue (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1975),
p. 56.
62 .Rodney Stark, Police Riots; Collective Violence
and Law Enforcement (Belmont: Wadsworth Co., 1972), p. 57.
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the situational exigimes, is not accountable-to anyone.
The legality of this rule depends on citizens’ opposition
to the officer’s modus operandi.63 The term police
brutality is charged with emotion therefore authorities on
police prefer “‘violent force’ both authorized and
unauthorized . . . (they) also agree, despite a lack of
concrete evidence, that today’s policemen resort to more
,,64unnecessary violence than they used to. Since there
does not exist codified statistical data on the extent of
police violence, this debate revolves around violence as a
continuum throughout history that has only been recently
magnified or as a current phenomenon.
The major difficulty in the critique of police
activity is in delineating where their role of protector
ends and enforcer begins. When one refers to brutality
this term can cover verbal harassment to homicide and the
extenuating circumstances become the determinate between
“necessary” and “unnecessary” use of force. The next
problem is perception, for what a citizen may deem brutal
the officer may consider necessary for effective law
enforcement.
Many writers have concluded that open defiance of
63Bittner, Policing Society, p. 97.
64David Burnham, “Police Violence: A changing
Pattern,” in The Ambivalent Force: Perspectives on the
Police, ed. A. S. Niederhoffer (New York: Holt Rinehart &
Winston, 1976), p. 189.
- 34
police authority is the major precipitator of violent
confrontations. Toch concluded that violence becomes
probable when issues of self—esteem are involved. “.
[V]iolent suspects often tend to be counterparts of violent
officers . . . police obsessed with danger, a public in
fear of police, produce polarization and distance.65
Police also use violence as personal means to
persuade the public to respect them. Police officers
responded in a survey that their major problem was lack of
respect.66 There also exists peer support of violence
among some police. The normal premise being that
disrespect makes the officer appear weak if this is
translated literally it may equate violence.67 Violence is
also protected through a code of silence based on the
belief “. . . that a brother—officer can do no
1,68wrong. .
Many police organizations lobby to legitimate the
65See William A. Westley, “Violence and the
Police,” American Journal of Sociology 59 (July 1953):34—
41, and Albert T. Reiss, “Police Brutality,” Transaction 5
(July-August 1968) :10—19. Hans Toch, Peacekeeping:
Police, Prison and Violence (Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books, 1976), p. 29.
66Lipset, “Why Cops Hate Liberals,” p. 188.
67Toch, Peacekeeping, p. 19.
68 Ibid., p. 19, for full discussion see Egon
Bittner, “Espirit De Corps and the Code of Secrecy,” in The
Police Community, ed. Zack Goldsmith (Palisades: Palisades
Publishing, 1974)
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use of violence only in that they reject the moral and
legal standards by which this behavior is judged brutal69
Some writers hold that police brutality is based
upon a value system that for “extra legal reasons .
condones the rough treatment of cop—fighters and sexual
criminals.”70 This belief is legitimated and physically
transformed by police discretion.
The police have the discretion to make decisions
and exercise a wide range of choices as to when and by what
means the law is enforced. Police discretion has become an
area of major contention in that it tends to act to the
distinct disadvantage of the minority offender.71 All
government agencies have flexibility in making decisions
within the bounds of legislative determinations; however,
the statutes pertaining to police impose unrealistic and
often conflicting responsibility.72 The inability of
legislative bodies to fashion rules to govern much
discretionary justice and the mistaken belief that
individualized justice produces a more equitable result
have meant increased oppression to Blacks.73
69Stark, Police Riots, p. 62.
70Niederhoffer, Ambivalent Force, p. 54.
71Kinnane, Policing, P. 107.
72Herman Goldstein, Policing a Free society
(Cambridge: Ballinger, 1977), p. 108.
73Taunya Banks, “Discretionary Justice and the
Black Offender,” in Blacks and Justice, ed. Charles E.
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Overall, the police are concerned with social
dissidents who challenge the values and traditions of
society add the variable racism and every Black citizen
becomes a suspect.74 There does not exist a training
manual in the United States which presents the idea that
Blacks should be treated differently in the criminal
process from whites; however, “‘for the police the Negro
epitomizes the slum dweller and in addition he is
culturally and biologically inherently criminal’”75 The
police view their work in Black areas as constant combat.
This “conflict approach” further asserts that police work
in protection of the stratification system will more likely
make members of disadvantaged groups the “target of law
enforcement efforts.”
The effects of police discretion are evident in the
number of incidents that are handled in the streets without
arrest. This commonplace practice is rationalized by the
policy theory that the victim would refuse to prosecute
because violence has become the accepted way of life for
his community.76 The presence of bystanders does not work
Owens and Jimmy Bell (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1977),
p. 37.
74 “ .Pierce, Brutality Reduction, p. 49.
75Skolnick, “Police and the Ghetto,” p. 218.
76Edna Erez, “Self Defined ‘Desert’ and Citizens
Assessment of the Police,” Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology, Vol. 74, no. 4 (1984):1277.
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to curb abuse nor presence of other police who do not
restrain police.77 In fact some police encourage
beatings.78
Street corner justice is also administered through
verbal assault, improper searches, and false arrest which
are the most frequent abuses by police.79 The judiciary
has tacitly supported police field interrogations through
their rulings of Terry v. Ohio8° in which probable cause
became the prime activator of “stop and frisk.” In Adams
v. Williams,8’ police power was extended in that any
evidence found during this procedure may be used for
convictions. Therefore, “. . . innocent citizens may be
stopped, searched and arrested at the whim of police
officers who have only the slightest suspicion of improper
,,82conduct.
The court had made legal strides in decreasing
these infractions through their rulings in Mapp, Escobedo,
and Miranda. The decisions in these cases have recently
been under attack by Attorney General Edwin Meese as aiding
77Niederhoffer, Behind the Shield, p. 61.
78Reiss, “Police Brutality,” p. 338.
79 See Algernon Black, The Police and the People
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1968).
80Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
81Adams v. Williams 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
82Long et al., American Minorities, pp. 120—22.
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and abetting criminality.83 Particular emphasis has been
put on reversing the Miranda decision which advises a
suspect of his rights.84 Malone found that the effect of
Miranda in decreasing the number of illegal confessions has
been slight. As a matter of fact, the police use Miranda
to justify their unorthodox methods of ascertaining
information. 85
The police have violated civil liberties through
interrogations by sophisticated means to extract and create
incriminating information. It has been found that they use
falsified evidence, physical violence, and “psychological
• ,, • 86coercion to produce true and false confessions. Sandra
Day O’Connor, the leading advocate in reversal of rights
established by the Warren Court held “. . . confessions
‘are essential to society’s compelling interest in finding,
convicting and punishing those who violate the law.”87 The
court’s “good faith” test which allows the police to
justify the most irate activities and provides immunity
83Jack M. Rakove, “Mr. Meese Meet Mr. Madison,”
Atlantic 258 (December) :19.
84Stephen Gillers, “The Meese Lie,” The Nation,
February 21, 1987, p. 205.
85Patrick Malone, “You Have the Right to Remain
Silent, Miranda After Twenty Years,” American Scholar 55
(Summer 1986) :367.
86Malone, “You Have the Right,” p. 373.
87Ibid., p. 379.
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exemplifies the priority of crime control at the expense of
human rights.88
Deadly Force
The use of weaponry to subdue an assailant is a
distinct subfield in police brutality research codified as
deadly force. However, this concept has little utility in
elucidation of police violence nor does it add contour for
its use is not clearly defined. The police can use any
amount of necessary force to effect an arrest and are
authorized to use deadly force if: the suspect may cause
bodily injury or death particularly in relation to the
crime, has firearm which is employed or threatens to employ
to escape arrest, and in self—defense.89 Standardization
of the use of deadly force on a national level does not
exist. Police manuals are not even clear on when force
should be used, and some make no mention of the problem at
all. Most rookies learn by watching their superiors in
action as opposed to what they have been taught.90 “Today,
virtually all jurisdictions allow police to use deadly
88Paul Peniand and Richard C. Boardman, Sect.
1983——Contemporary Trends in the Police Misconduct Area,”
Idaho Law Review 20 (Summer 1984):684-85.
89A. Leonard, The Police, the Judiciary and the
Criminal (Springfield: Charles Thomas, 1969), pp. 28-32.
90Wayne R. LaFaue, Arrest, the Decision to Take a
Suspect Into Custody (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965),
pp. 209—10.
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force to stop a suspected felon who committed a violent
crime or who appears dangerous.”91
Since deadly force is always permissible in self—
defense, police officers prone to abuse are afforded the
technique of planting weapons on abused suspects in the
cover—up or destruction of incriminating evidence.92 “It
is also argued that [the] coroners’ courts, criminal
courts, and the attached legal—medical professionals afford
a protective shield which justice finds virtually
impenetrable.
Deadly force may also be used to subdue one
suspected of committing a felony, of course the gray area
becomes how does one determine if in fact a felon has been
committed, a petty theft is not a felon but running in an
attempt to escape becomes felonious.94 The courts have
subscribed to the rule that it is better to let one guilty
suspect of a misdemeanor escape than to take their life,95
and has recently ruled that escape does not justify deadly
91Ann McDaniel, “When Should Cops Shoot?”
Newsweek, November 5, 1984, p. 69.
92George E. Berkeley, The Democratic Policeman
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 115.
93S-teven Box, Power, Crime, and Mystification (New
York: Tavestock, 1983), p. 86.
94LaFaue, Arrest, p. 215.
95Reneau v. State, 70 Tennessee 720, 721 (1879), in
Leonard, Police and Criminal, p. 28.
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force just because the police arrive late or the suspect is
96faster than they are. If the suspects killed during
escape were brought to trial in many instances their
offenses may not have earned them a prison sentence.97
Surely in the instances of escape an officer’s life is not
threatened to the point of justifying homicide. In a study
done by a police foundation there was no link between
lethal captures and lower crime rates. Actually, deadly
force statutes work against the police officer’s
responsibility to enforce law since it increases tension
between Blacks and police, especially “. . . when the
police take the lives of persons who present . . no
danger.98 LaFaue has purported that the police limit the
use of deadly force to those instances where they believe
such action would receive public approval since “. . . the
police department justifies its existence by the
apprehension of the dangerous professional criminal.”99
The use of deadly force is a result of
organizational laxity and flagrant abuse of lethal
96”The Supreme Court Rules on Deadly Force,”
Newsweek, April 8, 1985, p. 87. (Tennessee v. Garner and
Memphis Police Department v. Garner 53 U.S.L.W. 4410
[19851.)
97Steven Box, Power, p. 29.
98McDaniel, “When Should Cops Shoot?” p. 69.
99 LaFaue, Arrest, p. 215.
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power)°° Some writers have prescribed teaching
alternative methods in apprehension and use of the gun as a
final result.10’ Most lend their prescriptive remedies
towards clear statutory requirements on use coupled with
stringent supervision and discipline since all legal
boundaries are violated.102 However, “. . . it is
exceedingly rare that police actions involving the use of
force are actually reviewed and judged by anyone at
all.”03
The Police Problematic
The current trends in police study are management
efficiency and professionalization for overall improvement
in response to police misconduct, i.e., fraud, bribery,
etc., and their use of violence. It is widely believed by
police studies that attitudes can be held in check through
professionalism.104 “Segments of the community confronting
major economic adversity, such as unemployed Black youths,
were generally viewed as the principal objects of police
100Toch, Peacekeeping, p. 33.
101 See John C. Weistart, Police Practices (New
York: Oceana Publication, 1974).
102 Toch, Peacekeeping, p. 33, and Lawrence W.
Sherman, “Legal Issues in Law Enforcement,” in Future of
Policing, ed. Alvin Cohn (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978), p.
123.
103Bittner, “Non—Negotiable,” p. 98.
‘°4Toch, Peacekeeping, p. 36.
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mistreatment.”°5 In defense of their brutality tactics,
police say they are only human and become tired, fearful,
and angry like anyone else. A United States District Court
held that “. . . the police need not be any more imperious
to abuse than any layman.” However, as a professional, we
must expect more of a police officer in terms of his
capacity to perform his critical functions with competence
and expertise. Police as professionals cannot afford to
106lose their temper as the average citizen. This becomes
a function of increasing professionalization as a method to
increase police efficiency and decrease excesses of
authority.
The sixties also spurred academic inquiry into the
role and function of the police. The pluralist notion of a
neutral state balancing and addressing the interests of all
resulted in research on the police as an institution within
itself. The police institution is fraught with major
contradictions: public servant, crime fighter, maintenance
of order and control, selective distributor of violence
with human contacts varying from intimacy to coercion.
Only a small percentage of policing is dedicated to law
enforcement. The major task in this field is defining the
105Harlan Hahn, “Cops and Rioters,” in Police in
Urban Society, ed. Harlan Hahn’ (Beverly Hills: Sage,
1971), p. 149.
106 Stark, Police Riots, p. 59. Judge Sam Perry,
U.S. District Court, Chicago, June 12, 1969.
44
role of the police officer within the confines of a
standardized context as opposed to abstractions of symbols,
words, and gestures.’07
Psychosocial analysis of police is now in vogue
with occupational indices suggesting that the types
attracted are lower to middle—class high school graduates,
type of training becomes of utmost concern. It has been
found that the average officer only receives a minimum
requirement of two hundred hours of training.108 In an
attempt to curtail police violence, some remedies suggested
are: put emphasis on law abiding citizens as opposed to
apprehension of criminals, training to decrease use of
109weaponry, and psychological screening of applicants. On
the final point, there are police officers who enjoy
hurting people and the police force tends to attract those
men that like to use it)1° The police hold that it is
difficult to “weed out the sadists” from potentially able.
111law enforcers. Yet the police agencies are responsible
for the mental fitness of officers.
Schlossberg, a New York cop turned psychologist,
107Terry, Policing Society, pp. viii-ix.
108Lipset, “Why Cops Hate Liberals,” p. 195.
109Niederhoffer, Ambivalent Force, p. 190.
110 Ibid.
“1Toch, Peacekeeping, p. 31.
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holds that “. . . unfortunately, the only thing some
lawbreakers respect is force.” He also noted that youth is
a major contributor, after being closely supervised in the
first year they move into the adolescent phase. These
“young bucks” are put together on the night shift where
they reinforce one another’s dangerous tendencies.112
Promotion is slow and the seniority system further isolates
rookies from older cops.113
The police internally reflect class struggle and
they are becoming increasingly alienated from society at
large.114 The police function with a subculture that
reinforces negative behavior through peer pressure and
retards social development by keeping them from growing up
and being committed to their families. There is also a
high rate of suicide, alcoholism, and shortened life
expectancy. Police agencies are now turning to psychology
for stress reduction. The police are therefore caught in
between internal procedures and practices, also the common
enemy, i.e., the community at large as contributors to
stress with resultant violence. There are also a number of
police killed by citizens which heightens their paranoia
and sensitivity. One author suggested that killing of
“2Nikki Meredith, “Attacking the Roots of Police
Violence,” Psychology Today 18 (May 1984):26.
1131bid., p. 23.
114Harring, Police Classes, p. 19.
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police is deemed revolutionary by some.115
Police Reform
All classes receive some, though not equal, crime
control services in which the amount of police protection
is determined by property held. In working class
communities, the police have been the most visible
representative of the state as a resource person for social
services, medical care, and resolution of small scale
disputes.116 Yet the myth that police can prevent and
control crime and their lethal force has fueled their
already increasing power. The tension in the Black
community coupled with the aforementioned dualistic view of
police makes being a complainant against police
problematic. Other than litigation, the channels to
redress complaints of police misconduct have been internal
affairs of the police, civilian review boards, and programs
targeted at improving police community relations.
Most urban police forces house internal affair
bureaus to handle alleged police misconduct in the areas of
corruption and abuse. Blacks are dissatisfied with
internal review procedures in that the officers are rarely
reprimanded for their behavior. Most law officials agree
~5Curry and King, Race Tensions and the Police,
p. 52.
116Harring, Policing a Class Society, p. 237.
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that police must police themselves since “. . . they are
the only ones who can discharge this task effectively for
an agency functioning outside a police department does not
have the capacity to substitute for the numerous echelons
of supervising officers. •
The civilian review board is unique to the American
experience; however, it has shown to work against
minimization of abuses since it has increased alienation of
police.’18 The civilian review board in Philadelphia was
riddled with problems from organizational to results. The
board usually reported, “‘. . . no general pattern of
officially condoned police brutality or discrimination
based upon race, creed or national origin.’”19 The Black
Panthers referred to the boards as civilian fronts to
continue the police control of police, their remedy was
community policing of our own areas.12° Moss conducted a
study examining the extent to which Black communities could
117Berkeley, Democratic Policeman, p. 135.
“8lbid., pp. 145-46. See also Edward T.
Littlejohn, “The Civilian Police Commission: A Deterrent
of Police Misconduct,” University of Detroit Journal of
Urban Law 59 (Fall 1981):1131—1184.
119 ,,
Joseph D. Lohman and Gordon E. Mismer, Civilian
Review-—Philadelphia,” in Who Rules the Police, ed.
Ruchelman (New York: New York University Press, 1973),
p. 57.
120 Huey P. Newton, In Defense of Self Defense:
Executive Mandate Number One,” in The Black Panther Speaks,
ed. Philip S. Foner (New York: Lippincott, 1970), pp. 39-
40.
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translate political potential into control of the policing
function.’2’ He found that the increase in Black elected
officials has a negative effect on the communities’ desire
to control police. It has been assumed that BEO’s would be
able to control the police and decrease abuse.
Another area that has received considerable
attention is the improvement of police—community relations.
PCR units were created nationally to present a favorable
image to the public through services such as recreation,
education, and support of community affairs.122 The PCR
units were of questionable effectiveness, if officers took
the job lightly, they were pictured as exiles, if serious,
they risked contempt by peers. “The community impact was
largely on middle-class publics who already favored its
police.”123 However, one plan was implemented in
Philadelphia called the “North City Congress” which was a
training program in relations between the police and the
community. The effect was increased politicalization of
the community that began pressuring governmental agencies.
124A little while later, the program was abandoned.
121Larry Moss, Black Political Ascendancy in Urban
Centers and Black Control of the Local Police Function: An
Exploratory Analysis (Saratoga: R & E Research Associates,
1977) for a discussion.
‘22Toch, Peacekeeping, p. 37.
1231bid., p. 38.
124Niederhoffer, Ambivalent Force, pp. 232-33.
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The consensus seems to be that the police are
relatively autonomous from public accountability
If, as the police frequently allege, the increase
in recorded crimes of violence is proof that our
society is becoming more and more dangerous and in
need of a more determined and strengthened police
force, then by the same logic, the increase in
recorded allegations of police brutality is proof
that the police are becoming more violent and that =
we need better institutionalized methods of
deterrence and accountability.125
In 1968 Congress created the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration to provide local and state criminal justice
systems with financial and technical aide to improve
services. The intention of the program was not to solve
any of the nation’s social problems, but to support the
• • . • ,,126imprint of state and local criminal justice system.
Black Police
Over the last ten years the recruitment of Blacks
has been a major preoccupation of law enforcement agencies
to solve the problems of police/community relations. Even
with the recruitment efforts, the proportion of Blacks on
police forces is still not reflective of the population.127
Because of low recruitment only moderate improvement has
125 ,, •Box, Police, p. 88.
126 • ,, • •
Richard Velde, Blacks and Criminal Justice
Today,” in Blacks and Justice, ed. Charles E. Owens and
Jimmy Bell (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1977), p. 20.
127 •See Stephen Leinen, Black Police, White Society
(New York: New York University Press, 1984).
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been shown in: the portrayal of the police department as
nonracist, decreased hostility of the Black community, and
more effectiveness in relations with the ghetto. However,
the Black officers are policemen first and are more prone
to show they are not favoring Blacks. They are extremely
conscientious as victims of marginal status, oscillating
128between two roles. It has been found that they may be
quicker to arrest and use force because they demand a
higher standard.
Since the police subculture is reflective of
society at large there does exist polarization between
Black and white officers. The 1960s witnessed the
emergence of Black police organizations which now exist in
virtually every major city with a large Black population.
These Black Fraternal Orders represent Blacks in many
areas, inclusive of racial incidents such as demeaning
orders and police violence on Blacks.’29
It has also been argued that individual social
mobility coupled with indoctrination is a form of tokenism
and neocolonialism in that the oppressed become an integral
part and proponent of the very system that oppresses
128Robert Steadman, ed., The Police and the
Community (Baltimore: Hopkins University Press, 1972),
p. 37.
129 •,See Lee P. Brown, The Death of Police Community
Relations; Institute of Urban Affairs and Research,” Howard
University, Occasional Paper Vol. 1, no. 1 (1973) :24.
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them.13° One also cannot assume that since aperson is
Black that they will exhibit more compassion or behave
differently towards their race. Ideological subjugation is
so deep that most Blacks inculcate and exude the myths from
society about themselves to the extent of being more
oppressive than their oppressor. For example, the Blacks
in South Africa “. . . do military duty on equal terms
• . . the loyalty of [this] military unit-—given the right
leadership can be directed at itself, regardless of color
differences. p131
Constitutional Issues
The police as a legal institution within itself
legitimates repression and their practices are designed to
maintain a degree of order, not conformity to law. The
courts are not overly concerned with legality nor do they
go to great lengths to correct abuses. There are, however,
adherence to standards of justice for they must have some
• quality of mercy . . • to preserve the stability of
and to legitimate a harsh, repressive, class—biased legal
,,132order.
In this section the historical development of the
130Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, for a full
discussion of this phenomenon.
131 •
John Keegan, Is South Africa Invulnerable?
U.S. News and World Report, March 23, 1987, p. 31.
132 • •
Harring, Policing a Class Society, p. 17.
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Constitution in the protection of Blacks through provision
of punitive and preventive mechanisms as a vehicle for
redress to victims of violence will be examined.
Particular emphasis will be made on the Supreme Court’s
utilization of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil
Rights Acts passed after emancipation. It is hoped that
this analysis will serve as a basis of present legislation
as it relates to the elimination of police violence.
Here we are in the “hallowed hall” celebrating the
codification of a two hundred year old document landmarking
constitutional government to examine one of its major
tenets left unresolved. The major contradiction on which
this constitution rests is the status of Blacks that is
inextricably tied to a larger concern——federalism, i.e.,
the mode of political organization that unites separate
polities by means of a covenant or partnership.133 Slavery
was one of the major leverages used politically and
economically by the founding fathers to be in the union;
however, the inability to balance those interests led to
134the eruption of the Civil War.
In an effort to solidify the tenuous relationship
between the Federal government and individuals in the post
133Daniel Elazar, American Federalism——A View from
the States (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).
134Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of
the Constitution of the United States (New York: Free
Press, 1941)
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Civil War era, a number of constitutional amendments were
passed which upgraded the status of slaves to full citizens
with the privileges and protections thereof. This proved
to be symbolic mobility in its early years of enactment as
evidenced by the extension of slavery through the Black
codes, crop—lien system, prison labor, etc.’35 It was
unnecessary to codify individual rights in the original
constitution as it was assumed that states’ rights were
congruent with individual rights.
James Madison warned that the states would violate
the rights of citizens and even suggested granting the
legislature veto power over the states’ laws. The Civil
War made it evident that the states’ interests were
antithetical to the well—being of some of its citizens.136
The rights of individuals were evidenced gradually through
the Bill of Rights and other amendments which merely
focused on the relationship between the Federal government
and the individual, the states still reserved residual
power to define individual rights within their boundaries.
The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
provide citizenship status to newly freed slaves but it was
instrumental in other areas. It has been a vehicle since
135 Owens, Blacks and Justice, p. 10.
136 ,,James E. Bond, The Original Understanding of
the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio and
Pennsylvania,” Akron Law Review 16 (Winter 1985):439.
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1868 to incorporate the Bill of Rights and make them
applicable to the states, which has illuminated the
unresolved issue of Federal encroachment of states’
rights.137 The Fourteenth Amendment has also been used to
effect a turning point in economic development by the
advancement of corporate interests through its “conspiracy
theory,” which interprets “person” as a corporate entity.
This meant a death knell to “‘Negro—race theory’” beginning
with the Slaughterhouse cases which signaled the court’s
use of “. . . discretionary powers over social and economic
legislation.138 The aforementioned advances would not have
been made without the mandate to provide rights to Black
citizens. However, the efficacy of the Fourteenth
Amendment in safeguarding that objective has been slight.
In addition to the passage of amendments conferring
freedom and citizenship, civil rights acts were formulated
to promote the well-being of Blacks. Congress understood
that equal rights were empty without measures to secure an
economic foothold and protection of one’s person and
property.’39 The federalist question of balance became
137William J. Brennan, Jr., “The Bill of Rights and
the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians of Individual Rights,” James Madison Lecture, New
York University, November 18, 1986.
138Howard Jay Graham, “The Conspiracy Theory of the
Fourteenth Amendment,” reprint from Yale Law Journal 47
(January 1938) :372.
139 ,, •R. Walters, Federalism, p. 232.
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instrumental in providing a way for the national government
to sidestep their responsibility to assure equal
citizenship which was the original intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The primary impetus of the Fourteenth Amendment was
fear that the confederate states would deny the newly freed
slaves their rights to protection of life, liberty, and
property. Congress left the definition and enforcement of
its protections and prohibitions to the federal
• 140judiciary. The courts, in an effort to safeguard
federalism, restricted their interpretations in opposition
to the object of its intent. Also, the balance of power in
favor of the states, through court decisions, has had an
adverse effect on the political, economic, and social
status of Blacks, particularly evidenced through rulings
concerning violence on Blacks.’41
In the Civil Rights cases of 1883, the court made
state action a “prerequisite” for involving the amendments’
protection.’42 The court then established the parameters
in which police officers could be indicted for brutality in
143the Screws Case. Screws was the first case in which
140Brennan, “Bill of Rights and the States,” p. 3.
141 ,, •R. Walters, Federalism, p. 224.
142Dick Howard, “The States and the Supreme Court:”
(State and local government issues before the Supreme
Court) Catholic University Law Review 31 (Spring 1982):377.
‘43Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65S. Ct.
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Section 52 from the Civil Rights Act of April9, 1866 (14
Stat. 27, C 31) and its present form in Criminal Code of
1909, was used in a nonelection case.144 A Black man had
been arrested and beaten to death by a sheriff who claimed
the victim resisted arrest and had reached for a gun. His
death was deemed “inconsequential” to the administration of
justice. The court held that the officers did not act in
accordance with state law, thereby invalidating the “color
of law” test which insinuates state action.’45 In Ex Parte
Va. 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879), the court held, if an agent
of the state deprives one of property, life, or liberty
without due process, his act becomes that of the state.146
Section 52 was rendered vague and further that it failed to
provide an ascertainable standard of guilt. The
determinator was added that one was “willfully” deprived of
their rights, in this case life.’47 This case was returned
to the state for retrial in which the sheriff was
acquitted. This case points to two difficulties in
prosecuting police: one, the burden of proof is one the
1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945).
144
Robert Carr, Screws v. United States——The




Cohen, The Screws Case, p. 101.
147 ,, ,,
Carr, Screws, p. 51.
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defense in ascertaining state action, and as the Solicitor
General of Georgia noted, the incumbence of attempting to
prosecute depending on police authorities to release
evidence vital to the case.’48
149In Monroe v. Pape, the court used 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983 as a vehicle to redress those victimized by
the police and other officiates of the state in deprivation
of equal liberties. This case established the “good faith”
test in which police are given leeway in justification of
their actions based on suspicion of criminal activity. The
court held that individuals may “seek redress of claims
based on federal statutes” if a series of interpretations
are met inclusive of: who can be sued, liability of states
and municipalities; the forum in which they may be sued;
immunities; vindication of federal rights and the nature of
150the relief to be granted.
In U.S. v. Price, a case involving the murder to
three members of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee, the court utilized 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242 to
reverse a District Court’s decision.’51 The three members
were released from jail at night and picked up by the
‘48Ibid., p. 52.
149Monroe V. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 81 Supreme Court
473, 5 L.Ed. 2d 492 (1961).
150 I’
Howard, States and Supreme Court, p. 384.
151U.S. v. Price 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
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sheriff’s office and met by eighteen defendants, including
the police. The defendant “‘ did willfully assault, shoot
• ,,,152and kill each of the three.
The court held in Rizzo v. Goode’53 that superior
officers are liable in Section 1983 only if they “.
participated in, encouraged or ordered the unconstitutional
conduct of lower officials.”’54 In general, Section 1983
has been held inapplicable in respondent superior suits.
There is again a problem in providing supervisory liability
which can be easily masked as duty. The standard of proof
required for criminal prosecution is more exacting then
civil trials as “intent” to deny constitutional rights must
155be shown.
The former Attorney General initiated charges of
brutality against the City of Philadelphia for broad
declaratory and equitable relief against unconstitutional
practices and policies of the Philadelphia Police
Department. The suit alleged a “pervasive pattern of
police abuse that denied basic federal constitutional
rights.”156 His efforts were thwarted on the basis that
152 •Long et al., American Minorities, p. 57.
‘53Rizzo v. Goode 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
154,, ,,
Suing the Lawbrealcers, p. 782.
155 Ibid.
156 • •Long et al., American Minorities, p. 57.
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the Attorney General lacked standing and that the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Section 601 42 U.S.C.A. does not
contain a grant of authority to sue for enforcement of
civil rights laws.’57
Overall, the efforts of the court to enforce its
decisions on the states through the incorporation theory
has to have struck a blow to the tenacious balance of
power.158 Currently, there is a methodological debate on
this theory which Attorney General Edwin Meese terms
“intellectually shakey” and “constitutionally suspect.”159
The object of attack has primarily been on civil liberties
such as due process of law, suspects’ rights, and
affirmative action. Meese has charged that the judiciary
has read their personal views into constitutional
interpretations and calls for a return to “original
,,160intent.
If the court took heed to Meese’s attack and
returned not only to the intent of the founding fathers but
‘57Ibjd., p. 1225. See also Stephanie Franklin, “A
Continued Quest for an Effective Remedy for Police
Misconduct,” United States v. City of Philadelphia 482
F.Supp. 1248 (E.D. of Pa. 1979), Black Law Journal 7 (Fall
1981) :180—200.
158 ,,Howard, States and Supreme Court, p. 384.
159 ,, , , •Herman Schwartz, Meese s Original Intent -—A
Constitutional Shell Game,” The Nation, December 7, 1985,
p. 607.
160Rakove, “Mr. Meese Meet Mr. Madison,” p. 77.
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decisions of their predecessors, it would be found that the
present court has swayed off course. It was evident in
formulation of the Fourteenth Amendment that Blacks would
have to be protected as further verified in the Civil
~Rights Amendments. In terms of the “exclusionary rule”
which in Meese’s opinion only aides the guilty criminal,
the Supreme Court of 1886 upheld a ban on “unreasonable
search and seizures” in Boyd v. U.S. This decision
prohibited all government attempts to obtain a person’s
private papers or other property——by warrant or subpoena
161and forbade their use as evidence for conviction. If
the court becomes anymore conservative Meese may gain vast
support to this charge of strict interpretation. For
today:
• . . the Court is involved in a new curtailment of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s scope . . . the civil
and political rights of the individual . . . are
treated as inferior to the ever—increasing demands
of governmental authority. . . . (W)e see an
increasing tendency to insure control rather than
to nurture individuality.’62
Significance
The overall significance of this work is
presentation of a holistic analysis of police brutality and
redress mechanisms within the confines of this political
161Stuart Taylor, Jr., “Who’s Right About the
Constitution, Meese v. Brennan,” New Republic, January 6
and 13, 1986, p. 20.
162Brennan, “Bill of Rights and States,” pp. 15—16.
61
economy. Philadelphia is used as a case study due to its
unique record in this area of not only extensive abuse but
citizen efforts, legalities, and the epitome of abuse,
MOVE. Black Philadelphians are focused on because little
has been codified on their experience since the major
163sociological study by DuBois in 1899.
The study of police brutality has been approached
basically through piecemeal analysis in which causes and
continuation are viewed as dependent on a number of
independent variables. This study perceived the issue as
multifaceted indeed; yet, interrelated in its goal of
system maintenance.
The position of the federal government through
legislation and interpretations by the courts has been
nefarious at best. Through scrutinization of major
landmark decisions and the criteria for litigation against
the police, the present status of where the public stands
in relation to brutality can be discerned. The current
trend suggests that a police officer’s chance of escaping
prosecution are ninety—eight out of one hundred, which
“might appear to the police as a positive
encouragement.”164 Thus the parameters of and advantages
to using juridical means to curb police excesses are drawn.
E. B. DuBois, The Philadelphia Negro (New
York: Schocken Books, 1899)..
164Box, Power , p. 90.
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The MOVE incidents were grossly misrepresented. In
this paper, an analysis is not only given to the obvious
use of police force, but also redress efforts of those
abused by police; litigatory injustices; and overall
responsibility for police excesses. These issues have been
given only cursory acknowledgment by the few that chose to
examine this current phenomenon.
Through utilization of a historical basis coupled
with legalistic and grass-root efforts, a theoretical
foundation was established for organized activity outside
the confines of the system in the area of police abuse. It
is also hoped that this work will be useful to other
endeavors in the goal of eradication of police violence and
add to the dearth of knowledge in Black studies.
The focus of the next chapter will be on the
constitution and violence on Blacks. Private violence as
treated by the Thirteenth Amendment will be discussed in
addition to official violence. The Fourteenth Amendment
and subsequent civil rights legislation outline punitive
and preventive measures taken by the government.
Supplemental to this analysis is the present status of
unwarranted searches and interrogations to fully illustrate
the trend towards increased police authority.
Chapter III is a historical analysis of brutality
in Philadelphia and the efforts taken to end systematic
persecution of minorities. The litigatory process from
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local trials to federal charges against the city are fully
investigated. The organizational activities of the
community and efforts at improvement of relations with the
police are also documented.
Chapter IV is a study of MOVE beginning with a
theoretical description of the group’s philosophy and
subsequent behavior. The 1978 and 1985 events are
reconstructed only to aid the reader; for the analysis is
focused on issues raised from events as opposed to the
events themselves. These issues include: deadly force,
prosecution of officers for abuse, use of all—white jury,
redress for victims, respondeat superior, and the use of
commission and grand jury to investigate the police. This
work concludes by offering prescriptive suggestions towards
eradication of violence on minorities.
CHAPTER II
VIOLENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION
Supreme Court decisions are pivotal in American
legislative history to discern the status of any
legislatible phenomenon. The court’s interpretation of the
constitution has usually worked in the interest of the
state in it’s effort to propel the bourgeois advantage.1
“Never . . . can the Supreme Court be said to have for a
single hour been representative of anything except the
relatively conservative forces of its day.”2 Embodied in
such conservatism are racist beliefs, ethos, and practices.
Consequently, the court system as an agent of the dominant
ruling class, has sanctioned violence towards Blacks as
part of the aforesaid ideology. This has been accomplished
through its reluctance to protect Blacks and provide relief
to victims, coupled with an absence of punitive standards
to prosecute offenders. Instead, in the majority of cases,
the court has created a number of judicial “tests” that
1Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society
(New York: Grove Press, 1968), p. 23.
2Robert Jackson writing in 1941 in Stuart Taylor,
Jr. “Who’s Right About the Constitution, Meese v. Brennan,”
New Republic, January 6 and 13, 1986, p. 19.
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inevitably work to protect the violators. If in fact the
court rules in favor of the victim, the standards in the
burden of proof are fortified. These claims are examined
in the following pages beginning with the use of the
Thirteenth Amendment in private violence as distinguished
from police brutality as it developed into a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Concluding with an illustration
of the court’s present stance towards widening police
discretion at the expense of civil liberties.
During the slave era, the court established
noninterference in private and police violence on Blacks
masked by state’s rights. The court also tied the hands of
Congress, if they had been predisposed to render liberal
Black legislation, by support of state superiority in the
area of slavery. In the Dred Scott decision3 Justice Taney
ruled that Congress did not possess the power to abolish
slavery in the territories. Therefore, compromises between
the North and South “. . . had the total effect of creating
the presumption that the central government was powerless
to interfere with the institution of slavery.”4 In sum,
the court had thus established their link in the oppression
of Blacks by abandonment of the slave question.
The purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment and
3Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
4Ronald W. Walters, “Federalism, ‘Civil Rights’ and
Black Progress,” Black Law Journal 8 (Fall 1983) :222.
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subsequent civil rights legislation was to not only abolish
slavery but the “incidents and badges thereof.” It can be
argued that racially motivated violence, i.e., “. . . where
the perpetrator’s intent or conscious objective is to
injure a person or their property, because of the person’s
racial identity, is in fact consequential to enslavement
mentality.”5 Following such rationale, violators should be
prosecuted under said amendment and federal protection
against violence provided. The reluctance to do such has
justified white supremacy and extended the indignity of
subordination as Blacks “. . . ceased to be slave(s) of an
individual, but in some sense became the slave(s) of
society.
The court at that time repudiated the view that
social inequality resembled and in fact encompassed the
badges and incidents of bondage. The court maintained a
strict interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment as
emancipation and after which disavowed any obligation to
ensure freedom.,7 Thus federalism limited the Amendment to
be binding only on the individual, not states. It also
5 ‘ICharles H. Jones, Jr., An Argument for Federal
Protection Against Racially Motivated Crimes: 18 USC 241
and the Thirteenth Amendment,” in Harvard Civil Rights-
Civil Liberties Law Review 21 (Summer 1986):693.
6Frederick Douglass, “The Color Line,” North
American Revolution (June 1881) as excerpted in Jones v.
Mayer 392 U.S. (1968):446—47.
7Jones, “An Argument Against Race Crimes,” p. 709.
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became incumbent upon Blacks to prove violations of
federally secured rights. This burden of proof was further
complicated by the court’s requisite test of “intent” by
the violators.8 Under these stringent precedents it is no
wonder that it was not until 1968 that the court expanded
its interpretation of the badges of slavery as applicable
to Black exclusion from a white community as reminiscent of
9the Black codes.
Private Violence
In a nation where the ideals of freedom and
equality are held paramount, the right to life unencumbered
by violence has always been and remains to be questioned.
Following emancipation, lynching and other violent acts
became instruments of racial control. In fact, any act
that challenges the “subordinate status” has been met with
aggression to balance the dominant/submissive parody.
Throughout the history of the African in America, one can
note their assertiveness as being met with intense
opposition. The disciplining of slaves that evolved into a
reign of terror during reconstruction is today evidenced in
police brutality. The frequency and intensity of violence
is directly correlated to the nature of activity among
v. Guest 383 U.S. 745 (1966), Court devised
specific intent test.
9Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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Blacks. The current lull in the number of such acts deems
the inquiry of Black homicide moot to some; yet it is
representative of Black entrenchment for “(a) race firmly
locked into a subordinate caste position (does) not need
frequent violent reminders that its place is at the
bottom. • • •“~ This theoretical assertion is actualized
through elucidation of the court’s ideological stance on
this phenomenon.
The approach of the court has been the construction
of tests applicable by case to case considerations. Even
with the laws in place and deemed relevant through their
own precedents, systematic rulings on litigation involving
violence has yet to be realized. Since 1859 over 5,000
Blacks have been lynched, others have been maimed, beaten,
and burned by some known, otherwise anonymous, suspects.11
Between 1889-1918, 85 percent of the lynchings took place
in the South. The rationale offered was “. . . inefficiency
of their legal systems (that were) . . . slow and
uncertain, and that appellate court rulings based on legal
technicalities often rescued the guilty from punishment.”2
The significance of this argument is that it is identical
‘0Michal R. Belknap, Federal Law and Southern Order
(Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 1987),
p. 9.
“NAACP, Thirty Years of Lynchings in the United
States (New York: Arno Press, 1969).
12
Belknap, Law and Order, p. 5.
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to that offered by present day law enforcers when
questioned on their dissemination of street-level
13justice.
The organization of the Klan as an extension of the
early slave patrols serves as an extra level force to
repress Blacks through tyranny. Congress had passed 18
U.S.C.A. 241, better known as the “Ku Klux Klan Act” to
prosecute conspirators that “. . . injure, oppress,
threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
•,14Constitution. . . In the short run, the act proved to
be effective in bringing hundreds of indictments but only a
few convictions; yet it did serve to weaken the Klan.15
The Klan has yet to account for their crimes. As recently
as 1982, Klan members were acquitted for shooting at Black
pedestrians on the street that resulted in two injuries.
Monetary judgment was effected, but prosecution waned
because the court reasoned that the victims would have had
to be engaged in a federally protected right at the time of
the attack.’6 The Department of Justice claimed it lacked
‘3Arthur Niederhoffer (ed.), Behind the Shield: The
Police in Urban Society (New York: Anchor, 1969), p. 61.
14 George P. Sanger, ed., Statutes at Large and
Proclamations of the United states of America from March
1871—March 1873, Vol. xvii (Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,
1873), p. 13.
15Belknap, Law and Order, p. 12.
16
Crumsey v. Justice Knights of the Ku Klux Klan
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sufficient authority to initiate criminal proceedings using
18 U.S.C. Sec. 241.17
The role of the Justice Department can be better
illustrated through the call for protection and assistance
by the civil rights workers in the 1960s. During that
turbulent era not only Blacks but white sympathizers were
also killed by incalcitrant forces, which further
exemplifies Black subjugation as a function of “. . . the
,,18absolute refusal of the law to protect (them).
The fate of the perpetrators was left to the courts in
19which the majority were acquitted. In many instances,
representatives of the Justice Department witnessed
atrocities, took notes, held ~ome investigations, but fell
short of prosecution due to lack of federal jurisdiction.20
The court consistently held that the federalist
system precluded governmental intervention to enforce
constitutionally conferred rights. Racial violence by
No. 1—80-287 (E.D. Tenn. March 1, 1982).
17Belknap, Law and Order, p. 108.
18Jones, “An Argument Against Race Crimes,” p. 689.
19Derrick Bell, Race, Racism, and American Law
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1973), pp. 860-61.
20 .An example is the killing of Viola Liuzzo, a
white civil rights worker——no murder convictions, only
conspiracy. Suit brought against government because of
involvement of FBI informer was dismissed for lack of
evidence. “FBI Cleared in ‘65 Klan Shooting,” Philadelphia
Daily News, 27 May 1983, p. 28.
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private individuals constitute criminal acts which is under
the state’s jurisdiction. Also, the provision of police
protection is the responsibility of state and local
governments. Reliance upon the Southern states to
prosecute and protect up to and during the sixties was
• 21incredulous. Early requisites of the court to
substantiate federal intervention was/is whether the
violated right comes under the purview of federal
protection such as voting. Thus the federal prosecution of
lynching would depend on whether the victim was in federal
custody or the killing interfered with government
operations. The consequence of such logic produced rulings
such as U.S. v. Cruikshank (1876) in which sixty Blacks
were killed and their bodies left to rot in the sun in
Colfax, Louisiana. The court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment was inapplicable to rights of one person against
another. The justices did not believe that state inaction,
the constitutional basis of the Klan act, could make
federal intervention constitutional. Congress’ position
was evidenced by the fact that out of 248 bills introduced
on lynching between 1882 and 1951, not one passed.22
Police Brutality
Short of a written statute, substantiating state
21Belknap, Law and Order, p. 14.
22Ibid., p. 18.
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action became the new challenge in effecting civil rights
legislation. Due process and equal protection only
authorized Congress to forbid states to take affirmative
action to deny or invade upon individual rights. It was
not until 1945 that sec. 52 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
was utilized to prosecute racial violence. In this
landmark case of police brutality, state action was
inferred on the basis that the promulgators of violence
were state officials. Federal encroachment was legitimated
through the court’s “color of law” test which holds if one
is discriminated against because of one’s color under state
laws than it would be necessary to intervene for his
protection.23 The objective of this ruling was to strike
down discriminatory state laws and punish all individuals,
whether they worked in a professional capacity for a state
or not, if their actions deprived Blacks of the enjoyment
of their civil rights. Although of limited effectiveness
in voting, segregation or economic curtailment in civil
rights; Screws illustrated its weakness in the protection
of the most important of all rights--life. Robert Hall was
not only denied due process when he was beaten unconscious
but his life when he was “‘. . . dragged feet first through
23Cohen, “Screws,” p. 96; U.S. v. Classic 313 U.S.
299 (1941) “. . . wrongdoer niust be cloaked with the
authority of the state,” and Snowden v. Hughes 321 U.S. 1
(1944) held statute applicable to actions by state
officials in violating state law, in Snowden (1980),
pp. 191—92.
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the courthouse into the jail and thrown upon the floor
dying’ and ‘upon removal to a hospital died within the
hour.’”24 The instrumentality of sec. 52 to prosecute
police was rendered futile by the court through their
interpretation of “color of law.” Specifically by insertion
of the standard “willful intent” by violators and
nullification of acts violative of state law as not
constituting state action.
The problematic of adjudicating law enforcement
techniques was implanted in this case as the officers held
their act was justifiable on the grounds that “. . . they
used no more force in arresting the victim than was
necessary.”25 The statute was weakened further and police
discretion expanded by the court’s preclusion of an
officer’s responsibility in knowledge of rights since
sec. 52 lacked a precise “ascertainable standard of
guilt.”26 This rationale served as a major tenet of the
“good faith” test which pardons acts based on an officer’s
interpretation of legislation and proper enforcement
thereof. In accordance with the provision “willful intent”
in deprivation of federal rights, the severity of the law
is diminished,27 thereby making it possible to delineate
24 ,, •Cohen, Protection of Negro Rights, p. 94.
25Ibid., p. 100.
26 ,,Carr, Screws, p. 50.
27 • • •Civil Rights Act of 1866 in present form as
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law officials acting in “good faith” from willful violators
of the constitution. The “. . . cause of civil liberty
would have been better served if the court had invalidated
the law on the ground of vagueness and the Department of
Justice had then gone to Congress for a clear cut, modern
28statute.
The court has relinquished much of the
accountability of their decisions to Congress who has the
statutory power to determine the rights and privileges of
U.S. citizens. Perhaps Congress at that time believed the
Civil Rights Act in fact fulfilled that purpose and
undoubtedly did not foresee the dismantling of their
efforts by the court. The failure of a state to provide
equal protection of its citizens within its jurisdiction as
a result of inaction or inability made it the duty of
Congress to enforce protection. Congress made an attempt
to strengthen the effectiveness of 42 U.S.C. with the Civil
Rights Act of 1968 18 U.S.C.A. sec. 245 (B) that holds
“Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law,
by force or threat of force willfully injures,
intimidates or interferes with or attempts to
injure, intimidate or interfere with . . . (2) any
person because of his race, color, religion or
national origin . . . participating in or enjoying
benefits, privileges, employment, etc. . . . shall
be fined . . . or imprisoned.29
Criminal Code of 1909.
28 ,~Carr, Screws, p. 64.
29
William B. Lockhart, Yale Kamisar, and Jesse H.
Choper, The American Constitution--Cases and Materials (St.
- 75
The only differentiation of this act from the prior statute
is the inclusion of private violence under the same scope
as official acts. In light of Congressional authority to
“enact laws to punish all conspiracies with or without
state action——that interfere with fourteenth amendment
rights”30 renders the court’s search to find a
constitutional right dubious.
(T)o sustain a criminal indictment on such an
uncertain ground . . . subjects sec. 241 to
serious challenge on the scope of vagueness and
serves in effect to place this Court in the V
position of making criminal law under the name of
constitutional interpretation. 31
Shifting the responsibility between the branches of
government has historically and presently proved to belabor
and evade major issues. The federal government has been
vindicated from recrimination by: limited viable
legislation, determination of appropriate jurisdiction to
lack of inclination to enforce. The Thirteenth Amendment,
U.S.C. 241 in addition to “. . . a panoply of existing
Reconstruction statutes which could have been, and still
can be, invoked to provide for federal protection against
,,32violence inflicted upon citizens. . . . In U.S. v.
Paul: West Publishing Co., 1970), p. 1002.
301b1d., p. 1012.
31Ibid., p. 1013.
32Arthur Kinoy, “The Constitutional Right of Negro
Freedom,” Rutgers Law Review 21 (1967):387.
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Guest the court interpreted sec. 241 to protect one’s
federally secured rights, from interference with the added
burden of proving “specific intent” in violation of
rights.33 The expansion of sec. 241 to include Fourteenth
Amendment rights was accomplished in U.S. v. Price,34 in
which private persons were brought under purview of “under
color of” if they were jointly engaged with state officers.
Furthermore, the court revitalized U.s.c. 1985 (3), a
provision for remedial relief to victims of race crimes,
stressing motivation of the attacker as a determinate to
invoke Thirteenth Amendment legislation.35 As one can see,
“. . . these decisions support the contention that
substantive right to freedom from racially motivated
violence exists under the thirteenth amendment.”36
It has been found that police brutality and
racially motivated violence have been treated as
exclusively separate legal entities. This holds true even
when the perpetrators are police officers as illustrated by
Screws, or they participated in or refused to protect the
victims as in lynchings.37 The vehicles to investigate
33U.S. v. Guest 383 U.s. 745 (1966).
34U.S. v. Price 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
35Griffin v. Breckenridge 403 U.s. 88 (1971).
36Jones, “Argument Against Race crimes,” p. 706.
37 IIcohen, Screws, p. 108.
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police digressions are Fourteenth Amendment due process
violations and 42 U.S.C.A. sec. 1983 which acts as a
deterrent for police misconduct in that victims are
redressed for deprivation of their constitutionally secured
rights.
Legal mechanisms for controlling police abuse range
from common law torts such as false arrest, battery, and
trespassing; the exclusionary rule which bars the use of
illegally obtained evidence and criminal sanctions.
Prosecution of officers wanes primarily because of the
standard of proof required which is more exacting than
civil trials. Additionally state and federal provisions
are enforced by the District Attorney or the U.S. Attorney,
both of whom are reluctant to prosecute officers and are
dependent on police departments for information against the
officers in question and other cases as well.38 Since
Screws, however, the emphasis has been on utilization of 42
U.S.C. sec. 1983 for redress of grievances against police
brutality by monetary awards as opposed to penalization.
Moreover, sec. 1983 is being rendered virtually
ineffective as a deterrent against police excesses in that:
responsibility for monetary awards falls on the municipal
entity and not the individual officer; the erection of
numerous obstacles in bringing such claims; the enormity
3811 Suing the Lawbreakers, p. 782.
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39and the burden of proof on the plaintiff.
The basis of sec. 1983 claims are causation of
injury consistent with the execution of a government’s
policy or custom. If these acts represent official policy
then the government as an entity is responsible and thereby
liable for damages under sec. 1983.40
Historically, a municipality enjoyed immunity which
originally began as an extension of sovereign immunity of
the state. The problematic stems from “. . . the fact that
while a municipality is a governmental subdivision with all
the attendant powers and responsibilities of a governmental
body it is also a corporate entity.41 Governmental
immunity was never completely accepted by the courts
because it runs contrary to liability from negligence and
the constitutional guarantee that a person is entitled to a
legal remedy for personal and property interests. In
general, municipalities are held liable for injuries caused
by employers in performance of governmental functions of a
corporate nature. However, a distinction is made between
negligence of officers and acts done by the authority of
39Ibid., p. 781ff.
40Paul Penland and Richard Boardman, “Section 1983-
Contemporary Trends in the Police Misconduct Area,” Idaho
Law Review 20 (Summer 1984):677.
41Frederick Slabach, “Civil Rights-—Section 1983——
Municipal Corporation is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity
for Good Faith Violations by its Officials (Case Note),”
Mississippi Law Journal 51 (March 1980) :147.
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the municipality; therefore, if a corporation executes
lawful power in an illegal manner or directs an officer to
do an act illegally, it is liable.42 The court has granted
award damages under 42 U.s.c. sec. 1983 if the intent of
the defendant’s conduct is found to be evil and when it
involves “. . . reckless or callous indifference to the
43federally protected rights of others.
42 U.S.C. 1983 as a vehicle for redress against
police excesses is used because unlike sec. 242 it
establishes a civil remedy. In addition, specific intent
as proscribed by wilifuilness as a standard of proof was
removed. The principle case in this area is Monroe v.
Pape44 in which plaintiffs sought damages from both
individual police officers and the City of Chicago for
invasion of their constitutional rights. In Monroe v.
Pape, Justice Douglas,writing for the Court, asserted an
expansion of sec. 1983 in that acting “under color of state
law” is enough to substantiate state interest regardless if
the wrongdoer is acting within or beyond their
45instructions. However, the municipality could not be
42John Lichty, Redress Against Sovereignty. A
Study of the Increasing Liability of Municipalities in
Tort. (Grand Forks: Bureau of Governmental Affairs,
1972), p. 5.
43Penland, “Section 1983,” p. 674.
44Monroe v. Pape 365 U.S. 165 81 S.Ct. (1961).
45Dick Howard, “The States and the Supreme Court,”
Catholic University Law Review 31 (1982) :378.
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sued under this section.
Even though the court invoked municipal immunity,
it countered that drawback by the assertion that although
there may be in existence a state remedy, the injured party
could seek federal relief before the state. The federal
forum for redress against police misconduct has been
preferred in that it is believed that the federal judges
are more familiar with civil rights claims, are insulated
from local political pressures, discovery rules are more
liberal and backlogs are shorter in some jurisdictions.46
This ruling countered the tradition of comity between
federal and state courts,
the principle that federal courts ought sometimes
to defer to state tribunals before accepting
jurisdiction of a dispute . . through abstention
by a federal court so that a state court may
resolve an unclear state law . . . and refusal to
permit a federal court to intervene in certain
state proceedings, especially criminal trials.47
The Supreme Court overruled Monroe to the extent
that it held municipalities were not ‘persons’ under sec.
1983 in Monell v. Department of Social Services.48 The
court concluded that the Monroe Court had misconstrued the
legislative intent of the 1871 congress by their reluctance
46,,
Suing the Lawbreakers, p. 782.
47Howard, “States and Court,” p. 381.
48
Monell v. Department of Social Services 436 U.S.
658 (1978)
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to impose liability on a municipal corporation. They
reasoned that governmental entities are, in fact,
responsible and thereby liable for injuries resulting from
official policy or customs. As a result of Monell, local
governments can be sued directly under sec. 1983 for
damages, for declaratory judgments, or for injunctive
relief.49 On the question of qualified immunity as based
in “good faith,” the court responded. “On its face,
section 1983 allows no immunity from liability but when the
immunity is well grounded in common law and supported by
strong policy, the Supreme Court has recognized it.”5°
However, Monell reaffirmed Monroe, insofar as Monroe held
that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not a basis for
holding municipalities liable under sec. 1983 for the
constitutional torts of their employees. Qualified
immunity as determined by judicial decisions is based on
the rationale that without some immunity “. . officials
might be deterred by the risk of lawsuits from using their
unfettered and independent judgment . . . (which) on
balance, . . . will better serve the public good.”51
“The police judgment underlying the Court’s
recognition of qualified immunities resembles that in the
49Howard, “States and Court,” p. 386.
50Slabach, “Civil Rights,” p. 145.
51Howard, “States and Court,” p. 395.
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absolute immunity cases: ‘It is better to risk some error
and possible injury from such error than not to decide to
act at all.’”52 Outside of legislators, judges, and
prosecutors, all other officers may claim only qualified
immunity; police officers are among those who may make such
a claim. Additionally, such immunity would permit use of
the good faith defense in that they thought their action
was in fact constitutional and that they merely “.
incorrectly predicted the future course of constitutional
“53law.
Such rationale is exemplified by Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents54 in which a citizen’s constitutional
rights were clearly violated, the defendant’s were absolved
on the belief that their actions were constitutionally
subjective. The
trier of fact must decide that the officer’s
belief was reasonable, albeit mistaken. The
significant expansion of the defense was that the
police officer might not be liable because he
believed he had probable cause even though he
lacked probable cause for his actions.55
The issue of qualified immunity was somewhat
52Scheuer v. Rhodes 416 U.S. 232 (1974) in Howard,
“States and Court,” p. 103.
53Howard, “States and Court,” p. 402.
54Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d
1339(2d Cir., 1974).
55,,
Suing the Lawbreakers, p. 784.
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reconciled with Owen v. City of Independence56 in which the
chief of police was dismissed by the city manager. The ex—
officer claimed the dismissal violated his Fourteenth
Amendment rights on the basis that it deprived him of a
liberty interest. The federal circuit court held the city
was entitled to qualified immunity from liability; the
Supreme Court held the city is not entitled to immunity
under sec. 1983 for constitutional violations.57 Its
rationale was that a municipality may not invoke the good
faith defense to absolve its officials for this in effect
would remove the victim’s remedy for municipal wrongdoings.
Although the Owens ruling may prove to be costly through
the imposition of money damages, the court believed “. .
since it is the public at large that benefits from
government activities, it is proper that the public at
large be responsible when government infringes individual
rights.” The second principle in this ruling was
deterrence as officials realizing that the municipality
will be liable for injuries, whether the official acted in
good faith or not, the officials “. . . will have an
incentive to err on the side of protecting citizens’
,,58rights.
56Owen v. City of Independence 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
57Slabach, “Civil Rights,” pp. 140—41.
58Howard, “States and Court,” p. 104.
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Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, the court
has to revert to the time of the alleged violation and find
the appropriate law to “. . . determine whether the
defendants conduct violated a clearly established
constitutional right as of that time.”59 This decision
makes the intent of the defendant irrelevant and further
inquiry unnecessary as it provides a vehicle to dismiss
60sec. 1983 cases for failure to state a claim.
The tendency of the court has been to hold a city
liable for the negligence of police officers. Briefly, if
in the line of service an individual policeman commits some
act of negligence whereby a citizen is injured, the
municipality is liable for the individual act. However, in
regards to excessive force, the municipality in most cases
has not been held liable for injuries. The courts have
justified excesses as the enforcement of an officer’s duty.
In order for a municipality to be held liable it must be F
shown that the policeman did something he was in fact
authorized to do and if done in a proper manner would have
been lawful. It has been evidenced that even knowledge of
the violent character of an officer does not make the
municipality liable. 61
59Glen Lenhoff, “Federal Courts and the Decline of
42 U.S.C. 1983,” Michigan Bar Journal 64 (June 1985) :533.
60Ibjd
61Lichty, “Redress Against Sovereignty,” p. 12.
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The test utilized particularly for police
misconduct has been “deliberate indifference” as
established by Estell v. Gamble62 which is a display of the
reckless or gross negligence of civil standards. This test
is applicable to cases where the supervisory official knew
“. . . or had imputed knowledge of, a past pattern of
unconstitutional police behavior and did nothing about it.”
Therefore the burden on the plaintiff is to show training
was nonexistent or inadequate which would imply
acquiescence to the continuing pattern of police
misconduct.63 The landmark case in discernment of the
extent of supervisory involvement is Rizzo v. Goode.64 In
this case, a number of individuals and organizations in
Philadelphia accused the Mayor, City Managing Director, and
the Police Commissioner of Philadelphia of authorization
and encouragement of a “pervasive pattern of illegal and
unconstitutional mistreatment of citizens.”65 The district
court found that constitutional rights had, in fact, been
violated in an “‘unacceptably high number of instances’”
and that the official policy as through custom of the
department was: to discourage filing of complaints,
62Estell v. Gamble 429 U.S. 97 (1976)
63 ,, •Kramer, Sword and Shield, p. 78.
64Rizzo v. Goode 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
65”Notes on Rizzo v. Goode: Federal Remedies for
Police Misconduct,” Virginia Law Review 62 (1976):1260.
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minimal consequences of officers’ acts, and resistance to
disclose the disposition of the complaints. Although the
Constitution does not provide citizens with a right to
improved police procedures, the lower court ordered the
city officials to submit a comprehensive program for
increased police response to complaints by the citizens
according to the following guidelines: (1) detailed
revision of police manual specifically outlining police
conduct in public relations, unnecessary use of force and
property damage when processing suspects, (2) procedural
revisions in the process of complaints such as availability
of forms, investigation and adjudication of nonfrivolous
complaints, a provision of a forum in which complainants
may be heard and prompt notification of the latter on the
outcome.66 The Third Circuit upheld the appropriateness of
the injunction as a remedy to stem recurring violations,
the Supreme Court reversed. The basis for the reversal was
absence of sufficient case or controversy between
respondents and officials to substantiate injunctive
relief, officials who are not actively promoting civil
rights violations do not come under purview of sec. 1983
and “. . . principles of equitable restraint and federalism
barred the massive interference in police operations
required by the district courts injunction.”67 Although a
66Ibid
67”Notes on Rizzo,”, p. 1261
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pattern of police violations of civil rights was evidenced
in the case, the defendant’s relationship to that was not
clearly displayed. “The petitioners could not show that
there was any direct participation by supervisory personnel
which encouraged, implicitly authorized, approved, or
acquiesced to the alleged misconduct.”68 Liability based
on supervision and public responsibility to eliminate
police misconduct was rejected in Rizzo in accordance with
the inapplicability of sec. 1983 to the doctrine of
69 .respondeat superior. Therefore action against the police
cannot be predicated on lack of supervision even when such
supervision or training is negligent thereby preclusion of
sec. 1983 suits in which the only official action was
• 70inaction.
A nexus could have been established to substantiate
case or controversy if the individual officers involved
would have been named. The court held that police
officials do not cause brutality through mere acquiescence.
Also lacking was the existence of a statute which could
establish the likelihood of a resultant injury. The
absence of unconstitutional statutes, affirmative policy or
plans precludes upper echelon officials from being joined
68Kramer, “Sword and Shield,” p. 77
69,, •Suing the Lawbreakers, p. 784.
70Kramer, “Sword and Shield,” p. 77
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under sec. 1983 in accordance with the “threshold statutory
liability” test. In Rizzo,
(T)he court did not deny that a policy existed, but
rather focused on the nature of the policy. In
essence it drew a misfeasance—nonfeasance
distinction: liability attaches when a police
department as a matter of policy violates
constitutional rights, not when it simply refused
to correct violations.7’
Injunctive relief as a remedy to stem the tide of
police discretionary use of techniques has been utilized by
many litigants. The advantages of injunctions were
72outlined in Lankford v. Gelson: (1) they are directed to
top police administration as opposed to a few officers, and
by extension to the entire police force especially when a
municipality is sued, (2) it is directed to continuing
patterns of police violations rather than on isolated
incidents, and (3) police departments are encouraged to
check discretion by making it more effective through
“administrative rulemaking.”73 However, in light of “.
comity and federalism . . . the availability of broad
mandatory injunctions against police departments . . •“ is
limited.74 The juridical procedure to discern statutory
71”Notes on Rizzo,” pp. 1264—65.
72Lankford v. Gelson 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
73Lawrence Sherman, “Suing the Police,” Criminal Law
Bulletin 15 (March/April 1979) :168—71.
74Michael Seng, “Municipal Liability for Police
Misconduct,” Mississippi Law Journal 51 (March 1980):25.
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authority for an injunction has been based on the merits of
a case. In the Hague case,75 an injunction against Jersey
City officials who prevented C.I.O. organizers from
distributing leaflets and. public assemblage, was upheld.
Respondents in Rizzo had relied upon this ruling in their
claim for an injunction but the court distinguished Hague
as involving a “deliberate policy” of city officials in
denial of constitutional rights. The companion case that
formulated a base for the claim was Allee v. Medrano76 in
which injunctive relief was appropriately invoked where a
“‘pervasive pattern’” of police misconduct was shown. In
Allee, Texas Rangers enforced unconstitutional laws against
union pickets by consistently harassing them. The court
invalidated the claim not on the question of a pattern for
that was evidenced, but rather that the defendants could
77 rnot be linked as playing an “affirmative part.” The
inapplicability of Hague and Allee in police brutality
suits served to strengthen the requirements to attain
injunctory relief, in addition to the stringent standards
for proving the official’s role in unconstitutional
actions.
The respondeants in Rizzo v. Goode argued that they
75Hague v. C.I.O. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
76Allee v. Medrano 416 U.S. 802 (1974).
77,, Notes on Rizzo v. Goode, p. 1262.
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sought vindication of the right of “. . . ‘people living in
- a democratic society to be free from repeated patterns of
unconstitutional, illegal, and unjustified exercises of
police power.’” The court held that right may exist but it
does not substantiate mandatory relief through injunctive
remedies.78 Federalism evoked the enjoinment of state
officials in this case as determined by the nature of the
said violation.
Although the court has issued injunctions against
the police in some cases, such as Lyons to stop the use of
strangleholds, the overall effect of this method has been
slight.79 The result of the Rizzo case was to narrow the
use of injunctions as it restricted the lower federal
courts issuance of them as a judicial remedy to police
brutality. The limitation of an effective means to deal
with patterns of police abuse shows how police “. .
organizations have taken over our society at the expense of
,,80the individual.
The constriction on injunctive relief coupled with
qualified immunity as a basis for dismissals illustrates
the retreat of sec. 1983 which has coincided with the
general upswing of political conservatism in the United
78Ibid., p. 1263.
79Lyons v. City of Los Angeles 101 S.Ct. 333
(1980)
80 ,, •Sherman, Suing the Police, p. 168.
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States.8’ Prior to 1982, a defendant had to prove that his
acts were not malicious or unreasonable. As a result of
the Harlow ruling this requisite has been altered by the
insinuation that a defendant enjoys qualified immunity
where his “. . . actions do not violate a clearly
established constitutional right as of the time of the
defendants actions.”82 This defense has served as a
powerful weapon by local officials in sec. 1983 cases.
Rulings such as the aforementioned exemplifies the present
paradox of sec. 1983: the expansion of types of cases
qualified for review along with a narrowing of the scope of
42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. The lower courts have recognized that
“almost any common law tort committed by an individual
officer as well as systematic conduct may be viewed as a
constitutional violation. •,,83 Accordingly, there has
been an “‘. . . impressive flood of litigation against
state officers in the federal courts.’” Approximately one
out of every three cases “. . . were civil rights suits
claiming constitutional protection against state and local
officials.”84 The high proportion of sec. 1983 claims
has been the court’s basic rationale for the current
81Lenhoff, “Decline of 1983,” p. 536.
82Harlow v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 800 (1982) in
Lenhoff, “Decline of 1983,” p. 533.
83Slabach, “Civil Rights,” p. 147.
84Howard,”States and Courts,” p. 379.
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constriction of its applicability. The increasing volume
of suits have precipitated a liability insurance crisis;
yet, most suits fail because of their frivolous nature,
lack of research, and litigatory difficulties. Most police
cases involve false arrest, excessive force, and physical
brutality. Nominal effects of the suits have been the
precipitation of policy making oriented to defense of civil
suits, some means to review public complaints, statutory
immunization, and a decrease in unnecessary arrests. These
claims have yet to be put to any type of systematic
85 .testing. In order to provide an incentive to initiate
sec. 1983 claims, the successful sec. 1983 plaintiff can
claim attorney’s fees under the Civil Rights Attorney Fees
86Award Act of 1976. Such a statute was thought necessary
in order to enable poverty stricken Americans to vindicate
their constitutional rights.”87 However, defendants’
attorneys can claim their fees in areas where they have
prevailed and the invocation of the Frivolous Rule which
allows the exclusion of fees for time spent on unsuccessful
88claims, as contrived in Hemsley v. Eckerhart, has
diminished the attraction of sec. 1983 suits.
85 ,, •Sherman, Suing the Police, P. 171.
86Codified as 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 Pub. L. No. 94—599,
90 Stat. 2641 (1976) .
87Lenhoff,”Decline of 1983,” P. 536.
88Hemsley v. Eckerhart, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983).
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In the court’s eagerness to dispose of civil rights
claims they devised a formula which puts the focus on the
states to deal with compensatory cases. The court held
that the 1983 statute merely guarantees a forum in which
constitutional violations can be heard, not necessarily
rectified. The rationale was formulated in Paratt v.
Taylor89 in which procedural due process was distinguished
from substantive due process in that only the former is
applicable to sec. 1983 claims. Procedural due process is
a claim of deprivation of property or liberty without the
due process of law. It is only in denial of proper
procedure that a constitutional violation can be
asserted.9° If the plaintiff has state laws or alternative
remedies for redress of defendants’ alleged misconduct,
they are not denied due process.
According to the court, . . . the fourteenth
amendment outlaws deprivations of life, liberty and
property without due process, a plaintiff pursuing
such a claim under Section 1983 does not state a
cause of action if adequate alternative remedies
exist for the redress of a loss.”91
If a tort remedy exists or a forum in which one’s claim of
deprivation can be entertained then by the nature of
availability, one’s due process rights are not violated.
The reasoning in Paratt served to relegate procedural due
89Paratt v. Taylor 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
90Lenhoff, “Decline of 1983,” p. 534.
91Penland, “Section 1983,” p. 699.
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process claims to state courts and outside the confines of
sec. 1983. This rationale is evidenced in Hudson v.
Palmer92 which concerned the destruction of prisoners’
property by a guard. The court held the inmates’ sec. 1983
claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim and
the availability of state tort remedy. Now “neither
negligent nor intentional . . . deprivations of property
can be asserted under sec. l983.”~~ Here, as well as
Paratt, the mere existence of a tort is enough to satisfy
due process. For one “. . . only (has) a right to an
opportunity for a due process hearing at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.”94
In addition to limiting access to federal courts
for such claims, the court also fortified the requisite
standards to recover for damages. A person who causes said
deprivations is liable; however, “. . . the Court concluded
that compensatory damages are not to be presumed; rather
plaintiff must plead and prove damage.”95 Such damages
that have to be shown are: “deliberate indifference,
namely actual intent or recklessness.”96 The intent
92Hudson v. Palmer 52 U.S.L.W. 5052 (1984).
93Lenhoff, “Decline of 1983,” p. 534.
94 ‘
Court s reasoning from Paratt in Penland,
“Section 1983,” p. 699.
95Ibid., p. 672 from Carey v. Piphus 435 U.S. 247
(1978)
96Penland, “Section 1983,” p. 696.
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standard was revitalized in Williams v. Vincent in which
- the court distinguished “purely innocent acts” that may
somehow be transposed into civil rights violations as not
under the purview of Section 1983 action. The test invoked
to ascertain individual liability was a determination of
the behavior as that which “‘shocks the conscience.’”97
The court has recently considered a statute of
limitations on sec. 1983 in their continuing efforts to
delimit claims. In Wilson v. Garcia98 they first
characterized sec. 1983 alleged offenses as those involving
personal injury which is inclusive of one’s civil rights as
a part of the individual. “The Court read the fourteenth
amendment as a mandate that all persons shall be accorded
the full privileges of citizenship. The court then
reasoned that ‘ (a) violation of that command is an injury
to the individual rights of the person.’”99 It further
held that since personal injury cases are often addressed
through tort law, they would let the state apply the
relevant law to the sec. 1983 violation to determine its
relevance and utilize the time limitation given by that
97Williams v. Vincent 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974)
in Dirk Plessner, “A Step Toward Simplification with 42
U.S.C. Section 1983,” University of Toledo Law Review 18
(Fall 1986) :250.
98Wilson v. Garcia U.S. 105 S.Ct. 1938 (1985).
99Plessner, “Simplification with 1983,” p. 242.
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state law. If, however, the closest related statute cannot
be applied, the state will then rely on its residual
statute. This procedure has led to lengthy debates on
characterization of the appropriate statute that would
maximize the plaintiff’s most beneficial limitation period.
Although Congress is aware of the problem, they have not
legislated to solve it, thereby leaving it to the states to
establish their own “. . . limitations consistent with
internal state policy.”100 The court could have
established uniformity for internal and interstate cases by
“articulating one limitation period for all circuits in
,‘lolSection 1983 Civil Rights claims. Uniform
characterization falls short of promoting consistent
standards, for plaintiffs can now choose state or federal
forum.
The court’s consignment of sec. 1983 claims to
lower courts within the state’s jurisdiction has brought
the purpose and efficacy of the statute full circle. The
rationale for addressing 1983 claims in federal court as
opposed to the states encompasses the panoply of problems
in which it is now confronted with: jury bias, inadvisable
defense, qualifiable municipal liability, and the





aforementioned will now be investigated in relation to the
claim that sec. 1983 is not efficient enough to deal with
police excessive use of authority.
The plaintiffs in suits against the police are at
an inordinate disadvantage from the outset as their word is
pitted against one who upholds the law. In theory, the
local prosecutor can take action against cops accused of
anything from simple assault to murder, in practice it is
often difficult if not impossible. The prosecutor is in a
position where they have to depend on the police for their
investigations and in many instances are actual comrades
with them. It has been found that a prosecutor will offer
to drop the charges against a person if they will sign a
statement promising not to bring suit against the police.
A prosecutor is limited by being unable to condition a
voluntary dismissal of a charge upon a stipulation by the
defendant which is designed to forestall the latter’s civil
action.’02 On the other side, the defense attorneys used
are employed by the municipality. They are regarded as
experts in police procedure and often “make a pretrial
determination that the officers acted correctly.” The
district attorneys also socialize with the police and tend
103to inculcate the locker room versions of police duties.
‘°2Phi1 Smith, “Why Cops Get Away with Murder,”
Student Lawyer ABA 9 (March 1981) :41.
103James Fyfe, “The Expert Witness in Suits Against
Police” Pt. I, Criminal Law Bulletin 21 (May/June 1985):21.
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A major problem in police abuse litigation is
drawing the line between reasonable and excessive force as
based on the manner in which the alleged abuse took place.
The versions offered by the plaintiffs and defendants are
usually radically different, “and testimony that
corroborates the story of either side is often unavailable
because ‘few arrests, searches, or uses of force occur in
the presence of disinterested witnesses!’”04 When
interested witnesses can be found, depositions are used to
impeach them through extensive questioning.
Juries, the most critical determinate factor in
1983 cases, are found to be biased in such cases. The
media portrayal of the police, coupled with the middle-
class status of most jurors tends for decisions to favor
the police. Through preemptory challenges, Blacks and any
one else who has had any altercation with police, are
removed from being prospective jurors. The jurors’ frame
of reference of the police is more a result of “art and
instinct than on systematic knowledge, . . . they view
police work as an unending series of instant life or death
decisions.” This “‘split—second syndrome’” suggests that
any evaluation of the officers is unfair second
guessing.105 Furthermore, since no two situations are
104,, Suing the Police, p. 801.
105 ~, •Fyfe, Expert Witness, p. 247.
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alike, officers need discretion to respond on an ad hoc
basis; therefore, any action an officer takes should be
approved since they are adequate judges of correct action
as based on their training. The consequences of reliance
on such split—second decisions is that they are accompanied
by negative results.’06 Plaintiffs in such cases are
usually minorities or have a previous record of infractions
with the law and are thereby deemed as undesirable. Since
the plaintiffs are rarely totally innocent” it is difficult
for the jurors to empathize with them. There is also a
lack of clarity on the major issue of whether the degree of
force exercised was excessive or appropriate based on the
circumstances in which it was employed.
Police credibility plays a most important role,
even in the face of a record of repeated abuses and
incredulous behavior, the officer’s action will somehow be
vindicated. Also, the officer is not likely to admit his
mistakes and rarely will an officer use excessive force
“. . . against the middle—class who are able to articulate
,,107their grievances convincingly. Plaintiffs are not as
impressive as police with their letters from appreciative
citizens, and who have been trained to testify. The issue
becomes subjective analysis of officers’ character as
106 Ibid.
107”Suing the Police,” passim.
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opposed to whether the officers defaulted on their duties
and exacerbated situations, thereby being depicted as
victims in the hands of criminals. These claims are
evidenced in the relatively small number of suits actually
heard, even fewer cases won and the monetary amount of
awards. It has been found that “. . . the average Black
plaintiff received from the jury less than one half the
amount won by the average white.”08
Present Trends
The promise of a guarantee to life and liberty
became binding on state and local governments through the
Fourteenth Amendment. This nationalization of civil rights
took place between 1961 and 1969 through Supreme Court
interpretations of the Constitution. The present Attorney
General, Edwin Meese, has on several occasions attacked the
Supreme Court’s incorporation theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment as “constitutionally suspect” in that the state
has been held accountable for procedural due process
infractions. Meese has held that the courts have abrogated
the autonomy of local entities and heralded criminals
through their rulings. However, upon close examination,
one will note that the cause of civil justice is suffering
by the present constriction of rights and the expansion of
police discretionary powers as consistent with an ultra—
108 ,,Fyfe, Expert Witness, p. 247.
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conservative nation-state. The following remarks are in
attempt to exemplify these claims through cursory
examination of the court’s rulings on due process as they
relate to the aggrandizement of police powers.
Meese’s call to the courts to interpret the
Constitution as closely as possible to the ideas and
purposes of its framers is not based on concern for
judicial philosophy but for political results.
Conservatives once relied on the courts to protect property
rights against regulation by progressive majorities in
state legislatures and Congress,
(n)ow they hope to restrain ‘the unfettered and
inevitably arbitrary wills of an elite few . . .‘
so that democratic majorities in the states can
presumably restore prayer to the schools, restrict
abortion, suppress pornography and fill the jails
to overflowing. Since these social issues would
largely fall under the control of the states, the
attack on activist judges also clothes itself in
the garb of federalism.’09
The rulings issued by the Supreme Court affecting the
police give the impression that they somehow have control
over police functions. Many rulings that free criminals
are technical and have little to do with deterring police
abuse.’1° They “. . . merely provide that if the police
propose to set the criminal process into motion, then they
must proceed in certain legally restricted ways . •“ that
109 ,, •Rakove, Mr. Meese, Meet Mr. Madison, p. 77.
110Taylor, “Who’s Right About Constitution,” p. 19.
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are only deemed illegal when offended citizens seek civil
111redress.
Meese refers to the exclusionary rule which would
forbid inclusion of evidence obtained unconstitutionally as
established in Mapp v. Ohio”2 as only helping the guilty
criminal and purports abandonment. The original intent of
the framers was to ban all unreasonable search and seizures
and to prevent the use of one’s personal property, even
when obtained by subpoena, to be used as evidence in a
conviction.113 In fact, one can note that the Warren’s
court restriction of power is “. . . a pale remnant of
,,114expansive rights. . . . The present court has severed
the term reasonable to edifice a number of instances in
which officers cannot only search a person, but seize their
property (with or without a warrant) and use the evidence
found for conviction. Justification for which is based on
the deterrence rationale in the “good faith of an officer
in execution of their duty as exceptions to the
exclusionary rule. The court held in Illinois v. Krull”5
111 ,, •Egon Bittner, Self—Defined Dessert, in Terry,
Policing Society, p. 97. Brennan, “Bill of Rights and
States,” p. 6.
112Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
~3Tay1or, “Who’s Right About Constitution,” p. 20.
114
Ibid.
~5Illinois v. Krull 107 S.Ct. 1160 (1987)
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that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to evidence
obtained by the police acting in good faith. This ruling
was held to support “technical violations” such as acting
on a statute that is declared invalid later on. If an
officer is acting
in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute
authorizing warrantless administrative searches
that was subsequently found to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment he would be relinquished from
responsibility. The court reasoned that the
application of the exclusionary rule would have
little deterrent effect on future police
misconduct,’16
it thereby resigned itself to determining what evidence is
permissible to effect a conviction. The court considers
the circumstances in which evidence was obtained as
violations of the Fourth Amendment if they are “.
willful and prejudicial to the accused . . . regardless of
117 Lthe good faith of the individual officer. . . .“ The
tests are quantitative in that they measure degrees of
deviation from legalities: extent it was willful, extent
of privacy invaded, and whether or not the evidence would
have been disclosed without the violation.”8 The doctrine
used to decide whether fingerprints, confessions, etc. are
subjected to suppression due to an illegal arrest is known
116Criminal Law Bulletin 23 no. 5
(September/October 1987): 43.
117 .Frank W. Miller et aL, The Police Function
(Mineola: Foundation Press, 1982), p. 563.
118 Ibid.
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as the fruit of the poisonous tree)’9 In this vein of
logic, the court evades the dispute over the extent of
police authority, as the question is not abstract propriety
of police conduct, but admissibility of evidence.
Police methods to attain evidence is the area that
their discretionary powers have led to blatant abuse of
civil liberties. Case-by-case analysis by the court has
given license to continuation of such practices as police
merely seek innovative techniques to maintain daily
procedures. Police have evaded the search restriction
imposed by Mapp12° through concoction of any story that
would illicit some basis for “probable cause.”2’ The
Fourth Amendment protects security of persons and thereby
requires weighty public interest, i.e., enforcement of
criminal laws before government agents are allowed to
search or seize. The test for probable cause is
determination of
facts and circumstances within their (the
officers’) knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient
in themselves to warrant . . . the belief that” an
~9Debra Palmer, “Constitutional Law——Confessions
Evidence Obtained Pursuant to an Illegal Arrest is
Inadmissible at Trial--Taylor v. Alabama,” Black Law
Journal 8 (1983):352.
120Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.s. (1961).
121George E. Berkley, The Democratic Policeman
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 123-24.
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offense has been or is being committed (.by the
arrestee) 122
The requisites for probable cause have steadily increased
until now they are assessed under the “totality of
circumstances approach” which deems the concept as “fluid
• . • not readily or even usefully reduced to a neat set of
legal rules . . . and that with respect to searches, it
requires only that there be ‘a fair probability that
,,,123contraband or evidence of a crime will be found. In
wake of such retrenchment, the court is still unwilling to
overrule Mapp and continue to engraft exceptions that may
actually be incentives to search unsupported by adequate
probable cause. For instance, the test required for
issuance of warrants to verify probable cause was based on
knowledge of informant as credible or reliable, to
acceptance of information provided by an anonymous
• 124 •informant. The veracity of the informant is no longer
required, now only relevant considerations are used. The
totality of circumstances analyzes common sense to deduce
fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found, on an individual case basis, after the
‘22William Mertens, “The Fourth Amendment and the
Control of Police Discretion,” University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform 17 (1983—1984) :523—24.
l23iiiii v. Gates 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983).
124 ,,John McLaren, A Lawyers Guide to Search




The necessity of warrants which signifies a
magistrate’s collaboration of probable cause was further
eroded with the Terry opinion.’26 The court held that the
U.S. Constitution has recognized that under some
circumstances, an officer may detain a suspect briefly for
questioning in absence of probable cause. If a search or
seizure is found to be reasonable, as judged by a balancing
test, then probable cause does not need to be shown. The
Terry opinion thus opened wide the door to an unpredictably
diverse array of police practices that might now be
permitted.’27 The court was thus put in the position to
balance public interest in law enforcement as opposed to
the individual’s right to be left alone. The line is drawn
if the search “confer(s) too broad a discretionary
authority on the police.”28
Field interrogations and search and seizures are
theoretically based in crime prevention. Historically
police practices have condoned aggressive prevention
patrols in order to let the community feel the presence of
the police.’29 Studies on law enforcement have cited the
‘25McLaren, “Lawyers Guide to Warrants,” p. 9.
126Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968).




practice as the source of community complaints, for misuse
produced friction, even riots. Such activity provided the
background in which the court ruled in Terry, Mapp, and
Escobedo. However, since then the court has relaxed its
requirements for police justifiability of actions. For
example, regarding inventory searches of autos, the court
held “(t)here was no showing that the police were doing
anything more than following standardized caretaking
procedures.”13° The result is that illegal police conduct
will be allowed on the basis that it technically resembles
permissible enforcement policy. The court will not ban
field interrogations simply because police were abusive, as
they denied efficacy of suppression of evidence when police
have other purposes in mind than prosecution, it is only
when they exceed their bounds that the evidence and its
fruits must be excluded.
The final area under investigation is Miranda:
“‘after decades of police coercion, by means ranging from
torture to trickery, the privilege against self—
incrimination . . . requiring police in every state to give
warnings to a suspect before custodial interrogation.’”3’
Attorney General Edwin Meese would like the court to
overturn Miranda to stop the warnings. The Justice
‘30Colorado v. Bertine 107 S.Ct. 738 (1987).
131Brennan, “Bill of Rights and States,” p. 12.
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Department has even gone as far to prepare substitute
language to encourage confessions and exclude the
provisions for right to counsel.132 It has been found that
informing a suspect of his rights has not appreciably
affected confession rates. Miranda has not even curbed
tactics used by the police during interrogations such as
• showing the suspect fake evidence, putting the
suspect to a phony lie detector test that he is guaranteed
to flunk and making fraudulent offers of sympathy and
,,133help. The court ruled in Taylor v. Alabama that
illegally obtained confessions, only after a warrantless
arrest based on less than probable cause, should be
excluded as fruits of an illegal arrest.’34 Miranda ruling
warnings have been sufficient to attenuate illegal arrests
based on the following factors: “‘ (1) the temporal
proximity of the arrest and confession; (2) the presence of
intervening circumstances; (3) the purpose and flagrancy of
the police misconduct; and (4) the voluntariness of the
,,,135statements. In Colorado v. Connelly, the court found
that state need only prove a Miranda Waiver by a
132Stephen Gillers, “The Meese Lie,” The Nation,
February 21, 1987, p. 205.
‘33Malone, “You Have the Right to Remain Silent,”
p. 367.
134Taylor v. Alabama 102 S.Ct. 2664 (1982).
135 ,, •
Palmer, Constitutional Law, p. 352.
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,,136preponderance of the evidence. In order to discern the
voluntariness of a confession, coercive police action must
be proven. The court has upheld the admission of
statements made to a psychiatrist because the proceedings
in which information was obtained was not criminal
investigation.137 The court did not allow suppression of
statements taken under duress by a plaintiff for they
argued the latter clearly had the right to “. . . choose
between speech and silence.”’38 On tactics used by the
interrogators in which defendant was not fully informed of
the charges against him, “(t)he Court thus found that mere
silence by law enforcement agents as to the subject matter
of an interrogation is not ‘trickery’ sufficient to
invalidate a suspects waiver of Miranda rights.”139
Miranda has persisted . . . because it allows us to
celebrate our values of individualism without
paying any real price. . . (it) stands for the
enshrinement of individual rights over the need of
the state for efficiency, equal justice for rich
and poor before the law, the right to be presumed
innocent, and the demand that the police follow the
law while enforcing it. That it has managed to
fail in any real sense to reform police conduct,
(and) it serves interests opposite to those
intended by its authors.’4°
‘36Colorado v. Connelly 107 S.Ct. 515 (1986), in
Criminal Law Bulletin Vol. 23, no. 3 (May/June 1987) :287.
‘37Allen v. Illinois 106 S.Ct. 2988 (1986).
138Connectjcut v. Barrett 107 S.Ct. 838 (1987).
‘39Colorado v. Spring 107 S.Ct. 851 (1987).
‘40Malone, “You Have the Right to Remain Silent,”
p. 380.
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To effectuate Miranda, a city should be held liable for
abuse of process if an arrest is based on a scheme to
harass, for its ratification by the city makes it directly
involved in an illegal proceeding.141 The mystification of
respondeat superior that holds an official must not only
have knowledge of but direct unconstitutional practices to
be linked to them serves to foster toleration of police
officers by their supervisors “‘. . . who are lying and
covering up misconduct (which prevents us from ever)
,,,142getting to the root of it. In addition, an
articulated policy favoring or promoting police brutality,
a state statute or city ordinance authorizing
unconstitutional conduct would have to be produced to
establish a link between municipal officials and brutality.
Conclusions
Due to the inherent problems and obstacles in
bringing suit against the police, it has been surmised that
civil suits are not an effective deterrent to police
misconduct. If a plaintiff is successful in a sec. 1983
case, the fine is paid by the city as opposed to the
officer; barring suspension or criminal prosecution, the
‘41Michael Seng, “Municipal Liability for Police
Misconduct,” Mississippi Law Journal 51 (March 1986):9.
‘42Remark by J. A. (Tony) Canales, the U.S.
Attorney for Houston in Smith, “Cops Getting Away,” p. 37.
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police are virtually immune from the consequences of their
acts. By returning such suits to a local forum, familiarity
and political pressures curtail the likelihood of verdicts
in behalf of the complainant.
Overall, the police as an institution, have virtual
carte blanche in the performance of said duties and any
attempt to curb their excesses is met with resistance. The
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice recommended in 1967 that the
state legislatures and police departments impose control on
field interrogations, the court has not only invalidated
any restrictions, but expanded such practices.143
In analyzing Supreme Court cases, one may be prone
to herald rulings that, on all outward appearances, are
beneficial to the cause of liberty; however, at closer
scrutinization, the contradictory nature of its decisions
can be seen. The most evident technique for retrenchment
of the courts has been in their formulation of tests,
edified to dispose of civil rights cases. In this chapter,
the legitimation of violence on minorities was evidenced
through such requisites as: “willful intent” of violators,
color of law by the state, patterns of misconduct,
unconstitutional statutes, and overall appropriate standing
to bring suit. The types of relief sought from violence,
143 ,, • ,,Merten, Control of Police, passim.
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short of prosecution, have been: injunctive relief,
declaratory judgment, and monetary awards for damages. The
most utilized has been sec. 1983 in which damages are
awarded for deprivation of procedural processes in police
misconduct cases.
Prior to Monroe, sec. 1983 had only been used
twenty-one times from 1871 to 1920, most exclusively on the
voting rights of Blacks. The intention of the act was to
deter future deprivations and to compensate victims of past
abuses.’44 Although a municipality has been held liable
for official abuse of its citizens, the burden of proof and
the requirement of an “affirmative policy” from the Rizzo
ruling, makes redress claims “. . . a cumbersome and
inefficient process.”45 Furthermore, a pattern of police
brutality has to be found in order to initiate any type of
injunc’-~ •ie relief. The only way a municipality should be
allowed to limit liability is to withdraw completely the
police officer’s power to arrest, for inherent in that
power is official delegation of municipal authority which
makes “. . . his edicts and acts represent official
,,146policy.
144Slabach, “Civil Rights,” pp. 140—41 passim.
145,, .
Notes on Rizzo, p. 1275.
146 ,, •Seng, Municipal Liability, pp. 10-11.
CHAPTER III
POLICE BRUTALITY IN PHILADELPHIA
Philadelphia is being utilized as a case study to
test the extent of police abuse in America. It is
necessary at the outset to construct parameters of the
violence in the city by offering its role in the early
history as fostering a climate for policing excesses.
Secondly, the depth of police brutality is established in
the extensive numbers of cases alleging such activities.
Frank Rizzo is highlighted not only as one who encroached
upon the civil liberties of others but through his antics,
actions, and overall protection from prosecution of his
subordinates encouraged such abuses by police officers.
Due to the overall ineffectiveness of the infrastructural
mechanisms to address infractions of the police, civilian
organizations emerged from the community and City Hall to
facilitate that purpose. The culmination of the
aforementioned efforts were illuminated by the intervention
of the federal government in their attempt to prosecute
city officials for civilian abuse by law enforcers.
Early History
The City of Philadelphia is wrought with a history
113
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of racial conflict. Like most Northeastern cities, the
presence of Blacks in the nineteenth century was viewed as
a threat to the newly arrived immigrants and the “pure”
Americans in economic and social endeavors.1 Blacks and
others as relegated persons were banished to ethnic
enclaves, many of which they still inhabit, formulating in
Philadelphia “a loose confederation of separatist
neighborhoods, each with a distinct lifestyle reflecting
ethnic, race and income levels . . . (that) have little in
common.”2 The institutional ghetto was thus effected by
deliberate policies of the Philadelphia Housing Authority
and private realtors, the politicosocial ghetto was
sustained by Blacks.3 It was widely held that the
impoverishment of Blacks lent to crime in these areas. The
apprehensiveness of whites, and Blacks already established
in regard to the nature of Black migrants was reinforced by
stereotypical accounts that served to create an environment
of suspicion and fear.4 The compendium of these attitudes
‘See Florette Henri, Black Migration: Movement
North (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, Doubleday, 1974) for
a comprehensive analysis of employment and social strife.
2Fred Hamilton, Rizzo: From Cop to Mayor of
Philadelphia (New York: Viking Press, 1973), p. 19.
3 See Spear, Chicago: The Making of a Ghetto for
Discussion. Also “Black Philadelphia: A Troubled
Quarter,” Philadelphia Magazine Vol. 46, no. 12 (December
1958) :12—19, 40—44)
4 Case in point are articles by Robert Abbott in the
Chicago Defender which gave negative depictions of Blacks.
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induced an atmosphere in which police obstru~.ction of the
personal liberties of Blacks was legitimized.
The early function of the police was not only to
maintain peace but often to dole out punishment for alleged
crimes. The type of treatment Blacks received in the hands
of the police was brutal as evidenced in 1743 when a Black
man cut his own throat rather than be whipped by police
officers.5 By the mid-1800s the Philadelphia police, made
up of working class white males, illustrated a readiness
for violence and often competed with the gangs to keep
Blacks off the streets. The law enforcers were also used
as political cronies during elections, as they took pride
in their ability to keep the peace.6 The police became an
agent to monitor and control rebelliousness and often times
a precipitant of violence throughout the Black urban
experience.
The strata of the Black community that was active
in propelling its interests, embellished in majoritarian
terms, was met with resistance from either the governmental
institutions, white community or within the ranks. Over a
period of time the faces and causes have shifted in degrees
but the primary purpose of racial equality for
5Howard Sprogle, The Philadelphia Police, Past and
Present (Philadelphia: 1887), pp. 56-57.
6Roger Lane, Roots of Violence in Black
Philadelphia 1860-1900 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1986), pp. 10—11.
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socioeconomic advancement has remained consistent.
Philadelphia held the first free Black political convention
in 1831 in which Blacks were urged to abandon the word
“colored” and adopt “oppressed Americans.” Also separatism =
was a central theme at this and other pre—Civil War
conventions.7 Additional progressive acts took place in
Philadelphia such as the founding of Black churches, a high
school, and a literary society in the early 1830s. Blacks
were devoted to the underground railroad and had a strong
belief in the unlimited capacity of Black intelligence.
The influx of new Blacks from the South which reached 47.7
percent of the total Black population by 1847, coupled with
8increasing violence led to retrenchment of Black progress.
The lull in cultural achievements became reflective of
their tendency to look back at past acts as opposed to
9continuance of the momentum needed to face adversity.
During the fight for the franchise, proslavery
forces burned down a Black church in 1837. In the
following year an antislavery agitation center was burned
the day after its first meeting. It was reported that
7Charles Blockson, Pennsylvania’s Black History
(Philadelphia: Portfolio Associates, 1975), p. 6.
8William E. B. DuBois, The Philadelphia Negro (New
York: Schocken Books, 1899), pp. 25, 304.
9Terry Gross, “Fresh Air.” Dr. Allan Ballard,
author of One More Day’s Journey (New York: McGraw Hill,
1984). WHYY—FM, June 29, 1984.
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the city’s police refused to provide adequate
protection.”° Every fire during those turbulent times had
been an occasion for a small riot in which the police
failed to enforce civil order.” The numerous clashes
between Blacks and immigrants during the 1840s caused state
and federal troops to intervene.’2 August 1, 1842, a riot
was precipitated by a conflict between Black members of the
Moyamensing Temperance Society and a mob of whites. Blacks
living in the area were beaten and their homes were damaged
as windows, doors, and furniture were smashed, which were
in turn thrown into the streets by the mobs. Blacks were
also forcibly removed from their homes and beaten on the
street. Smith’s Beneficial Hall, a Black meeting place,
was burned down. Also the Society of Covenanters, a Black
religious society, was set aflame, “nothing was saved but
,,13the walls.
All ensuing attempts to integrate the city and
elevate the status of Blacks were met with resistance
throughout the next centennial. Helmeted troops had to be
posted throughout the transit system upon the appointment
of Black drivers so that they would be protected from
10Blockson, Pennsylvania Black History, p. 124.
11Lane, Roots of Violence, p. 11.
12Elizabeth Geffen, “Violence in Philadelphia in
the 1840’s and 1850’s,” Pennsylvania History 36 (1969):384.
13Sprogle, The Philadelphia Police, p. 77.
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racist attacks that occurred in August of 1944. As a
result of the Transport Workers Union having to upgrade
Blacks, Federal troops had to contain mobs that tried to
shut down the transit system. It took six days to restore
order.14 “Paradoxically, inter racial tension in
Philadelphia (grew) rather than diminish(ed) as a direct
consequence of Negro advances in housing, employment and
suffrage which (were) ultimately expected to extinguish
these frictions. ,,15
By the 1960s civil disobedience had been a direct
result of the injustices that Blacks had endured.
Philadelphia as. a few other urban areas, witnessed a riot
in August of 1964, which was sparked by an attempted arrest
made by police officers. The police were attempting to
arrest a woman whose car was blocking a major intersection. L
While the woman was being removed, bricks and bottles were
hurled from the rooftops of houses adjacent to the
incident——police reinforcement dispersed the crowd and it
appeared as if the situation was under control. Later that
morning, smashing and looting resumed on Columbia Avenue,
following a rumor that a pregnant woman was beaten and shot
by a white police officer. Disorder continued for the next
few days. The police were so restrained while Blacks
14Philadelphia Tribune, 5 September 1964, also
Allen Ballard, One More Day’s Journey.
‘5”Black Philadelphia,” p. 17.
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damaged their areas that Black leaders called for more
stringent measures to the point of volunteering to be
deputized in an effort to support the police.16 After the
smoke cleared, over 1,300 persons were arrested and
detained illegally. One Muslim, believed to have incited
the riot, was held for $10,000 bail. During the incident,
Robert Green, aged twenty—two and owner of a small business
17in the area, was fatally shot by the police.
The source of tension most prominent in
Philadelphia centers around housing and crime. A plan to
build public housing in a predominantly white area ignited
protests of the residents and the formation of a white
rights group to obstruct construction. The Whitman Park
scandal lasted over a span of twenty years and caused the
city to lose over two million dollars in federal funds for
18public housing for not complying with guidelines. As
Mayor, Frank Rizzo sided with the residents and called for
the formation of a “white rights” group to protect
19themselves from Blacks encroaching into their area.
‘6Lenora Berson, Case Study of a Riot (New York:
Institute of Human Relations Press, 1966), pp. 1, 15—19.
17Philadelphia Tribune, 12 September 1964, p. 12.
18,, City Spending One Million to Prevent
Construction of Whitman Park,” Philadelphia Tribune, 13
November 1976, p. 1.
‘9”Rizzo Promises Fight,” Bulletin, 4 April 1978,
p. 1, and “HUD Says Rizzo Let $19 Million Aid Slip Away,”
Evening Bulletin, 28 August 1980, pp. 13—15.
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In March 1985 the police launched Operation Cold
- Turkey in which over 1,500 people were stopped, searched,
and sometimes arrested for being present at fifty—one
targeted street corners or blocks. The City consented to
an injunction prohibiting such sweeps. In this same year,
after a police officer was killed in a predominantly
Hispanic neighborhood, the police swept the area, hauling
in suspects, searching homes, and harassing family members
of said suspects. “A federal judge found the police
conduct ‘disgraceful’ and issued an injunction prohibiting
further sweeps.”2° As a result of activities on
November 22, 1985, a state of emergency was called that
banned gatherings of more than four in a thirty block white
area. A Black and an interracial couple had moved into
homes in this southwest Philadelphia neighborhood and were
met with rocks, potshots by BB gUns, racial slurs, and an
attempted fire.2’ “Many police officers came to the scene,
but failed to take any action while the two families
huddled inside for hours in fear for their safety.” The
unruly mobs were not dispersed, nor were the persons that
hurled debris at the homes arrested.22 Chuck Stone of the
20Frank Kent, American Civil Liberties Union,
Representative of the Coalition for Police Accountability,
“Report and Recommendations of the Coalition for Police
Accountability,” April 21, 1986, pp. 1—2.
21”Brotherly Fear: Racism Rocks Philadelphia,”
Time, December 9, 1985, p. 34.
22 ,,Kent, Police Accountability, p. 2.
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Philadelphia Daily News commented that this action was
consequential to the 1985 MOVE bombing in that the violence
committed by the city “. . . legitimized violence in other
people’s thinking. ,,23
Current complaints involve the use of excessive
force during apprehension and detention of suspects, which
appears to be utilized as a method to humiliate and harass.
It has been found in Philadelphia, after nineteen hours of
open meetings on brutality, that the arrest process is an
instrument of indiscriminate community control, and,
in some cases, is an expression of an individual
,,24policeman s bigotry. The other area of concern is
ironically enough, the lack of law enforcement as a form of
abuse. The proliferation of open drug sales on
Philadelphia street corners is idly witnessed by the
police. The activities are continuous on a daily basis,
thereby not affording residents any solitude.
It is argued here that racial intolerance and
violence in Philadelphia, is a prerequisite to a climate in
which police brutality is allowed to flourish. It is no
accident that this city is cited as a case study as it had
one of the highest rates of violence and the most
23”Brotherly Fear,” p~ 34.
24 ,, .
Richard K. Bennett, Pennsylvania State Committee
to the United States Commission on Civil Rights,” March
1971, p. 6.
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progressive attempts to counteract such incipient
injustice. This problematic is strongly rooted in the
1700s and came to fruition with the 1985 bombing of a Black
neighborhood. The parameters of police brutality will now
be established followed by the response of the community
and the political structure.
Police Abuse in Philadelphia
Abuse refers to those practices by the police that
are outside the confines of “legitimate police functions of
law enforcement, crime prevention and maintenance of public
order.”25 There are basically two identifiable types of
abuse: “ideological” and routine. Actions aimed at the
suppression of particular viewpoints, organizational
efforts directed towards correcting system deviations
and/or harassment based on alternative life styles
comprises “ideological abuse.” Routine abuse extends from
verbal assaults, unauthorized searches, seizures of persons
or goods, excessive use of force, long detentions up to and
inclusive of “justifiable homicide.”26 The problematic is
two-fold in that not only are people abused but those
responsible for such violence escape any type of reprimand
or prosecution in the majority of cases.
25Frank Donner, “The ~Return of the Red Squads,”
Nation, October 12, 1985, p. 339.
26 ,, ,,Kent, Police Accountability, Appendix A, pp. 1-
2.
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The types and number of brutality cases vary with
the one disclosing such figures. Police records are
inadequate overall for obvious reasons, also it has been
found that the procedure for filing complaints lends too
much discretion for police disposal before an
investigation. It has been alleged that the manner in
which investigators question complainants serves to justify
police actions rather than determine facts.27 The police
do not publish comprehensive statistics as to the number of
complaints received, processed, or cases of alleged
brutalization. The newspapers publish an inordinate amount
of allegations of police infractions, however, it is
difficult to distinguish frivolous claims from legitimate
abuse. The data from the following available sources
found, lend credence to the general theory that although
Blacks are roughly one-third of the general population they
account for over one—half of the complaints and cases of
abuse.
From 1950-1960 the Homicide Unit of the
Philadelphia Police Department reported thirty-two cases
resulting in death. The medical examiner’s inquest
exonerated the officers involved in thirty cases on the
grounds that death was d.ue to justifiable homicide. In two
cases the officers were subjected to a grand jury
27”Feds Bring Brutality Suit in Philadelphia,”
Police Magazine, November 1979, p. 28.
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investigation, they were then tried and found not guilty.28
The United States House Commission on police misconduct
found in “Philadelphia from 1960-1970 Blacks constituted 22
percent of the population, 37 percent of those arrested,
,,29and 90 percent of those killed by police. Regardless
of the index used, the Negro’s tendency to be a subject of
police slayings is excessive.”30
The Black United Front estimates that in the last
three decades, over seven hundred minorities were killed
and three hundred were injured by the police. Out of these
figures, not one single officer was criminally prosecuted
or suspended from the force.3’ The Public Interest Law
Concern of Philadelphia estimated in the 1970s, as based on
the number of complaints and actual litigation, that over a
five year period, police shot one person a week and 50
percent of the victims were unarmed.32
Extensive abuse by the police has forced the city’s
Black and Puerto Rican communities to live “‘in a pervasive
28Gerald D. Robin, “Justifiable Homicide by Police
Officers,” Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police
Science Vol. 54 (June 1963) :226.
Commission on Police Misconduct, p. 1.
30Robjn, “Justifiable Homicide,” p. 226.
31Hugh King and Lamar Williams produced and
directed “Black and Blue,” an independent film documentary
on police brutality in Philadelphia.
32”PILCOP Report,” Philadelphia Tribune, 20 April
1979, p. 1.
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state of fear.’. . ~ It has been found that 70 percent
of the men who complained of brutality were in fact Black
or Puerto Rican.34 Typical cases are:35 detaining and
arresting persons without adequate probable cause; use of
excessive force in apprehending suspects, such as blows to
the head and body with nightsticks; use of racial slurs and
derogatory terms in reference to minority persons;
detention of persons improperly clothed; refusal to allow
parents to confer with juveniles during initial custody;
threatening persons if any charges brought against officers
for misconduct during arrest that they would be rearrested
and convicted; unauthorized entry into homes, often
breaking down doors or glass of entry way, total disregard
for a person’s belongings during searches. Cases in point
of last claim are: Delores Terry’s home which was
ransacked twice by police looking for a rifle which was
never found, and the home of Rev. Joseph Kirkland was
damaged after he implored the police to cease the beating
33Testimony of Angel Ortiz, Director of the
Philadelphia Office of Community Legal Services, in Bruce
Cory, “Close Look at the Philadelphia Story: Has Rizzo
Regime Encouraged Brutality?” Police Magazine, July 1979,
p. 33.
34David Alpern with Susan Agrest, “Roundhouse
Punches,” Newsweek, July 4, 1977, p. 24.
35These are excerpts from the cases used as a basis
for Council of Organizations on Philadelphia Police
Accountability and Responsibility v. Rizzo, 357 Federal
Supplement, March 14, 1973.
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of Christian Harris.36 The police in pursuit of Richard
Rozanski for a murder he was acquitted of, entered the home
of his mother—in—law without a search warrant and
brandishing arms, began to overturn the furniture and
intimidated the family.37 There are also numerous reports
of people being abused when stopped for traffic violations.
A case in point is William Cradle who was dragged from his
car, after being stopped for running a stop sign, and was
• . battered . . . with night clubs until he dropped to
the ground bleeding and unconscious. • ,,38
Journalists of the Philadelphia Inquirer reviewed
433 homicide cases from 1974-1977 and asked judges to
determine if the interroga.tions were illegal in which they
noted that 80 cases were.39 Suspects have been beaten
utilizing techniques that leave no severe marks, such as:
beating feet and ankles; twisting, kicking, or using
objects to jab testicles; placing a telephone book on
suspect’s head and hammering; pummeling back, kidneys, and
36”Blacks Have Borne Agony of Police Assaults for a
Long Time,” Philadelphia Tribune, Saturday, 16 July 1977,
p. 2.
37Jonathan Neumann and William K. Marimow, “How
Police Harassed a Family,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 25 April
1977, p. 1.
38 ,, • ,,Kiernan, Philadelphia Story, p. 32.
39The following comments in this paragraph are from
Jonathan Neumann and William K. Marimow, series entitled
“The Homicide Files” appeared in the Philadelphia Inquirer,
24, 25, 26, 27 April 1977, cover story and followup.
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ribs. Psychological abuse is used by forcing other
suspects to watch, constant interrogation on an average of
twelve to fifteen hours, and by cajoling and misleading the
suspect either through threats or unkept promises. The
physical abuse was collaborated by hospital records of
suspects after interrogations. One suspect, Leon
Harasimowicz, died before a doctor could attend to his
injuries. In the beating of William Roy Hoskins, there was
sufficient evidence to prosecute four detectives, however,
a decision was made in private, by the Police Commissioner,
District Attorney, and City Managing Director not to
prosecute, instead they were transferred.
Allegations against the police of conduct
reflecting various degrees of the aforementioned are
numerous. More serious are the cases of justifiable use of
deadly force. Other than those cases where police report
self defense or that suspect had committed a felon which
thereby legitimates the use of weaponry, we have: nineteen
year old Cornell Warren arrested on a traffic violation was
shot in the back while handcuffed,4° the killing of Jose
Reyes, a former mental patient was shot in the head, while
standing in the doorway of his home; in this case, the
District Attorney was restrained from issuing a subpoena
for records to investigate. Also, a federal grand jury
4 °H IIBrutality Complaints: Prominent Cases,
Bulletin, 19 August 1974, p. 4.
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refused to indict the officer on criminal charges.41
Harold Brown, shot during a scuffle with police; Ricardo
Smack was “accidently” shot in the abdomen while lying on
the ground;42 Michael Sherard, killed, for running down the
street with a portable television which police suspected
was stolen;43 Andre Carter, caught between a suspected
felon and police was shot twice and paralyzed for life.44
Most other cases follow this same pattern lacking a basis
to substantiate use of deadly force. The circumstances in
most instances are so outrageous they led a Justice
Department official to rate the city’s police force as
“‘the most brutal in the- nation.’”45 Between 1970—1974 the
46police shot 236 people, killing 81 of them. The record
appears to show that a Black man is not supposed to walk
47away from any confrontation with a white officer.
41,, Police Story: Two Hard Towns, Time,
September 12, 1977; also re Reyes 1978, 287 A2d 1011, 36
Pennsylvania Commonwealth 318.
42 ,,
Maury Levy, Right on! Philadelphia s Panthers
are a Lot of Upset Cats,” Philadelphia Magazine, June 1970,
p. 78.
43”Bankrupt Justice Gives Blank Check to Cop,”
Probable Cause 1, no. 4 (December 1976):1.
44King and Williams, “Black and Blue.”
45”Police Story,” p. 29.
46Ibjd
47King and Williams, “Black and Blue.”
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The Role of Frank Rizzo
Overall, as is established, police violence is an
integral part of the Black Philadelphian experience. The
extent of abuse appears to follow a cyclical pattern
underlined by a continuum of such a threat. Alleged
subversions are met with a rise of abuses, when the fear
subsides, there is a disclosure of the practices that
evidences its violation of the norm. As time passes,
general amnesia fosters a climate in which the practices
48are renewed. However, this theory is injected with an
intervening variable indigenous to Philadelphia, i.e., an
enormous increase and sustenance of such abuses during
Frank Rizzo’s tenure as Commissioner and Mayor of the city
from 1960 to 1970, three times as many Black
citizens were killed by policemen as white.
Furthermore, in 1970, the number of blacks killed
showed a dramatic increase, almost double that of
the previous year and more than double the average
from 1960 to 1969.~~
Fomenting a clear connection between Rizzo and abuse has
been a major problematic and has been found to be spurious
at best. However, a compendium of theoretical assertions
along with factual accounts of Rizzo’s actions in regard to
police and encounters with Blacks will be offered to
solidify a causal determinant of Rizzo and police abuse.
48 I,Donner, Return of Red Squads, p. 300.
49Bennett, Pennsylvania Committee on Civil Rights,
p. 7.
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Optimum clarity can be achieved through a bi€graphical
reconstruction of Rizzo and resultant activities as based
on his language, ideas, and their effect.
Rizzo’s background represents an expose of life in
America; for it is only here that a high school dropout
and avowed racist could become the Mayor of a major city
with a high proportion of Blacks. Frank Rizzo grew up in
an ethnic neighborhood in Philadelphia. Rizzo believed
that his people (Italians) had a similar background to
Blacks, for he had no understanding of the Black
experience. According to one of Rizzo’s friends, Danny
Troisi, Rizzo never had any negative encounters with Blacks
during his childhood days, which led Danny to assert that
Rizzo’s racism is probably “based on the short—sightedness
of a policeman. . . . Conceivably being part of the police
department, it’s easy to misplace poverty with a tendency
toward breaking the law. Rich people don’t have to
,,50steal.
Prior to Rizzo’s twenty-third birthday in 1943, he
followed in his father’s footsteps and went into the
Philadelphia Police Department. Rizzo attained a grand
reputation as a foot patrolman, although in all of Rizzo’s
years in the city’s gambling and nightclub center he never
50
Joseph R. Daughen and Peter Binzen, The Cop Who
Would be King--Mayor Frank Rizzo (Boston: Little, Brown,
1977), p. 56.
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made an important rackets arrest.51
On January 16, 1952, Rizzo was promoted from foot
patrolman to captain and assigned to West Philadelphia, a
primarily Black area. It was here that he had full
exposure to the people “he didn’t know very well.” Rizzo
sought to stop gambling, whoring, and bootlegging by
leading raids on a number of Black after—hour clubs,
stores, and even private homes searching for untaxed
alcohol. There was a number of complaints by Black West
Philadelphians.52 Yet some store owners and businessmen in
that District looked upon Rizzo as a “White Messiah-come to
save them from the ravages of hoodlums and stick—up men,
(however) (t)here were so many complaints being filed
with then District Attorney Richardson Dilworth against
Rizzo and his men,” that the D.A.’s office did not know
what do with them.
One citizen, in describing Rizzo said that he
inspired fear. When he walked the street a whole wave of
fear preceded him. All these little guys, small time hoods
were scurrying up alleys when they saw him coming. He was
a real fist—in—the—belly guy. A cold rage would come over
51Ibid., P. 82.
52Based on comments made by Blacks who lived in the
area during that time offered during survey, corroborate
the general dissatisfaction with Rizzo’s tactics.
53 II • • •Greg Walter, Rizzo, Philadelphia Magazine, July
1967, p. 74.
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him; as he appeared to almost go blank and then bang in the
gut, “. . . he had this whimsical way of just clobbering
“54you.
Rizzo was not directly responsible for all the
charges leveled against him. What he was responsible for
was getting his men to emulate him. If the captain could
physically abuse people, search a house without a warrant,
or punch a suspect into a confession, what was to stop
other officers from doing the same thing? The ranks
employed his techniques to impress their supervisor, they
also reflected the values and thinking of Rizzo. As Rizzo
insisted on perpetuating a tough-guy image, he would defend
55his men under the most questionable of circumstances.
It was the methods employed to maintain law and
order and the population it was geared towards which will
be explicated through the following series of events that
gave Rizzo the reputation as being racially insensitive.
On May 1, 1965, NAACP pickets began marching in front of
Girard College to demand the admission of Blacks. The
picketing which was organized and led by Cecil Moore, a
Black criminal lawyer, lasted through the summer and into
the fall of 1965.56 The night of June 24, 1965 witnessed
54Ibid., p. 75.
55Hamilton, From Cop to Mayor, p. 49.
56Philadelphia Tribune, 4 May 1965, pp. 1, 3.
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the inevitable clash of the pickets and the police,
although there was no outbreak of violence, store windows
were broken and two policemen were slightly injured. Moore
asserted that Rizzo acted
“viciously” that night, ordering his men to run
their police motorcycles up on sidewalks to terrify
the crowd. Moore also claims that when (then
Commissioner) Leary protected a Black demonstrator
named George Brower from a police beating Rizzo
deliberately struck his superior on the head.
Rizzo denies this charge.5’
Another instance of Rizzo’s actions was in 1966
when Rizzo was informed that the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee was harboring firearms and even
produced three sticks of dynamite which had detonating caps
allegedly retrieved by the informant. Rizzo organized four
teams of heavily armed police with a reserve of one
thousand, who were to make raids on the four SNCC
headquarters. Only two and a half sticks of dynamite were
found at one of the headquarters, which lacked detonators.
Four persons were arrested and held at $50,000 bail since
dynamite was involved. The charges were dismissed.58
In the aftermath, Black civil rights leaders
jumped on Rizzo. James Forman called him a
“racist” and said he had ordered the raids to
“promote his personal ambitions” . . . SNCC charged
that Rizzo planted the dynamite. Stokely
Carmichael said: “The next time Racist Rizzo
57 Daughen and Binzen, Cop Who Would be King, p. 96.
58Bulletin, 25 June 1967.
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brings his troops into our neighborhood he’s going
to have to answer to all of us.”59
In August 1966 at the height of the Civil Rights
movement, Rizzo was appointed acting Police Commissioner by
Mayor Tate. The white population of the city had been
thrown into paranoia over the Civil Rights movement and
what they viewed as an encroachment of their liberties by
Blacks. In an effort to garner the votes from this sector
of the polity, and allay their fears, a media generated law
and order campaign was launched. Rizzo’s promotion can be
viewed as a result of urban stress in which he purported to
cure increased rebellion by, as he would state it,
“crush(ing) the opposition.” Rizzo appealed to Blacks to
trust American laws and courts for their own protection,
but even the liberals believed the police were corrupt and
60the system was both racist and inhumane.
At each instance of Rizzo’s ascendency, there were
outcries of disapproval from the Black community which were
unheeded. The National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People said that Rizzo was “completely
incompetent,” and that he lacked the “necessary education”
for top police command in addition to a long record of
,,61persecuting Negroes with storm trooper tactics.





Although Tate had used Rizzo for political pu~rposes, he did
believe that he gave the city the best police chief in the
United States. “Rizzo has been my best appointment,
without question. ,,62
The former Police Commissioner Leary had
concentrated on improvement of police hardware. He revised
the entire communication system so that police response
time could be cut to two minutes. Leary also instituted
many effective yet controversial special units. Rizzo
later took the branch method and expanded on those
improvements.63 Rizzo used a World War I tactic which was
used by the French to save Paris by renting buses capable
of carrying fifty armed police at a time. He also
developed a riot squad equipped with powered rifles with
telescopic sights and requested armored personnel carriers
or tanks. Rizzo put integrated patrol cars in Black areas
to decrease tension and increased the size of the K9 units;
ergo, Philadelphia was armed and prepared for any type of
civil disorder.64 Spencer Cox, former Director of the
Philadelphia Chapter of the ACLU said that Rizzo had
launched a “‘gigantic, repressive political surveillance
apparatus . . .“ through 18,000 detailed intelligence files
62Ibid., p. 104.
63Hamilton, From Cop to Mayor, p. 76.
64Ibid.,, p. 73.
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on political activists. The name of any activists believed
to “‘cause trouble . . . (especially) leftist radicals,’”
had their name, address, picture, and rundown on file.65
In September 1967 a poii commissioned by the
Philadelphia Bulletin found that 84 percent of the public
approved of Rizzo’s handling of the police department, with
only a 3 percent disapproval and no opinion by 13 percent
of the public.66 Two months later, on November 11, 1967,
Philadelphia experienced its own mini-Soweto.
A school demonstration was organized to demand more
courses in Black history and culture.67 Although the
students were well behaved, Rizzo stationed about two
hundred policemen around the crowd. Dr. Mark R. Shedd,
then Superintendent of Schools, recalled that the students
“wanted things that weren’t totally unrealistic.
We heard their demands and then went into a
conference session to give them an answer! Rizzo
barged into the meeting furious. He told me he was
going to run my ass out of town!”68
Richard H. DeLone, a. young white administrative assistant
at that time, recalled the incident as a police riot.
65”Secret Files Have Names of 18,000 People and 600
Organizations,” Philadelphia Tribune, July 28, 1970, p. 4.
66Daughen and Binzen, Cop Who Would be King,
p. 130.
67 ,, •Bob Queen, Cross Charges Fly in Philly, The
Afro-American, Philadelphia ed., 25 November 1967, p. 1.
68Hamilton, From Cop to Mayor, pp. 78-79.
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They just beat the shit out of those kids who
offered no resistance. It was a real stampede. I
had seen police brutality before but never at this
level. I saw two cops holding a kid while the
third hit him over the head. I saw a cop break his
billy stick over a kid’s shoulder. They were
really pounding the shit out of them. It was
totally unnecessary and really bloody. Rizzo just
couldn’t keep his finger off the trigger. He
started a police riot. There’s absolutely no doubt
about it.6~
The response of the public and the administration at that
time was split. The then Superintendent Mark Shedd stated
that he did not view any activities that would warrant such
action by the police. People began calling the police
within an hour after the incident praising the role of
Rizzo in quelling the march. Then Mayor Tate, who was
vacationing in Europe at the time, also hailed Rizzo, while
the Black community called for Rizzo’s removal.70
The most notorious raid of civil rights activists
was led against the Black Panthers in August 1970, when
photographers took pictures of the members standing spread
eagle with their pants around their ankles. The police
asserted that the members were ordered to loosen their
pants but they stripped voluntarily, hoping to embarrass
Rizzo who was not present when the raid was conducted, but
was at the Roundhouse (headquarters) planning three




71simultaneous raids on the Panthers. Rizzo cynically
commented, “‘Imagine the big Black Panthers with their
pants down.’”72 Charles Sisco, then age twenty—four, said
that the police had started shooting into the Panther
headquarters demanding that they come out. Rizzo ordered
the raid because an undercover officer reported that
weapons, inclusive of a bomb, were on the premises. All
the furniture and everything else that could be moved was
confiscated by the police.73 People from the community had
gone to the precinct to protest the bail of $100,000 per
member.74 This incident was part of the suit against Rizzo
as being responsible for the manner in which the raid was
conducted but the Panthers were dismissed from the suit for
lack of standing.75
Rizzo’s reputation for overreacting was further
exemplified when over one thousand heavily armed police
were posted throughout the city during the People’s
Constitutional Convention at Temple University during that
71Laurence Giller, “Many Criticize Police Raid on
Black Panthers Center,” Philadelphia Tribune, 1 September
1970, p. 1.
72Lisa DePaulo, “Rizzo for Beginners,” Philadelphia
Magazine, October 1987, p. 135.
73 ,, • I,
Giller, Raid on Panthers, p. 1.
74Pamala Haynes, “Panthers’ Captain Gets Community
Support,” Philadelphia Tribune, 5 September 1970, p. 1.




Although Rizzo asserted that he was trying to
improve relations with the Black community, he was becoming
• . the face of the police state” in the latter
• 77sixties.
• . . No public figure in America has taken a
tougher “law and order” approach to crime and
- dissent than Rizzo. Whether boasting that he would
“make Attila the Hun look like a faggot,”
there has never been any question about where Rizzo
stood. 78
Most of the complaints about Rizzo alleged that he and his
officers had made civil liberty violations by using illegal
searches, utilizing excessive and unnecessary force in
apprehension of suspects, forced confessions, and
discrimination against Blacks. These charges were filed
continuously until he resigned as police commissioner in
February 1971.
Commenting on Rizzo’s overall performance, Philip
Savage, former director of the NAACP for Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, and Delaware, stated:
The tone of his tenure as Commissioner has been
highly anti-democratic, antijudical and more in
line with the way in which punishment was meted out
76 Haynes, Panthers, p. 1.
77 •Statement by William S. Rawis, former Head of
Urban League in Philadelphia, in Hamilton, From Cop to
Mayor, p. 87.
78Bruce Cory, “A Close Look at the Philadelphia
Story: Has Rizzo Regime Encouraged Brutality?” Police
Magazine, July 1979, p. 33.
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during pioneer days . . . Rizzo’s utterances have
made it almost impossible for anyone accused to get
a fair trial. He calls accused persons ‘creeps’
and ‘animals’! These labels tend to prejudge the
innocence or guilt of persons, thereby serving to
undermine our whole judicial process. Those like
Rizzo who tend to inculcate anti—democratic
feelings among uninitiated segments of our
community weaken the democratic process. Rizzo
represents to whites the protection against Black
political takeover--the only barrier protecting
them against barbaric, animalistic actions of
Blacks, the kind of crap whites have been taught to
believe about Blacks. To that extent Rizzo has
been a promoter and exponent of Black hatred. I
don’t believe he is anti-black, personally. I
don’t believe that it’s intended. He’s unaware of
his actions and expressions and he can’t control
them. This tends to promote hatred of stud~~ts,
black radicals and those accused of crimes.
Georgie Woods, a radio personality, remarked during an
interview in 1971, that he thought Rizzo was a “good police
commissioner,” however, there were many mistakes in his
relations with the Black community. “The Black community
wants law and order, but we want it with justice. This
,,80(was) his biggest failing. In 1965, Mr. Woods was
accosted by Rizzo, when Woods had attempted to stop an
interracial fight, and notify the police, Woods was grabbed
by Rizzo and held at gunpoint, “‘Make one move, you black
son-of-a-bitch, and it’ll take thirty-six doctors to put
you back together.’” Woods was subsequently arrested and
charged with inciting a riot. After Rizzo was informed of
who he was, Rizzo said he did not recognize him. “Woods
79Hamilton, From Cop to Mayor, p. 87
80Ibid., p. 72.
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held no grudge against Rizzo for the embarrassing
81incident,” nor did he press charges. The experience and
subsequent view of Georgie Woods is reflective of a cadre
within the Black community. Rizzo’s ascendency to Mayor
would not have been possible without the support of some of
the Black community, the turnout and voting preferences
reflect that Blacks, particularly in the North Philadelphia
82area, had supported Rizzo in both elections.
As a police captain and later Commissioner, it can
be strongly argued that Rizzo’s reputation as a tough cop,
as supported through the aforementioned interactions with
the citizenry, coupled with constant defense of abusive
officers influenced the precipitation of police violence.
It has been found that “(p)ublicly, most police commanders
have been unrelenting in their denials of police brutality.
Privately, many of these same commanders speak of the
excessive use of force by their officers as one of the
,,83worst problems. . . . It is also known that police
disfavor the legal and administrative limits on the use of
violence.84 Police activities are constantly being
81Walter, “Rizzo,” p. 79.
82Edward G. Mekel, Former Deputy City Commissioner,
Sixty-Sixth Annual Report of the Registration Division of
City of Philadelphia, 1971, pp. 1-3.
83Stark, Police Riots, p. 60.
142
influenced by its spokesman, the public, the politicians,
85and news reporters. However, it is the policies of the
chief, spoken and unspoken, that carry the most weight.
Officially the use of excessive force is condemned, yet a
chief eager for arrests, and a desire for political
ascendency, may lead to the allowance of “.
considerable leeway (to officers) if they make enough
arrests.”86 To further propound this issue, the
ineffectiveness of prosecution of police as having little
effect as deterrence for the police know “. . . that their
chances of being caught are small and that their chances of
being convicted are infinitesimal.”87 If they were
indicted, the department’s attitude would be one of
tolerance and tacit approval as evidenced by their
reluctance to cooperate with investigators.88 Rizzo had
utilized the defense of “‘mistaken judgment’” to exonerate
his officers from “blatant and unwarranted actions.”89 To
exemplify the extent to which this issue was personalized
by Rizzo, he once shouted at a Prosecuting Attorney during
85Cooper, Police and Ghetto, p. 4.
86Meredith, “Attacking Roots of Violence,” p. 24.
87 Comment made by George Parry, former director of
the District Attorney’s Police Brutality Unit, in Cory, “A
Close Look at Brutality,” p. 36.
88Ibid
89Hamilton, From Cop to Mayor, p. 49.
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the defense of an officer in court, “‘Don’t get involved
with me or you’ll be worrying about your own rights.’”90
Rizzo enjoyed the unrelenting support of then Mayor Tate,
who categorically denied abuse and backed the police in
“virtually every issue, irrespective of the opposition,” as
based on observations from 1966 to 1969.91
Rizzo as Mayor
The police have been protected from political
pressures through civil service and unionization; however,
they have wielded significant political power through these
channels. Their politicalness, coupled with a belief that
police can prevent crime, has elevated them to a favorable
political position.92 This theory is exemplified by
Rizzo’s use of the police as a political base as reflected
through continual endorsement by the Fraternal Order of
Police. Rizzo also capitalized on the ideological
manipulation of the voters through his law enforcement
experience to catapult him into the mayoralship.
Rizzo’s basic political platform was his call for
law and order which to many of his constituents meant keep
Blacks in line “. . . if they want to kill, rape and rob
90Ibid.
91 Leonard Ruchelman, Who Rules the Police? (New
York: New York University Press, 1973), p. 274.
92 ,, •T. Jones, Police in America, p. 29.
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one another, let them. . • •1,93 Comments were made such as
bring back the electric chair,”. . . I’ll throw the switch
myself” or “. . . the way to treat criminals is ‘Spaco Ii
Capo’ (i.e., break their heads). . . .“ He believed that
the Black Panthers should have been “strung up” and MOVE
run out of the city.94 These comments and media shorts on
Black criminals fueled Rizzo’s ideas which were “.
particularly effective among the white working class whose
neighborhoods border(ed) the black ghettos.”95 Rizzo
became the personification of civil law as he promised
Philadelphians that he was “. . . going to make Attila the
Hun look like a Faggot.”96 “Rizzoism” metered down into
the ranks of the police and was legitimated through
constant denial of police infractions. At the height of
homicides by law enforcers, Rizzo had then Commissioner
O’Neill to investigate and he found no reason to warrant
97disciplinary actions against the officers. It was not
until the United States Attorney General launched an
examination of allegations of abuse that Rizzo conceded to
93Hamilton, From Cop to Mayor, p. 12.
94Southeastern Pennsylvania Chapter of Americans
for Democratic Action, The Sayings of Chairman Frank or I
Never Saw My Mother Naked, United States of America, 1977,
pp. 10—12.
95Hamilton, From Cop to Mayor, p. 11.
96Sayings of Chairman Frank, p. 62.
97Ruchelman, Who Rules Police?, p. 274.
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some misconduct in the ranks.
It had to be the environ of fear in a highly
racially divided city that led to Rizzo’s ascendency; for
his knowledge of municipal government was very limited. In
Rizzo’s mayoral campaign he had a conservative platform as
he was against busing, government subsidized housing, and
increasing taxes. He pledged to improve city services and
bring businesses back to the city in order to stimulate the
economy. Yet “(h)is appearances in city hail were usually
confined to an annual trip to Council Chambers to plead for
a larger police budget.”98
Rizzo had influence on the police and through their
defense he contributed to an atmosphere in which abuse was
condoned; yet, this could not be proven satisfactorily to
the courts. In a class action suit brought against Rizzo
an attempt was made to hold Rizzo responsible for brutality
as commissioner and in subsequent litigation as Mayor.99
In the first case, the Supreme Court reversed the decision
of a lower court which found the policies and practices of
the force inappropriate , not solely on unsubstantiated
respondeat superior but an absence of a pattern of
misconduct)00 In both cases, the courts failed to view
98Hamiiton, From Cop to Mayor, p. 49.
99C.O.P.P.A.R. v.Rizzo 357 F.Supp. (1973) and
United States v. Philadelphia 482 F.Supp. 1248 (1979).
100Tony Jackson, former director of Police
Projection PILCOP, from transcripts of the MacNeil/Lehrer
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police brutality as a consequence of the procedures and
policies of the police department. It has been shown quite
often that Philadelphia’s method of handling complaints is
“‘purposefully fragmented’” which serves to justify police
101excesses. The court held that if a pattern could be
established then perhaps a link could be made to a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In fact what is
needed is a judicial perspective to the organizational
realities of policing and the serious nature of
brutalization before a connection can be established to the
officials in charge.102
Internal Procedures to Oversee Police
Due to the professional aura given to policing, it
is generally held that police should oversee and discipline
themselves. This reasoning was ingrained in the very
structure of the Philadelphia police department as the
discipline function was given to themselves by the Home
103Rule Charter of 1959. The procedure utilized to lodge
complaints is that the individual must first go to any
Report, “Police Brutality,” (356 W. 58th St., New York, NY:
Air Date, August 15, 1979).
‘°“Feds Bring Brutality Suit in Philadelphia,”
p. 28.
102 ,,Frank Anechiarico, Suing the Philadelphia
Police: The Case for an Institutional Approach,” Law and
Police 4 (April 1984):239.
103Pennsylvania Crime Commission, p. 454.
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precinct in the Philadelphia area and see the Operations
Room Supervisor who will record the complaint. There are
no specific forms provided for police misconduct, therefore
a general form is used in which all the pertinent
information is ascertained as to exactly what happened, the
officer’s name, badge number, or the vehicle which can be
utilized to pinpoint the officer. The supervisor then
types a skeleton report and assigns it a number.
Afterwards, the Internal Affairs Bureau is notified, if the
supervisor deems that the complaint is reliable, i.e.,
nonfrivolous and worth investigating. The Internal Affairs
Bureau assigns the complaint another number and will send
someone out to interview the complainant, after the
interview, a determination is made on what type of action
should be taken.104 If Internal Affairs recommends that an
officer be disciplined based on the event, the case is then
referred to the Police Board of Inquiry made up of top
police administrators and an officer of equal rank to the
one accused of wrong doing. It is up to the board to deem
if charges are in fact substantial enough to reprimand the
officer.
It is obvious that blatant problems and
inconsistencies are built into the nature of this
104lnterview with Corporal of Philadelphia Highway
Patrol, January 22, 1988, 34th and Girard Ayes.,
Philadelphia, PA.
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procedural system. The likelihood of a citizen who
underwent abuse, entering a police precinct to make a
complaint against an officer are remote. Secondly, the
Operations Room supervisor has extensive latitude in
determining whether the complaint is legitimate and thereby
deeming reportable value. It has been held that many
verbal complaints remain in that form and unless one
witnessed in fact the officer recording the information,
chances are they will remain unheard. It has been found
that the police tend “. . . to minimize, and seek avoidance
or withdrawal of complaints.”’05 The complaint is usually
subjected to a polygraph and also is questioned in a
hostile environment often with the accused officer there
106based on his right to face the accusor. If the
complaint does make it to Internal Affairs, one is faced
with a new set of problems: small inadequate staff due to
deficient training in investigative techniques and overall
lack of independence. Police rotate time in Internal
Affairs, therefore there is no assurance that the officer
under investigation may not have to work alongside the
investigator.107 The Bureau also lacks written guidelines
that note the disciplinary procedures and role of the
‘05C.O.P.P.A.R. vs. Rizzo 357 F.Supp. 1289.
106
Schwartz, Complaints Against Police, , p. 1028.
107Pennsylvania Crime Commission, p. 24.
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commanders resulting in overlap of functions with the
individual commanding officers.’08 After the Bureau
concludes its investigation, usually comprised of
interviewing the complainant and witnesses, a report is
prepared for the Police Commissioner, in which a history of
previous misconduct charges are deleted. It is solely up
to the Commissioner at that point to determine if the
officer should, in fact, be disciplined.109 The case is
then referred to the Police Board of Inquiry, if evidence
is extremely strong; however, it should be noted that even
at this stage, the Commissioner may cancel a hearing or
drop the charges since the Board is in fact “‘a creature of
the Police Commissioner.’”~~° If the Commissioner
disagrees with the findings of the Board, he can ignore the
recommendations. The procedure offered by the police to
discipline its officers has been deemed inadequate by all
from the magistrates to the citizen except the police
institution itself. The procedure is directed to
departmental violations as opposed to the constitutional
violations of the citizens.111 Finally, if a complainant’s
case does make it through the system, they are not informed
108 Ibid.
109Pennsylvania Crime Commission, p. 472.
110 Ibid.
“Rizzo v. Goode 423 U.s. 362 (1976).
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of the outcome. -
Other methods to oversee and protect civilian
liberties have been the establishment of the Commission on
Human Relations that was created by the Home Rule Charter,
“(t)o investigate, educate, conciliate and enforce laws
that forbid discriminatory practices. In addition, it has
acted to cuench frictions before they get a chance to
start--especially with regard to changing
neighborhoods.”12 The Commission merely referred the
complaints they received alleging misconduct to the Police
Department, for they had no investigatory or enforcement
powers “with respect to such complaints.”~3
In Pennsylvania, the United States Attorney and the
District Attorney have some power to prosecute the police.
In a study of police investigations conducted by the
District Attorney’s office of the Special Community Rights
Division, a clear conflict of interest was found in the
pursuit of such endeavors. The District Attorney is
dependent on the police for investigations which are first
referred to the police department. In addition, the
officers involved will not speak to anyone outside the
police department without the approval of their
114supervisors. If an officer does speak up, it has been
‘12”Black Philadelphia,” p. 19.
113C.O.P.P.A.R. v. Rizzo, p. 1293
114 ,, •Schwartz, Complaints Against Police, p. 1025.
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found that there is a high incidence of perjury, as noted
by the Pennsylvania Crime Commissioner who stated that the
police officer “intentionally gave false statements in
,,115reports and in courts. The problems in getting an
officer to testify against a fellow officer have been
deemed partially responsible for the failure of many police
investigations. The hierarchical structure of the
department reinforces a “‘conspiracy of silence,’” for one
that does testify is labeled a traitor and will be put
under considerable social pressure.”6
There are also policies implanted that impede
checks on the police. The most readily used is the “serious
injury policy” in which the citizen has to suffer severe
physical damage preferably substantiated by hospital
records, to sustain merit for the officer to be
disciplined. The majority of cases that do not meet this
standard are dropped. The complainant’s satisfaction is
used to dispose of complaints on a nonprosecution basis
when police receive some type of reprimand or short—term
suspension, which can be taken out of vacation or sick
115The Pennsylvania Crime Commission Report on
Police Corruption and the Quality of Law Enforcement in
Philadelphia, March 1974, p. 19.
116 ,,Howard B. Klein, Fighting Corruption in the
Philadelphia Police Department: The Death Knell of the
‘Conspiracy of Silence,’” Temple Law Quarterly 60 (Spring
1987) :107—8.
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days. Finally the mutual release policy, when both sides
drop charges against each other, therefore, many cases in
which officers should be reprimanded are “washed out.”117
Serious cases were found where the evidence was inordinate
against the officers yet the District Attorney failed to
prosecute. In addition, the District Attorney’s office
often times does not communicate its decision to prosecute
• 118the police officer to the claimant.
One ambitious effort of the D.A. was the
establishment of the Community Rights Division that was
devised to handle litigation against police. However, this
was viewed as a political ploy to receive the endorsement
of Black Philadelphians for Ed Rendell.~~9 One major
problem confronting them was finding an attorney willing to
handle cases. The head of the division, George Parry, was
subsequently brought in from Buffalo to handle major
litigation.120 However, the overall record of the District
Attorney’s office, inclusive of the division in actual
prosecutions, is not known but based on media accounts and
117 ,, •
Schwartz, Complaints Against Police,’ pp. 1025-
26.
118
C.O.P.P.A.R. v. Rizzo. This practice has been
reformed in that the complainant has access to information.
119 • • •
Interview with Michael Churchill, Director of
PILCOP.
120Adrian Lee, “Delbert Africa ‘Beating’ Case,”
Evening Bulletin, 1 May 1979, p. 9.
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interviews, it is believed to be slight.
Another problem in Philadelphia is “the lack of a
strong training and supervisory system with the objective
,,121of limiting abuse of civilians. The Police
Commissioner denied such conduct exists or even constitutes
a serious problem and therefore has not established a
meaningful procedure to handle complaints against the
officers. There does not exist a method to keep track of
the complaints received and only minor penalties are
imposed on police. In fact, the officers who take the
Fifth Amendment on alleged abuse cases are retained without
penalty. In Goode v. Tate, Judge Fuller held it is a
practice of the police to discourage the filing of
complaints to avoid or minimize the consequences of proven
misconduct. Little or nothing is done by the city to
punish such infractions or to prevent their reoccurrence.
Redress Measures
After a long period of citizen dissatisfaction with
the existing avenues for redress of grievances against
police, the City Council became concerned with “the excess
zeal being showed by policemen in searching houses for
numbers writers——often without warrants, or with warrants
obtained too readily.”122 In response, then Mayor Dilworth
121Public Interest Law Concern, “Summary of Police
Project,” 1978, p. 2.
122Joseph D. Lohman and Gordon E. Mismer, “Civilian
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established the Police Advisory Board as part of his reform
policies to gain support of the city’s minority population.
Sixteen years prior to the founding of the Board there had
not been any instances in which a member of the
Philadelphia police had been disciplined for a wrong done
123to a civilian.
The idea of civilian review boards is unique to the
American experience, for there has virtually been no
attempt to create such boards in continental countries.
Civilians infiltrating the profession to deem police
actions as reasonably justifiable have been viewed as
ludicrous at best. However, if the record shows that the
police are absent an inclination to police themselves when
a citizen complains then civilian investigations are
desirable.’24 This subject addresses the very foundation
of a democracy as it “. . . focuses on the issue of civil
watchfulness and control of the military arm of the
,,125communities.
Overall, the notion has been critiqued in that it
may in fact work against democratization for it puts the
Review in Philadelphia,” in Who Rules the Police, ed.
Leonard Ruchelman (New York: New York University Press,
1973), pp. 46—48.
123Littlejohn, “Civilian Police Commission,” p. 15.
1241bid., p. 14.
125 Ibid., p. 9.
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police on the defense and increases theiralienation. This
will serve to widen the gap between police and the
community in which abuse may in fact increase due to
neglect. Of course, the groups most affected will be the
ones the Board is designed to help, the low income. In
Philadelphia, it is difficult to test those claims as the
Board did not exist long enough for it to be empirically
126scrutinized.
The overall procedure utilized by the Board was to
hold public hearings to investigate each complaint through
information provided by both sides. The Board attempted to
remain objective in its activities, yet two members of the
Board were retired police officers and the other members
127represented various business interests. The Board was
riddled with problems, one was lack of funding and poor
recordkeeping, thereby precluding an ethnic breakdown of
complaints and types. The goal of the Board was to relieve
hostility and resentment against the city government for
wrongs suffered at the hands of the police. It took
referrals from public agencies and organizations and was
able to provide the mayor with useful information on police
practices and individual incidents.’28
126Berkely, Democratic Policemen, pp. 145-46.
‘27Lohman and Mismer, “Civilian Review,” pp. 50-52.
128 Ibid.
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After its first six years the Board reported that
it had received 510 complaints and that over half of them
were withdrawn before the hearing. Out of the remaining
complaints, 156 resulted in findings of proper police
conduct.129 The general consensus of the Board was that
there was “‘no general pattern of officiality condoned
police brutality or discrimination based upon race, creed
or national origin.’”130 In those cases where a police
officer may have been found at fault, the Board did not
have the power to subpoena that officer or initiate any
131type of action to enforce its decision. Many
complaints were withdrawn because of the delay in
completing investigations. Seventy—two percent of all
complainants were non-white although Philadelphia’s
population was almost three—fourths white.”32 The Police
Advisory Board developed its own “modus operandi
empirically,” which was basically to submit their findings
to the Police Commissioner who had the sole authority under
the charter to discipline the members; the consideration of
civilian complaints was a role thrust upon it.’33 The
129Berson, Case Study of Riot, p. 51.
‘30Lohman and Mismer, “Civilian Review,” p. 57.
131 Ibid.
132Littlejohn, “The Civilian Police Commission,”
p. 12.
133Spencer Coxe, “Police Advisory Board: The
Philadelphia Story,” Connecticut Bar Journal 35 (June
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Board’s recommendations included: suspension with loss of
pay, departmental reprimand, letters of apology, and
punishments. The counsel for the police usually argued the
officer was merely carrying out orders and the department,
not officer, should be on trial. In this instance, the
Board could have been used to clarify and improve the
policy as well as redress of wrongs.134
The problems with the Police Advisory Board stemmed
from the unanticipated ancillary functions such as go
between the police and the citizen. This put the Police
Advisory Board in a position to explain the powers of the
police to the citizens. First the complainant had to
initiate the process, present the case, and solicit a
response from the police. The citizen had the burden of
proof and was unrepresented by council. Due to the lack of
financial support the services that could have been
rendered were delimited. Additionally, the Police Advisory
Board had to depend on the police department to conduct
investigations as they were unable to hire individuals for
that purpose)~ Finally, the Board had no way to initiate
an action without a complaint and had no power to subpoena.
The Police Commissioners and the Fraternal Order of
1961) :140.
1341bid., p. 149.
135Lohman and Mismer, “Civilian Review,” pp. 63—64.
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Police were vehemently opposed to the Police Advisory Board
and responded with injunctory litigation aimed at ending
their proceedings. The first injunction resulted in the
name being changed and an agreement that the Board would
only make suggestions, not advise, as “Rizzo (was)
determined that no outside force shall oversee the police.”
The Board was eventually dissolved by court order after a
petition to that effect was brought against it. “Mayor
Tate said in a press conference . . . that he intends to
let Rizzo handle complaints.”136 The then President of the
FOP, John Harrington, had repeated the claim that the
Police Advisory Board was a hindrance to law enforcement
137efforts, particularly during the riot of 1964.
The Board had recommended that police services be
improved in the “‘avoidance of violence to apprehended
persons.’”138 One major complaint was arrest records, even
when the person was absolved from wrong doing. The Police
Advisory Board was successful in having some records
destroyed. It also engendered some apologies and provided
a psychological dividend in that the complainants were
heard.
It cannot honestly be said that the incidence of
illegal practices in Philadelphia has measurably
136McCormick, “Bless Frank Rizzo,” p. 127.
137Ruchelman, Who Rules Police? p. 260.
138 ,, .Lohman and Mismer, Civilian Review, p. 58.
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declined because of the board . . . but is an
indispensable step toward the reduction of these
abuses with police authority to a minimum139
The public received very little information about the Board
through the press; most people remained totally unaware of
its existence. 11• Negroe Newspapers publicly state(d)
its lack of faith in the board.”4° Community leaders such
as Cecil B. Moore, the then President of the local branch
of the NAACP, stated “there should be no special court for
policemen. If they have done something wrong, you should
lock them up like everybody else!”4’ Moore also commented
that the Police Advisory Board was “‘designed to whitewash
crimes of the police.’”142
Grass Root Efforts
The lack of effective infrastructural mechanisms to
restrain overzealous behavior of the police precipitated
community response in the hopes of instituting internal and
extra—legal means to fulfill that function. Other than
riots, the most utilized technique to display outcry
against abuse have been rallies and marches. It was not
unusual for the community to coalesce after what was
considered to be unnecessary use of force by the police,
139 Coxe, Police Advisory Board, p. 154.
‘40Ibid., pp. 151—52.
141 ,,Lohman and Mismer, Civilian Review, p. 56.
142Berson, Case Study of a Riot, p. 52.
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especially during the sixties. Many protests were aimed at
the removal of Frank Rizzo as Police Commissioner and Mayor
as it was held that his overall demeanor and comments were
anti-Black.143 Demonstrations were held city-wide and at
the precinct level in addition to marches that usually
144attracted an average of one thousand persons. These
techniques are still being used as annual reminders of the
MOVE incidents as supporters and sympathizers of the group
hold a vigil at the precise time that the bomb was dropped
on their home.’45
The underlying consensus of most groups was that
the police department is unresponsive to complainants, due
to deficient structures which makes a fair hearing
• • 146.
impossible. These same organizations became targets of
police harassment for expounding their views and the nature
of their activities. The leaders often complained of being
roused in the night for ticket violations, subjected to
147questioning and overall imposition by the police. Rizzo
accused the United Fund of distributing funds to legal
agencies that were harassing the police since they provide
143
Hamilton, From Cop to Mayor, p. 81.
144Cory, “A Close Look,” pp. 26, 33.
145,, • • ,, •MOVE Sympathizers Organize, Philadelphia
Inquirer, 13 May 1986, p. 1.
146McCormjck, “God Bless Frank Rizzo,” p. 122.
1471bid., p. 123.
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legal counsel for people with brutality claims. He also
threatened to stop the police from contributing funds
unless support to legal aide societies ceased.’48
The North City Congress (NCC) was established in
1964 by the Philadelphia Council for Community Advancement
(PCAA) and a Ford Foundation grant after the riots in that
same year, to foster communication and improved relations
between the police and the community.149 The group served
as a clearinghouse for complaints that arose from
neighborhood problems and police—community tensions, the
goal being to exact enough political power from the
150community to influence policing. Alton Lemon, former
director of North City Congress, and an expert in police
community relations, attributed the high rate of tensions
to unmet needs in the Black community.
Because of their experiences they do not feel the
system under which we live is working for them.
Instead, they see the system as opposing their
efforts to conform to American ideals. Policeman
in particular, and other law enforcement officers
to some extent, are viewed as helping to maintain
the status guo.~-51
1481bid., p. 122.
149Arthur Niederhoffer and Alexander Smith, “North
City Congress Police Community Relations Program,” in
Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban Society, ed.
Niederhoffer, (New York: Anchor Books Edition/Doubleday),
p. 234.
1501bid., p. 235.
151 , .Lawyers Commission for Civil Rights Under Law,
“Proceedings, Planning Sessions on Police Community
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NCC represented a compromise between the police and
the community to improve relations through a training
program for the police and the community to educate the
latter on police procedures. The police were enlightened
on the concerns of the Black community and were encouraged
to increase familiarity through programs such as Operation
Handshake. The program was successful to the extent that
it was supported by the community. There was also an
absence of further rioting which may or may not be
attributed to the efforts of the NCC and the human
relations squad. 152
A crucial factor in an organization such as this is
the attitude of the Police Commissioner. Once Rizzo took
the lead, mistrust by the community coupled with
controversy about Rizzo worked against its support base.
Further, as the organization became more knowledgeable of
the political process in terms of the proper governmental
agencies to pressure, municipal backing began to wane.’53
Although the group is still in existence, their goals are
more militant in terms of lending their support to any
organizational effort aimed at the elimination of abuse and
other vestiges of oppression which is clearly a step above
Relations,” Washington, D.C., 1967, p. 26.





Other than policing themselves, police are
virtually immune from control by external sources. The
City Council and local electorate have proved to be
ineffective in their efforts to control them. The
prosecutors are not responsible for supervision of police
and would rather not be involved in the issue of reviewing
their procedures. The role of the community has had an
impact on policing through educating the people and as
somewhat of an ideological deterrent in that the police are
aware that their acts will not go unnoticed. Although a
number of methods are used by community advocates the most
favored is litigation for punitive and preventive redress.
Public Interest Law
Center of Philadelphia (PILCOP)’55
PILCOP played a major role in the litigatory
pursuits to effectuate police accountability through their
attempt to get the police department to uphold civil
liberties in law enforcement. PILCOP not only provided a
clearinghouse for allegations of police brutality cases,
154,, .North City Congress, paper housed at the
Blockson Collection, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA,
1987.
‘55The following historical reconstruction of
PILCOP is based on an interview with Michael Churchill,
present director of Public Interest Law Center of
Philadelphia, November 3, 1987, 125 South 9th St.,
Philadelphia, PA.
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but also acted as a proponent to change the discriminatory
policies and practices of the Philadelphia Police
Department (PPD) through legal actions.
The center found its origin as an offspring of
Kennedy’s Lawyers Commission on Civil Rights at the end of
the sixties which examined civil rights cases on a
volunteer basis. At that time, police abuse cases were
handled along with housing and other violations under the
Equal Protection Act. The early activities that initiated
litigation concerning the police were spearheaded by the
Coalition Against Police Abuse (CAPA) that was also
organized in the early seventies. This group represented a
coalition of community interests, legal affiliates, and
interested citizens united to eliminate brutality and
disseminate information on that problem.’56 One of their
first actions was that they sought an injunction to halt
racial discrimination in the hiring of police officers for
the number of Black and other minorities which decreased 28
percent under Rizzo’s tenure as Commissioner. The class
action suit “. . . charged the city with racial bias in the
hiring and promotion of Black policemen.” A temporary
restraining order was issued in May 1972 requiring one
156Coalition Against Police Abuses; American Civil
Liberties Union; Community Advocate Unit; Pennsylvania
Department of Justice; National Emergency Civil Liberties
Committee; National Lawyers Guild; Philadelphians for Equal
Justice and PILCOP, A Citizens Manual on Police Abuse
(Philadelphia, 1976), p. 9.
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Black officer be hired for every two whites.’57
In the mid-seventies, the Law Enforcement
Assistance Agency made funds available to those interests
concerned with the enforcement of civil rights, which led
to the consolidation of the law—related organizations under
the auspices of PILCOP. Upon receiving funds, the center
was able to set up the police project as a separate
component of the law center and began the collection of
data as a basis to strategize their efforts to counter
police infractions.
Most brutality cases were referred to PILCOP by
community groups or public law concerns. All vital
information was taken inclusive of race, police district in
which incident occurred, and the exact nature of the
alleged abuse. A number of different strategies were then
employed such as: directing the complainant to the police
department; soliciting the Human Relations Commission to
aid in efforts; pressing charges against the police
department through the prosecutor’s office; and initiating
action through the small claims court for monetary awards.
In 1976, 550 complaints of abuse were filed at PILCOP out
of that total, 420 complainants were interviewed, 50
percent of them charged police with abuse, 216 received
some type of media attention, and 98 complainants faced
157New York Times, 27 May 1972, p. 32.
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158charges.
PILCOP also served as an aide to attorneys involved
in litigation by provision of a resource bank of trial
methods and any information that may be pertinent to that
particular case; for example, a file was kept on police
repeat offenders of abuse. There were also training
sessions for lawyers in abuse cases which entailed law
updates and innovative techniques for favorable rulings.
In addition, PILCOP issued yearly reports on the breadth of
problems as based on complaints and resulting action,
entitled Probable Cause.
Citizen problems in seeking redress are that, in
two-thirds of the cases, the citizen is charged with
disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, or assault and
battery on a police officer. The citizen is also pressured
to bargain away the right to sue or institute a criminal
complaint and there are very few attorneys willing to deal
effectively with this situation because they are unfamiliar
with the possibility of an effective civil case. If the
complaint is made to the department, the maze of procedure
is intended to discourage the complainant, and if hearings
are held, the victim usually needs counsel. If the
District Attorney’s office does not act, the complainant
has the option to appeal the decision to the Court of
158Citizens Manual on Abuse, p. 9.
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Common Pleas. This procedure requires the victim to bear
the expense of an attorney for any possibility of success.
Finally, a civil suit for damages can be filed if the
incident resulted in injuries.’59
PILCOP had run into some difficulty concerning
funding in 1975 when debate ensued by the local regional
Governor’s Commission over whether brutality ought to be
checked. After a very close vote PILCOP was commissioned
for another year. The National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People’s local chapter, headed by
Aiphonso Deal, and PILCOP then held public investigations
of brutality in Philadelphia. The hearings received wide
publicity which served as a means to educate the public on
the efforts of the organization. The center also published
a report on all the shootings in the city between 1971-1974
and made an analysis of deadly force. This information was
utilized by the Justice Department in 1978 in their
investigation of brutality claims and as a partial basis of
their suit against the city. In 1977, PILCOP represented
the Guardian Civic League suit for discriminatory
practices, tests, and promotions. Overall the
organization’s purpose and method were two—fold in
adjudication of infractions of civil liberties and the
promotion of equal opportunities of minorities within the
159PILCOP, “Summary of Police Project,” 1978.
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police structure.
By 1981 the funding for the project had all but
dissipated, most problems were in some form addressed and
others had to be set aside for lack of funding. The staff
that handled screening and referral were laid off, yet
files were maintained on officers involved in a number of
obstructions and complaints were referred to lawyers.
Research on viable prescriptive remedies to the problems
continued.
Churchill holds that the decline in blatant abuse
cases is due primarily to an institutional change of Mayors
for the type of leadership and the personality thereof
played an important role in abuses. The suits brought
against the officers also had a nominal effect, even though
most officers escaped prosecution, the threat of litigation
served to stem the tide. Anther factor that impeded overt
abuse was intervention by the Justice Department that
served as an overall embarrassment to the city particularly
to the businesses. What’s more, the organization of the
Black community led to a rise in the number of elected
officials addressing this issue continuing to decline.
Some hold that the rulings rendered by the court,
coupled with increased criticism, have helped destroy the
morale of the police and further complicate the issue by
forcing them to seek ulterior ways to maintain their
169
accepted methods.169 Prescriptive remedies utilizing the
legal mechanisms of the system are aimed at increased
litigation particularly injunctions to remove repeat
offenders.161 The prosecution of repeat offenders would be
expedited with invocation of the “use immunity statute”
which would require a court order to compel the testimony
of a witness on the basis that no information derived will
162be used against that witness in any criminal case.
Judicial review of police policy has been recommended to
encourage development and revision of police tactics. In
this way the conduct of an officer can be scrutinized as to
its conformity to departmental policy. The communication
of judicial decisions to the police department makes a
proviso in which prosecutors automatically appeal cases in
which law enforcement policy is in question.163 “In short,
the cooperation of officers in these investigations and the
stiff sentences meted out to the convicted offenders will
help the police to police themselves.”64
160Ruchelman, Who Rules Police? pp. 33-36.
‘61Hariston v. Huzier, 334 F.Supp. 251 (W.D.Pa.
1971), and Makone v. Waddle, F.Supp. (W.D.Pa. 1977).
162 Ruchelman, Who Rules Police? p. 40.
163 ,, •Klein, Fighting Corruption, p. 110.
1641bid., p. 115.
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United States v. City of Philadelphia -
The preceding sections sought to expose the
widespread abuse of Philadelphians by the police and the
role of the former Police Commissioner and Mayor in the
protection of those inciting such violence, as well as
setting an example through his own acts implying
institutional approval. It then became necessary to
examine the infrastructural mechanisms to address abuse
along with efforts made by the local polity, grass—root,
and organizational pursuits. The compendium of all the
aforementioned endeavors were of limited instrumentality in
curbing the excesses of the Philadelphia police force. It
was in this environ that the United States Attorney General
became a part of the continual quest for a remedy, the
encroachment of civil liberties through police excesses.
Interest in the suit against the City of
Philadelphia was spurred by a number of concerns. Foremost
was the litigatory vacuum left by the failure of the Rizzo
v. Goode case to exact an injunction against the police
department for abuse through establishment of a formidable
link between Rizzo and police actions. Secondly, criticism
loomed against the department as case after case of police
excesses were reported in not only Philadelphia newspapers,
but national releases as well. The most poignant series
was the Pulitzer Prize winning story on tactics used by the
171
165Homicide detectives to exact confessions. Those stories
initiated the investigation of fifty-two cases by the U.S.
Attorney’s Office, out of these only three resulted in
indictments. In one case a jury acquitted the officer =
charged, in another the indictment was withdrawn. The
third case——the Wilkinson case——the police were convicted
on only one count of conspiracy.166 The Wilkinson case
involved a mildly retarded auto mechanic who was beaten
into signing a confession of a fire bombing death of a
Puerto Rican woman and her children. Six neighbors were
also coerced to testify against him.
The discontent felt by defense attorneys of their
frustrated efforts led to an alignment of forces between
them and the City’s existing organizations aimed at the
elimination of abuse. At the helm of these undertakings
was, of course, PILCOP. The Department of Justice
discussed steps they might take “. . . to eliminate alleged =
unlawful police practices in Philadelphia.”167 The overall
opinion of interested parties in Philadelphia was that
unless the case could be filed in a succinct, comprehensive
manner, that it would have little deterrent effect on
‘65Newmann and Marimow, “The Homicide Files,”
Philadelphia Inquirer, 24, 25, 26, 27 April 1977.
166. . ,, . . ,~Michael Kiernan, Philadelphia Story, Police
Magazine, July 1979, p. 32.
167 . .
Ibid. Under Attorney General Benjamin R.
Civiletti.
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police practices. Local concerns held that these types of
suits not only “. . . drag on for a long time,” thereby
discouraging the plaintiffs, but they are costly and on
face do not warrant the results comparable to its
investments.’68 In fact, based on the victims questioned
by Jayma Abdoo, they favored criminal prosecution of
officers rather than injunctive relief.’69 The Department
of Justice favored a case that would address systematic
injustices; for in the provision of proof of such, the city
government would be forced to do something about it. The
statutory base would be the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in that citizens were denied basic
rights. The existence of discriminatory practices while
being a recipient of federal funds would also be
incorporated.170 It is ironic that while the latter claim
received cursory examination that was linked to standing,
the former claim was barely perused.
This suit was contemplated in 1977 but was not
filed until 1979. The City held that the suit was merely a
political act by the federal government to gain support
168Letter to Peter Hearn, 123 S. Broad St.,
Philadelphia, PA 19109, from U.S. Department of Justice,
Washington, DC 20530, October 4, 1977, p. 1.
1691bid., p. 6.
‘70Sheldon Albert, Ralph Teti, David L. Rhode, and
James C. Crumlish III, “Philadelphia Obtains Dismissal of
United States’ Police Brutality Claims,” Municipal
Attorney, March-April 1981, p. 1.
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from minorities. Nationally, this unprecedented move was
viewed as an attempt of the Carter Administration to “.
consolidate and resolve the major problems in police
conduct litigation.”171 Locally, citizens that
overwhelmingly believed in the extensive problem of police
abuse viewed the suit as part of the continuing legacy of
looking towards the government to mend social ills.’72 The
suit was well supported by the Guardian Civic League,
Philadelphia’s Black police organization, and the former
President Harold James remarked that “. . . the suit (was)
‘long overdue.’ (He added) We regret that the image of
many has been tarnished by the unprofessional actions of a
,,173few and the inaction of others. .
Overall, the suit charged then Mayor Frank Rizzo
and nineteen other city and police officials, inclusive of
then Commissioner O’Neill, with the implementation of a
system that encouraged abuse and the denial of citizen
rights. The Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) was
deemed to be inundated with instances of brutality and
constitutional violations to the extent that they “‘shock
171 . ,,
Frank Anechiarico, Suing the Philadelphia
Police: The Case for an Institutional Approach,” Law and
Policy 6 (April 1984) :241.
172Comment based on survey results.
‘73”Feds Bring Brutality Suit in Philadelphia,”
Police Magazine, November 1979, p. 28.
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the conscience.”74 The policies and practices identified
as acquiescent in or permitted are:
1. The physical abuse of persons
2. Use of deadly force
3. Use of the arrest process to coerce and
influence citizens
4. Fragmentation of internal investigation which
serve to protect officers rather than prosecute
5. The insulation of officers from external
investigation
6. Harassment of critics..’75
Two areas distinguished here for purposes of
emphasis are those procedures that condoned abuse and
training. In the first we find that in twenty identifiable
cases, fifteen of the officers had a full, documented
history of abuse of citizens and were promoted to higher
realms of service.’76 The department also commended and
promoted other officers that have brutalized persons. In
addition, the PPD refused to suspend or discipline officers
that have been found “civily liable for abuse, or have been
convicted of crimes deemed barbaric and misdirected by the
174Daniel Reich, “The Authority of the Attorney
General to Institute Police Brutality Suits--United States
v. City of Philadelphia,” American Criminal Law Review 17
(Fall 1979):255.
175Albert, “Philadelphia Obtains Dismissal,” p. 1.
176 ,, •Kiernan, Philadelphia Story, p. 32.
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,,177courts.
The suit identified insufficient training and the
quality of new recruits as an important facet in abuse.
The entrance requirements for the Philadelphia police force
are good physical condition, no police record, the ability
to pass a written exam and high school diploma or GED
equivalent.178 “Philadelphia has no educational admission
requirement other than passage of a general intelligence
exam (and) . . . offers no salary incentives to officers
taking college courses.”79 Training consists of an
eighteen week program in addition to in—service training in
a mobile classroom.’80 Parry, former District Attorney in
charge of police prosecutions, holds that the department
has been most “deficient in training its officers in the
legal use of deadly force. . . . (They) do not have their
own written firearms policies.” The state statute permits
officers to “fire on persons suspected of ‘forcible
felonies.’ Even Police Commissioner O’Neill said that the
177,, Text of the U.S. Lawsuit alleging abuse by
Philadelphia Police,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 19 August
1979, p. 4—E.
178Citizen Crime Commission of Philadelphia, “Study
of Police Departments in Five Major Cities,” 1700 Walnut
St., Suite 1000, Philadelphia, PA 19103, January 1980,
p. 29.
179 ,,Cory, A Close Look, p. 36.
180,, .
Study of Police, p. 36.
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,,,181deadly force law isn t sufficiently clear. What s
more, the department failed to provide psychological
screening services especially to aide known offenders in
handling stress.
Finally, the Department exhibited community
disregard by their lack of initiative in fostering police—
community relations. The claims advanced were: rights to
due process of law; to be secure against unreasonable
search and seizures; and the right to be free from being
compelled to be a witness against oneself.’82 The Attorney
General sought injunctive relief from the systemic
practices of abuse since no other forum was available for
such a remedy. He held that the pattern of abuse precluded
individual civil suits for damages and that they had a
direct burden on interstate commerce as people visiting the
city are privy to such abuse. The statutory basis was the
enforcement of 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242 and 245 which
prohibited denial of constitutional rights and ability to
bring suit when the U.S. has an interest and 42 U.S.C. 2000
in which recipient programs of federal funds are not
allowed to discriminate.’83
On October 30, 1979, District Court Judge Ditter
181 ,,Cory, A Close Look, p. 36.
‘82”Text of the U.S. Lawsuit,” p. 4-E.
183 Ibid.
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dismissed most of the suit primarily on lack of standing by
the Attorney General based on absence of authority to
advance the civil rights of third persons; to initiate and
maintain a civil lawsuit; and the timetable advanced, would
deny individual defendants their day in court.184 The
Attorney General does possess the authority to initiate
suit to prevent discrimination in the distribution of
federal funds; however, the office failed to substantiate
this charge with facts resulting in the dismissal of this
185claim along with the rest of the suit.
Judge Ditter dismissed the complaint “without ever
testing the merits of its deeply serious charges” as he
only questioned standing of the Attorney General.’86
Ditter held that on three separate occasions Congress
failed to empower the Attorney General to prosecute
conspiracies that interfere with constitutional rights,
which would have corrected the deficiency of 42 U.S.C.
1985. His observation was based on the ensuing debates
during the passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960,
and 1964 which hypothesized the effects of suits by the
Attorney General on the public, particularly if the former
184United States v. City of Philadelphia, Cir. A,
No. 79—2937 U.S. District Court E.D. Penn. (10-30—79) 482
F.Supp. 1248 (1979), pp. 1248—1249.
v. Philadelphia, p. 1274.
‘86Ibid., p. 1252.
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is politically minded.’87 Ditter believed that the
Attorney General wanted him to enter an injunction based on
his views and those of his defendants of how the police
department should be run. Utilizing the aforementioned
evidence he concluded that he “cannot recognize a power
which Congress has thrice refused to grant.”88
The Attorney General argued that Congressional
inaction should not have a “. . . bearing on (this) power
to bring a civil suit which seeks to enjoin the deprivation
of the rights secured by the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.”189 It is clear that Judge Ditter
interpreted the efforts by the Attorney General as a
usurpation of Congressional authority and as an
encroachment on not only federalism but the delicate
balance between the branches of government. The Attorney
General, as an integral component of the executive branch
has the “expressed authority” to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed. By filing the suit, the Attorney
General was fulfilling that executive function to ensure
that constitutional claims were adhered to. There was no
hint of law making in the request for an injunction,





of rights evades the substantive issue of legislation to
• . enjoin widespread deprivations of constitutional
,,190rights.
The Attorney General argued that he possessed
statutory authority through 28 U.S.C. 518(b) which holds
that a case may be considered where the United States has
an interest. Ditter held that this was merely a
“housekeeping provision” that pertains only to the
organization of the federal government, and congress did
not intend to vest that much power to the office as based
on Congressional hostility towards intrusion in local
affairs.’91 If one questions the criteria of exactly what
constitutes an interest it will be noted that Ditter
ignored a large body of case law that permits the Attorney
General to bring suit.192 Although the government is
prohibited from interference in a private suit, it is
authorized to investigate matters that affect the public at
193large and in the enforcement of criminal laws. In re
Neagle 135 U.S. 1 (1890), the court reaffirmed the power of
the executive branch to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed. In re Debs the Supreme Court allowed the
‘90Reich, “Authority of Attorney General,” p. 263.
191u.s. v. Philadelphia, p. 1258.
‘92Reich, “Authority of the Attorney General,”
p. 264.
‘93Brawer v. Horowitz, 533 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1976).
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Attorney General to bring suit for an injtmction against
striking union leaders for they threatened to obstruct
interstate commerce and transportation of the mails,
thereby effecting a state of emergency.194 The Judge
rejected the relevancy of these arguments in the
Philadelphia suit on the grounds that the situation in
Philadelphia evolved over a period of time and did not
encompass an emergency situation.’95 Here, more than
anywhere else, the Judge displays his lack of sensitivity
to the issue of brutality, his inherent bias toward police
discretion in controlling their own affairs, and the role
of brutality on the expression of constitutional liberties.
Judge Ditter made over five remarks regarding the impact of
this type of suit on policing, particularly in the scrutiny
of their procedures and the possible limitation of their
powers. The Judge made only one cursory remark regarding
the effects of brutality on the people. In fact the Judge
made a mockery of inequality in a set of hypotheticals of
the Attorney General bringing suit to save dogs that are
destroyed after forty-eight hours without notifying owners,
libraries with not enough books on Africans, or a hospital
with restrictive visiting hours. These advances stemmed
from the fact that the Judge could not see a relationship
1941n re flebs, 158 U.s. 564, 15 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed.
1092 (1895)
195U.S. v. Philadelphia, p. 1265.
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between practices and procedures of the department that
serve to foster brutality, which led him to conclude that
restrictive policies of any entity serving the public could
196be challenged.
The final charge to the Attorney General to be
considered here was his right to initiate suit as a third
party when other remedies existed, such as individual and
class actions under 42 U.S.C. 1983.197 This brings us full
circle to the problematic raised in Chapter II of the
constriction of Sec. 1983 cases, also the failure of Rizzo
v. Goode to exact injunctive relief. Ditter concluded that
when Rizzo v. Goode went to the court, Philadelphia could
not be cited as a “person” but the ruling in Monroe v. Pape
now makes that possible. Yet, Rizzo v. Goode required a
pattern of abuse linked with policies and practices of the
department which was the basis of U.S. v. Philadelphia.
One other oversight was the cost involved in such
litigation and based on past defeats this possibility did
not look promising. The patterns of brutality cannot be
stemmed by individual claims for monetary damages, and if
relief from police misconduct is a private good, then
individual litigants cannot claim injunctive relief that




addition, the “‘ (p)atterns of complaints appear to indicate
institutional rather than individual problems.’”198
On appeal, the United States modified its position
and advanced that the actions of the defendants not only
violated due process, but 18 U.S.C. secs. 241-242 in that
the abuse practices were disproportionately aimed at Blacks
and Hispanics.199 Judge Aldisert, writing for the three
judge circuit court, followed the precedent as set by Judge
Ditter in rejection of the suit on the absence of implied
power to initiate suit and a lack of evidence to support
the allegation of discriminatory brutality practices.
There was also lacking a nexus between discrimination and
the expenditure of federal funds. The court repudiated the
contention that secs. 241 and 242 could be interpreted as
to grant a right of action as to injunctive relief. It
further rejected that cause of action should be applied in
the absence of other remedies.20° Since the U.S. is not
part of the violated class, it could not state a claim,
granting such would pose a frontal attack on the federalist
system. The appropriate question should not have been
198 . ,, •Anechiarico, Suing Philadelphia Police,
p. 241.
199Stephanie Franklin, “United States v. City of
Philadelphia: A Continued ~Quest for an Effective Remedy




congressional inaction as indication of the limitation of
the power of the Attorney General, but “. . . whether
Congress intended that the United States has an ‘interest’
in the prevention of widespread, systematic denials of
constitutional rights.”201 The dismissal of this suit
limited the power of the Attorney General to enforce
federal civil statutes, therefore, the civil rights of
persons victimized by police remain unprotected. The
federal government has thus revealed their ineffectiveness
and lack of inclination to support civil liberties in this
202instance.
Conclusion
In this chapter the total disregard of the well-
being of Blacks as a continual legacy in the Philadelphia
experience was demonstrated through incidents of violence
from the 1700s to the present time. The role of the
Philadelphia police as precipitator and manager of such
violence was displayed by an examination of their torrid
history as witnesses to and proponents of violence on
Blacks. The department has been deemed as one of the most
brutal police forces in the nation and the methods to
oversee it have been ineffective. “Consequently, this
department serves as a model for evaluating the failure of
201Reich, “Authority of Attorney General,” p. 267.
202 ,,Franklin, Quest for Remedy, p. 198.
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police accountability throughout the country.”203 The
notions of abusive patterns as being reflective of internal
policies and that they are in fact condoned by the upper
echelons of the police force and municipal authorities was
examined by relating the career of Frank Rizzo to police
activities and his protection of officers from prosecution.
The logical consequence was to then examine all existing
vehicles for recourse of such abuse. It was found that the
infrastructural mechanisms were deficient, grass—root
ef forts, though persistent, had little results and that
civil sanctions and criminal penalties, “. . . have failed
to deter police misconduct and offer little or no
protection from abuse.”204 The City of Philadelphia has
awarded millions in settlements of victims of abuse. Some
conmLentators like to herald that fact as evidence of the
City’s effort to deter abuse. However, these claims only
affect individuals and do not provide broad declaratory
relief from brutalization. The escalation of such suits
gives merit to their inability to curtail abuse. It should
also be noted that these awards are usually minimal and
infrequent due to the exacting standards in such
litigation. When compared to the suffering endured by the




205replace the loss of a human life.
United States v. Philadelphia was representative of
a compilation of all the aforementioned in that it
reflected the dialectics of repressionary law enforcement
and the ineptitude of any mechanism to counteract that.
The cases clearly showed institutionalized abuse through
practice, procedures, examples, and rewards as opposed to
punishment for excessive force. The problem of utilizing
the Equal Protection Clause is illustrative of the conflict
of discretion and control of police functions.206 Due to
the nature of the environ, discretion has to be allowed in
order to effectuate the enforcement of law, yet there does
exist structured ideals to control such discretion. It
must be remembered that all the democratic process requires
is the provision of structures and a forum to address civil
violations, not corrections.
205Sheldon Albert, Philadelphia City Solicitor,
held that the “. . . dollar verdicts are miniscule.” On
“The MacNeil/Lehrer Report,” August 15, 1979, p. 2.
206 ,, •




This chapter will begin with the theoretical
evolution of MOVE followed by their philosophy, membership,
tactics, and the events that ultimately led to their
confrontations with the police. The first major incident
that gave MOVE national recognition was in 1978 in which
they were forced from their home and a police officer was
killed. During the conflict, a MOVE member, Delbert
Africa, was publicly beaten by three law enforcement
off icers. The trial of those officers will be examined to
illustrate the limitations of prosecuting officers
inclusive of the use of an all white jury. The second
MOVE/police conflict ended with an area of the Black
community razed under the leadership of a Black mayor. It
will be argued here that lack of restraints on the police
use of deadly force led to their excessive behavior.
Finally, in the continued quest to impede police abuse we
had the use of an innovative technique, the MOVE
Commission, which was set up by the Mayor to investigate
the incident. Their findings and recommendations will be
examined as their role in checking police activities will
186
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be assessed. The point here is to exemplify aforementioned
theories of police brutality and redress efforts through
the MOVE experience.
During the 1960s there was a revolutionary voice
within the black community that sought to overthrow the
capitalist system with all its incipient injustices as a
direct consequence of mass exploitation. The
Revolutionaries wanted the right to define themselves as a
people and determine their own destiny through self-
reliance. This force did not depend upon the system for
freedom; for its promises masked the purpose of absorption
within the system.1
The moderate faction of the Black community won out
and established the integrationist agenda which merely
elevated the level of Black interaction within the
capitalist system via individual mobility and intensified
consumerism. What happened to that revolutionary voice that
wanted freedom by “any means necessary” as Blacks moved
into quiet acceptance of the status quo? While some
continue to struggle through other means such as writing,
teaching, organizational, and litigatory pursuits, others
have been unable to reconcile the contradictions of the
revolution from above that dissipated the true goals of the
people below. The masses, ~by which the battle was waged,
1 See Stokeley Carmichael and Charles Hamilton,
Black Power (New York: Random House, 1967).
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still continue to live in abject poverty and despair while
blinded by the illusory dream of freedom through
commodities. It was the last category of Revolutionaries
that the untold tragedy of a movement deferred weighed its
toll. These Blacks may never possess the mind set or
socioeconomic requisites to accept the reality of a race
asleep in the wake of mass oppression. Society has termed
some of these as “schizophrenic,” “extremists,”
“aberrations,” or just different. Somewhere within this
configuration of terms lies MOVE, a group born out of the
heartbreak of an untimely cause.
The void created after the decline of major
activists’ groups of the sixties left some of its
membership in disarray, in search of an identifiable group.
The absence of a vehicle to articulate their cause led
those that were unable to consolidate themselves within the
system, to the MOVE philosophy. The background of the
majority of MOVE members can be traced back to the Black
2Panthers and the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM).
Since its inception, membership has been noted at
up to the hundreds, including a large number of supporters
that expound the teachings of John Africa and have adopted
some of MOVE’s dietary and physical regimens. There are
2The following comments on MOVE’s organization are
from Murray Dubin and Andrew Wallace, “The People Behind
the Barricade,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 7 May 1978, pp. Al,
A12.
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also MOVE sympathizers which are composed of people from
the community who basically feel that MOVE was treated
unfairly. The core of the group was a family unit, Vincent
Leaphart, alias John Africa, his sister Laverne Leaphart
Sims, her husband Charles Sims, and their children Debbie
Angela Sims, Charles Shelton Sims, Dennis Merrick Sims, and
Gail Zelda Sims. Vincent Leapharts’ sister, Louise
Leaphart James, was a former member, now a supporter, gave
the house on Osage Avenue to her son Frank R. James Africa.
There were white members of MOVE, such as one of
the cofounders, Donald Glassey, who is said to have
codified the philosophy since John Africa did not have a
formal education. Glassey left the group in the early
seventies and denounced the group and its teachings during
an interview following the 1985 siege.3 Sharon Gale Penn
and Sue Africa renounced their membership in the midst of
the police conflict and returned to their former way of
life. Chuckie Africa said of Penn that she “. . . is not
as strong as the (other members) . . . and the same system
that harassed her and made her weak has now taken her
over.”4 This pattern is reflective of other whites in the
sixties who avowed the virtues of the Black revolution and
were able to step out of it any time and return to the
3lnterview on KYW, May 14, 1985.
4”A Defection: But MOVE Stays,” Philadelphia
Inquirer, 2 August 1979, p. Al.
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system, something Blacks were unable to do-because of their
color.
the MOVE organization is a powerful family of
revolutionaries, fixed in principle, strong in
cohesion, steady as the foundation of a massive
tree. A people totally equipped with the profound
understanding of simple assertion, collective
commitment, unbending direction.5
The historical structure of Afro—American movements
reflects the impact of Christianity as it revolves around
the Christ as its essence, many groups also became the
personification of one being.6 MOVE from its origin in
1972 centered itself on the teachings as based on the
philosophy of John Africa.7 A movement such as this can be
compared to the Rastafarians in that they both reflect
emotional discontent and unrest possessed with a visualized
goal and a change in social institutions.8 Also present is
the “. . . messianic—millenarjan overtone, deeply religious
in nature, with victory rooted in the hope that the power
of the supernatural would overcome might with moral
5The philosophy of MOVE has been extracted from a
six week series in the Philadelphia Tribune, entitled “On
the MOVE from the Writings of John Africa,” 28 June 1975,
5, 9, 12, 15 and 29 July 1975. This quote is from 28 June
1978, p. 17.
6James H. Cone, Black Theology and Black Power (New
York: Seabury Press, 1969), p. 34.
7Tim Quinn, “The Heart of Darkness,” Philadelphia
Magazine, May 1978, p. 133.
8Leonard Barrett, The Rastafarians (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1977), p. 233.
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right.”9 An integral part of the MOVE philosophy is that
God is on the side of truth and right which are virtues
they possess, oft times acts of nature were used to provide
their connection with the almighty such as: after the
police erected the barricade in 1978, the wind blew it
down; being in a house for over fifty-two days without
water or food and emerged healthier than ever; the judges
that came in contact with MOVE either died or suffered
terminal illnesses; survival through the police pogroms of
1978 and Birdie and Ramona Africa in 1985.10 Dissonance,
social, and cultural incongruities produced alienation of
the group as they take on a counterculture “. . . which
leads to the death of society or its rejuvenation.”1
MOVE extolled an antitechnological, back-to-nature
stance with their level of critique aimed at governmental
institutions as opposed to the capitalist economy as the
source of all ills. As professional Agents Provocateurs,
their daily goal was to bring attention to the
contradiction of the “world system” that advances its
interests at the cost of the majority.
Their ideas are directed to oppressed people in
9lbid., p. 210.
10lnterview with MOVE supporter Jeanette Knighton,
January 1981, at Philadelphia City Hall. Incidents
corroborated by news sources.
11
Barrett, The Rastafarians, p. 167.
192
general; poor whites; Puerto Ricans; Blacks; and people of
the Third World that are a part of international
oppression. MOVE believed that the only answer to world
depression is self—dependence; for, one cannot look to the
government of repression for protection.’2 A government
that diverts interest to external affairs to mask internal
conflict. “Building war ships to protect against the
danger of invasion and being invaded with vd, fbi, tb, cia,
tnt, cd, ddt, drug addicts,alcoholics, racism, sexism,
,,13 .deceptionism. Politicians are a continued target of
critique as those who would go to any length for support,
reflect the most immoral fabric in the weave of society,
lacking any type of credibility or accountability to those
who empower them; “These politicians have solicited the
indulgence of false patriotism, and left you to mourn the
death of its victims.”4
MOVE constantly harassed the Black bourgeoisie for
their cooptation into the system likened only to a criminal
act. Cruse noted that extremist factions, from desperation
and alienation of the ghetto, pass a stage of hate to
“ghetto paranoia, directed not only towards whites, but as
a more immediate target the middle-class Negro, the
12Africa, “On the MOVE,” 12 July 1975.
13 Ibid., 1 July 1975, p. 5.
14Ibid., 15 July 1975, p. 2.
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‘bourgeois,’”5 By Blacks compromising with the system,
they took on the nature of the oppressor, thereby accepting
their ethos while condoning the oppression of themselves
and others.16
It is impossible for Black folks to solve the
problem of inequality while endorsing, supporting
this higher-lower syndrome. It is impossible for
Black folks to solve police brutality while BLACK
CAPTAINS are hired to supervise the beatings;
impossible for Black folks to solve the problems of
court injustice while BLACK judges are hired to put
you away.17
One theoretically based tactic that made MOVE the
source of much criticism was the right to represent oneself
in court:
The same crazy politician that will see you
offended, watch you defend yourself, be
responsible, reliable, use self—control, and tell
you not to take the law in your own hands. Tell
you you can’t be the judge of such circumstances,
that this kind of situation has to be officially
administered by a qualified judge, a so—called
legal administrator. . . . Any time anybody is
willing to allow the law of life to be taken out of
their hands and put in the slippery hands of
lifeless politician they can expect politics.
During their trial for the alleged murder of Officer James
Ramp, conspiracy, rioting, and other lesser offenses,
William Phillips Africa said: “‘A freeman has no choice
15Harold Cruse, Crisis of Negro Intellectual (New
York: Morrow, 1967), p. 365.
16Africa, “On the MOVE,” 28 July 1975, p. 17.
17Ibid., 22 July 1975, p. 6.
18 Ibid., 15 July 1975, p. 15.
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but to represent themselves;” Delbert Orr Africa maintained
that “‘an Attorney does not believe as I believe. He’ll
answer with slick stuff, sly stuff. I’ve been taught to be
honest, straight forward.’” The MOVE members also waived
their right to a jury for as Janine Africa held, “‘(b)eing
tried by one confused judge who didn’t witness the
situation is bad enough . . . (b)ut being tried by twelve
confused people is. . “s Delbert Africa did not want a
jury because he felt that it would be composed of “‘racist
whites from the Northeast and store—bought Negroes from
downtown.’”2°
The origin of self—representation is from England
when persons accused of serious crimes were not allowed
counsel, the Sixth Amendment was an attempt to rectify this
legacy. Prior to the 1963 Gideon ruling, people unable to
afford a lawyer were forced to go to trial unrepresented,
but the Gideon decision changed this so that those
defendants facing “serious charges” had to be provided with
counsel.2’ However, the quality of lawyers provided meant
“no meaningful difference in their situation, as they were
convicted and given stiff sentences with almost the same
19Murray Dubin, “MOVE 9 Waive Jury, Will Defend
Themselves,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 12 December 1979,
p. Fl.
20Ibid., p. F2.
21Gideon v. Wainright 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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regularity as in pre—Gideon days.” Self—representation has
been critiqued because it is bound with the concern for
courtroom ethics. It is believed that a person
representing themselves will have less respect for order
22and will be more disruptive than a represented person.
MOVE often taunted the judges, disturbed the decorum of the
court, and made a mockery of the legal profession through
their constant barrage of insults and other verbal
23attacks.
Blacks are turning to self—representation because
of the “inherently racist, repressive and class—biased
judicial system.” Many feel that a lawyer will not be able
to represent them with “aggressiveness and sensitivity.”
It is also an organizational tactic to “. . . forcefully
and effectively defend oneself while expounding the
,,24philosophy of the movement. At one point, MOVE
exhortations had gotten so out of hand the judge had wanted
them gagged and bound. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court ruled in 1976 that it disapproved of the binding and
gagging of seven MOVE members in municipal court in 1974
when they refused to quiet down during a hearing on charges
22Angela Davis et al., If They Come in the Morning:
Voices of Resistance (New York: Okpaku, 1971), pp. 212-14.
23
Profanity and insults used are documented
throughout news accounts of trial and was also witnessed by
the author.
24Davis, If They Come, p. 211.
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resulting from a demonstration. The court stated that
“binding and gagging only increases the tension in a
courtroom and is counterproductive. The high court also
expressed its disfavor of contempt of court actions against
defendants.”25 MOVE was eventually banished from the
courtroom and the rest of their case was handled by court
appointed back-up lawyers.
The question can be raised as to whether or not the
nineteen week, $400,000 trial of the MOVE nine for the
killing of James Ramp was a political ploy to incarcerate
the members for a lengthy period.26 The rationale for such
a query is based on the fact that MOVE was sentenced on
less than substantial evidence. There are still many
unanswered questions such as why was the MOVE house
demolished before ballistic experts could perform an
investigation. The District Attorney’s office was not even
contacted for their opinion of the demolition which turned
out to be a bad decision in litigation.27 Ramp, a Vietnam
War military advisor, allowed himself to be caught in the
line of fire. It was never established whether the bullet
25 .A. W. Geiselman, Jr., Bowing to Precedent: No
Gags for MOVE,” Philadelphia Bulletin, 20 January 1980,
p. 1.
26Murray Dubin, “Nine MOVE Members Convicted--All
Guilty in Killing of Officer,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 8 May
1980, p. Al.
27
Interview with Tony Jackson, June 1981.
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that was supposed to have been fired through a screened—in
basement window, through water pouring in from deluge guns,
entered his chest and exited the back, or vice versa. In
one police picture an officer was seen running across the
street with the type of gun that killed Ramp, yet on
testimony the police said they did not use that particular
type of weapon and that it was found in the basement of
MOVE headquarters. It is difficult to conceive in the wake
of so many inconsistencies how the MOVE nine were sentenced
to serve thirty to one hundred years for third degree
murder.28 Being imprisoned for life or executed by the
state was MOVE’s final statement to attest the injustices
of this system.
The prospect of long prison terms is meant to
preserve order; it is supposed to serve as a threat
to anyone who dares disturb existing social
relations, whether by failing to observe the sacred
rules of property, or by consciously challenging
the right of an unjust system of racism and
domination to function smoothly.29
MOVE 1978--Trial of Officers
The major obstacle in attaining convictions in
police brutality litigation is that the burden of proof
lies on the victim. Rarely are there any witnesses to
collaborate the victim’s testimony and evidence is
28 ,, • ,,Dubin, Nine MOVE Members Convicted, Evening
Bulletin, 4 August 1981, p. Al.
29Angela Davis, “The Soledad Brothers,” The Black
Scholar Vol. 2 no. 8—9 (April—May 1971) :2—3.
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primarily in the form of hospital records. In the 1978
MOVE siege, three officers savagely beat Delbert as he
surrendered with his hands on his head; videotaped for the
world to see; yet the officers involved escaped any type of
reprimand for their actions. (All of the Blacks surveyed
and only 25% of the whites held that police overreacted and
abused Delbert Africa; however, only 40% of Blacks
recommended suspension from the force.) “These men in
uniform, under the guise of being law enforcement officers,
savagely kicked and stomped a human being, and they
(police) had no regard for the public who might have been
,,30looking. The purpose of presenting this trial is to
codify the manipulation of court procedure to relieve the
officers of being penalized of violating Delbert Orr Africa
after he surrendered. The problematics in the prosecution
of the police will be exemplified utilizing this case of
Officers Geist, Mulvihill, and Zagame charged with simple
31and aggravated assault and official oppression. The
tactics used by the police prior to and during proceedings,
and the role of the all-white jury in such cases, will be
addressed.
30
Comment by Sergeant Aiphonso Deal, Philadelphia
Police, in “Four Officers Named in MOVE Beating,”
Philadelphia Daily News, 13 February 1979, p 3.
31The information on Commonwealth v. Geist,
Mulvihill and Zagame, docket #7911—001 1/3 2/3 3/3 (January
1980) is from notes taken by the author while witnessing
the trial.
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In 1978, MOVE found themselves in an armed
confrontation with the Philadelphia police. Their problems
with the police and city government stem back to 1972 as
MOVE constantly harassed officials for their policies that
they believed encroached upon the liberties of the masses.
Following one incident of police brutality, a MOVE baby was
said to have been killed by the police, making the police a
32target of increased criticism. In 1977, the Powelton
Association voiced complaints about MOVE harboring dogs and
rats on their property. However, some hold it was not
concern of MOVE’s sanitation habits but attention by the
press that led to initial conflict.33 When MOVE refused to
allow Licenses and Inspections on the property, warrants
were issued by Common Pleas Court Judge G. Fred DiBona, for
the arrest of Delbert, Merle, Jeanette, Phil, and Edward
Africa on June 4, 1977 because of their refusal to evacuate
the premises of 307-309 N. 33rd Street, based on health
code violations. For over a year, the police maintained a
barricade, also ordered by Judge DiBona, because MOVE
brandished weapons in front of their compound.34
32,, ,,
Commune Mourns Death of Baby, Philadelphia
Inquirer, 30 March 1976, p. B1.
33Seventy—one percent of those surveyed disagreed
with the media inflamation of MOVE’s disposition through
negative accounts. However, 43 percent based 80 percent of
their opinion on MOVE from media. See pp. 10-13 for sample
and appendix for results.
34”Blockade Set Up,” Evening Bulletin, 16 March
1978.
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The community displayed more opposition against the
barricade than against MOVE. The Powelton United Neighbors
initiated a suit to prevent its construction and the City
Wide Black Community Coalition for Human Rights held one of
the largest demonstrations in Philadelphia history
denouncing the barrier.35
In addition to the barricade that was set up, all
city services were cut off. The police had staked the area
out on a twenty—four hour basis and made so much money in
overtime that one police officer purchased a boat and named
it Delbert Africa.36 The case against MOVE was never
really firmly established other than refusing to let the
city inspect the premises for alleged health code
violations. MOVE was within their right to carry arms for
the purpose of protecting their property as they did not
venture away from the compound with the weapons. According
to constitutional law, one has the right to resist arrest
if they fear the use of deadly force in their
apprehension.37 MOVE clearly had a basis to resist under
these circumstances;however, the general consensus is that
35 ,,
Quinn, Heart of Darkness, pp. 247, 250.
36Police officer interview, June 1980, Philadelphia
City Hall, by writer.
37Dag E. Ytreberg, “Arrest--Right to Resist
Excessive Force,” American Law Reports 77 (San Francisco:
Bancroft Whitney, 1977), pp. 290—91.
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MOVE has no rights since they disturbed the peace with use
of the bullhorn, accumulated debris——attracting rodents——on
their property, and created a war zone.
Most people surveyed held that MOVE had no right to
defend themselves militarily and that the possession of
arms merely served to inflame the situation.38 Cruse holds
that “. . . armed self—defense was militantly raised so as
to provoke the police into more severe repressive actions
by giving them a ready-made excuse to shoot to kill.”39
Whenever Blacks use arms to defend themselves
• it is twisted and distorted on official
levels and ultimately rendered synonymous with
criminal aggression. On the other hand, when
policemen are clearly indulging in acts of criminal
aggression, officially they are defending
themselves through “justifiable assault or
justifiable homicide.”4°
On May 3, 1978, an agreement was reached with MOVE
for them to vacate the premises within ninety days, no
later than August 20, 1978.41 After a period of ten days
and countless pleas over the bullhorn to get MOVE to
surrender, over five hundred police officers and fire
personnel were stationed around the compound, water was
38 One Hundred percent of whites and seventy—five
percent of Blacks.
39 Cruse, Crisis of Negro Intellectual, p. 359.
40Davis, If They Come, p. 25.
41 .Testimony of Chief Inspector Fend of the
Philadelphia Police Department, January 8, 1980.
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pumped into the basement with deluge guns, tear gas was
thrown into openings of the upstairs, and a barrage of
gunfire filled the streets. Once the members were removed,
the property was demolished; therefore destroying valuable
evidence for their defense.
A videotape of the events of May 20, 1978 was shown
at the trial with no display of emotion by the jury as they
watched Delbert Africa being severely beaten by the
officers, thereby visually proving that these officers had
used excessive force.42 Norman Y. Lono of the Philadelphia
Daily News testified that Delbert Africa surrendered with
his hands up:
(a) helmet hit Delbert in the face and Delbert fell
backwards into the rubble. The same officer
grabbed his hair and dragged him across the street
and dropped him to the sidewalk. The other two
off icers started kicking his torso and lower
portions of his body . . . the chest and crotch
area. Two officers were involved in kicking
Delbert and a third one in a stakeout jumpsuit with
an automatic weapon joined in. Kicks were coming
from all over the place——kicked in face and crotch
then (he was) handcuffed and taken away. Another
officer comes up and takes two jabs at Delbert and
is restrained by another officer. (I) didn’t see
Delbert resist at any time.
On August 8, 1978, Delbert Africa was examined at Jefferson
Medical in which lacerations on the head, eyes, ears,
throat, and lungs were found. Also multiple contusions
including a contusion of the testes and a fractured right
42William Zembrzusky, “MOVE Incident on May 20,
1978,” videotape.
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jaw.43 The kicking of a Black man in the groin by a white
police officer is more than mere apprehension. “it is
something more fundamental and psychological going on. It
is the attempt to destroy the very essence, the very soul,
‘.44the very spirit of a human; that is what it is.
The defense, in an attempt to justify police
actions, used the behavior of MOVE members leading to the
events as warranting such abuse. Chief Inspector Fend of
the Philadelphia Police Department, the first witness of
the defense, recalled that the MOVE members were dressed in
battle fatigues and carried weapons including a submachine
gun; rifles, sawed-off shotguns and knives. William
Philips Africa came out with three sticks of dynamite and
threatened to throw it at police officers. The members
also did extensive calisthenics to display their physical
prowess, such as hundreds of push—ups at one time. The
physical condition of the members were noted by the police
for they were cautioned to be careful in apprehending them
and ensure they were searched properly. In short, the MOVE
members were considered armed and dangerous although no one
up until this point had been hurt nor were any crimes
committed; yet, a military situation did exist.
43Testimony of Carol McLean, Assistant Director of
Records at Jefferson Medical Center, February 2, 1978.
44Cornment by Reverend Daughtry during the United
States House Commission on Police Misconduct hearings,
p. 501.
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The officers that were posted at the MOVE
headquarters seemed to have been more taunted by the verbal
abuse they received from MOVE than the brandishment of
arms. One theory is that although a police officer will
walk into a physical situation they become terrified of
words. “Don’t forget, most cops don’t have any education,
they’re inarticulate” therefore, they feel more challenged
by words than by any actual threat.45 The police were on
stakeout for so long until MOVE members knew them by name
and would make remarks about their personal life. It is
necessary here to reproduce some of what was said by MOVE
for it was also held by the defense that the language used
by MOVE incited the police.
Let Black people rise up and long live revolution.
Europeans came over here, stole land from Indians
Motherf______ telling us what to do. . . . Uncle
Toms——how many have beer to f for dinner? .
All MOVE members are instructed to keep weapons
pointed up at all times. . . . We’re non—violent
want to be left alone, if they approach us
with any violence, we’ll retort. . . . If you try
to come in we’ll kill you. . • •46
There exists a thin line between using a courtroom
to discern justice and using theatrics to manipulate that
function. In this final portion of the case, we will note
the use of tactics which ultimately led to the dismissal of
this suit. The trial was moved to another courtroom
45Niederhoffer, The Ambivalent Force, p. 191.
46Commonwealth v. Geist, Mulvihill, and Zagame.
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equipped with an elevator which raised a cage from the
detention area below that was next to jurors. Phil Africa
was brought into the courtroom with his hands and feet
cuffed, shackled together by a heavy chain, he was removed
from the cage and asked his name, in which he retorted:
Phil Africa, disciple of John Africa. Judge, let
me ask you whats (the) purpose of shackles, bitch
convicted for murder and given 40,000 bail wasn’t
shackled . . . when these perverted f_ing
sheriffs beat our ass, they don’t get shackled.
Judge Kubacki ordered Phil to be removed from the
courtroom. Prosecuting attorney Parry stated, “there is no
rational reason to bring in Africans other than to inflame
the jurors.” The jurors appeared to be frightened;
however, one laughed. Delbert Africa was brought in by
five sheriffs. “You in charge of this courtroom——whats
purpose of shackles and handcuffs? You’re a criminal, this
is something you and Sprague (Defense Attorney) hooked up.”
Judge Kubacki told Delbert to shut up, Delbert replied,
“don’t you ever tell me to shut up.” The wife of one of
the defendants remarked, “we didn’t have to pay to go to
the zoo today,” and laughed.
On February 2, 1980, the fourth day of the trial,
the real drama began with the testimonies of the three
officers charged with aggravated assault. Joseph Zagame
was first, he began by describing the behavior of MOVE as
parading out front with a loudspeaker talking constantly,
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making threats on his life and his family as MOVE allegedly
knew where he lived. MOVE worked on shifts and according
to Zagame, were more militarily equipped than the police.
Zagame was not only called a “sleazy little Daygo” by MOVE,
but he was also cursed, spit at, and never knew what would
happen for they had guns, knives, and would fight amongst
themselves inside. Zagame was a good friend of Officer
James Ramp, the officer killed during the shootout, he put
47Ramp s body in the police van after he was slain. He saw
Delbert coming out of the window and had previously seen
Delbert with a knife; fearing that Delbert still had the
knife, Zagame grabbed his helmet and hit him because
Delbert was capable of trickery. Zagame grabbed Delbert by
the hair because he did not have on a shirt and he was in
the line of fire. Delbert made a struggle so Zagame hit
him again to keep him down. One officer said he did not
have his gun (Geist), thought Delbert had it, “rolled him =
over with their feet to get him over--couldn’t get
handcuffs on him (so) kicked him over a few times.”
Charles Geist, the second officer, began by
summarizing his observations of MOVE. His duties were to
patrol vehicle traffic around the compound because he had
information that MOVE dug tunnels to houses in the
47Mrs. Ramp testified that Ramp approached her the
day before the incident and said, “he was going to be
killed.” An ex-police officer said of Ramp that “He loved
to kill. . . . He was sick.” Interview, January 31, 1980.
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neighborhood and he had to check them. The odor of the
place permeated the entire neighborhood. There was an
eight foot barricade, twenty—five to thirty-five dogs of
varying sizes, hundreds of rats, the place was disgusting
and filthy. In December, while walking on patrol, he saw
Delbert holding a naked baby while he himself was dressed
warmly. As Geist moved towards Delbert he grabbed the baby
by the ankles and turned the baby upside down and said, “if
you come any closer I’ll rip the baby in half and blame it
on you.” As Geist continued to describe the conditions and
his mental state on the day in question, he began to cry.
Also Ramp’s sister and a few other spectators began tearing
up as Geist described how he saw Officer Ramp die. “(An)
explosion came out of the MOVE compound——smoke and gas
burned our skin and eyes——water washed feces down street,
rats were running across (his) face.”
At this point, Geist saw Zagame struggling with
Delbert and losing since he is a small built man; ergo, he
joined in the effort to subdue Delbert. After Geist pushed
Delbert on the ground, he noticed that his revolver was
missing, thereby getting hysterical as he believed that
Delbert had his gun. “(I) kicked him anywhere I could and
stomped him until he got handcuffs on.” Geist then
admitted that he kicked him~ between the legs for it was his
belief that Delbert still needed subduing.
The final officer, Terrance Mulvihill, testified
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with more of the same——inclusive of tears, tenseness, and
gasping for air and water. He believed MOVE was dangerous
and was terrified of the group. Delbert referred to
Mulvihill as a “faggot” and that since his mother had
venereal disease when he was born, that he was retarded.
On the day in question, Mulvihill was shaking so bad until
he could not load magazines, he prayed that he would get
out of the incident without injuries. Mulvihill began
brutalizing Delbert after he saw that “Delbert was fighting
two officers and heard Geist say “he’s got my gun.”
After the lunch recess, Judge Kubacki ended the
proceedings with the following statement:
All evidence is in and has been reported.
Philadelphia is bleeding to death over MOVE death,
District Attorney offices, news, community, police
department is divided, no verdict can stop the
f low. Only a lightning rod can stop it, and I’ll
be the lightning rod. (The) Judge will make (the)
decision, (and) will direct a verdict of not guilty
(thereby) taking it out of hand of jury. Court
adjourned.48
As outlined in the presentation of the trial, the
officers utilized numerous techniques to thwart the efforts
of some type of justice in their prosecution. The incident
in which Delbert was beaten took place in August 1978, the
unprecedented technique is unconstitutional
since the defendants had requested a jury but it was not
challenged since the decision was in their favor. However,
a judge does have the option of issuing a verdict if the
one reached by the jury was unreasonable because the
prosecution failed to establish burden of proof for the
crime.
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trial of the three officers did not begin until January
1980. The police also withheld the names of the officers
for over six months.49 District Attorney Ed Rendell tried
to persuade the police department to discipline the three
officers to avoid “. . . the embarrassment of prosecuting
them.” The maximum departmental punishment short of
dismissal is thirty days’ suspension without pay.5°
A major problem in the District Attorney’s office
was finding the right prosecutor for the case. At that
time there was a police unit within the D.A.’s office, but
only certain lawyers were assigned to it. There was
concern over using Black lawyers on police cases, as it is
believed that would instigate racial tension and a white
attorney may be more objective. Due to the public pressure
to prosecute and the conflict of interest between the
police and the district attorney, no one wanted the case.51
Rendell was forced to bring in an outsider, George Parry,
to handle the prosecution. The second problem was finding
a judge to hear the case; most Black judges did not want it
as they are often challenged when handling cases that
49,, Three Policemen to be Indicted in MOVE
Incident,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 2 August 1979, p. 1.
50 ,, , • ,Adrian Lee, Delbert Africa Beating Case,
Evening Bulletin, 1 May 1979, p. 9.
51 . •
Interview with Tony Jackson, former Director of
PILCOP, also acted as public defender for MOVE, June 1981,
Philadelphia.
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concern racial issues. Progressive judges~did not want to
be targets of MOVE taunts. MOVE had created their
predisposition by the way they acted in court that spurred
most judges to react which is what MOVE wanted. Judge
Kubacki was prepared in that his negative attitude acted as
the vehicle to enforce his point.52
The Fraternal Order of Police made constant
accusations of the trial being politically motivated and
refused to cooperate in hopes to contravene litigation.
Every challenge imaginable was made from jury selection to
relocation of the trial. The best attorney in the city was
hired to defend the police; Albert Sprague, who defended
the city against allegations of police misconduct in Rizzo
v. Goode and U.S. v. Philadelphia. The police officers
were well versed prior to proceedings as their stories were
almost identical. Theatrics was used to persuade the
jurors of their deep love for the officer killed and their
shared convictions of fear of the “prowess” of Delbert
Africa as embellished in tearful sobs. One of the most
effective tactics used by Sprague was having the courtroom
changed to one with an elevated cage. Delbert was not
informed of the proceedings and, knowing the nature of
53MOVE, his reaction was predictable.
52lnterview with Tony Jackson.
53 .Interview with Jeanette Knighton.
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The mood among the officers in response to the
charges pending against the officers that beat Delbert was
outrage. Members of the Fraternal Order of Police marched
and held a rally in City Hall courtyard to protest the
proceedings.54 Alphonso Deal was forced to resign from the
Philadelphia Police Department due to internal pressures
brought on after he sent a telegram to Rizzo calling for
the dismissal of the officers who beat Delbert Africa. The
Mayor told reporters that Deal was a “nut” and an “absolute
disgrace,” that he had better “retire” as he would “get a
piece of him.” Deal was cited as being an outstanding
off icer by the City Council in 1968, yet when he spoke out
against the incident his professional career was
jeopardized.55
Deal held that “(I)n a civilized society we can’t
tolerate police officers taking justice in own hands.”56
In outlining the treatment he received after this
statement, he noted that first his assignment was changed
to the district in which the attack on a Black family took
place in 1985. Other officers had failed to respond to his
request for backup, as he was clicked out of the police
54,, . ,,Officers Protest Trial, Philadelphia Inquirer,
19 May 1980, p. A—i.
55 ,,Cory, A Close Look, p. 37.
56 Interview with Aiphonso Deal, January 29, 1981.
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radio. He was eventually suspended and ordered to
apologize for speaking out against the police. Deal
objected against his suspension because the decision was
made by a kangaroo court,” while the FOP had locked the
door to keep him out. Two thousand FOP members signed a
petition demanding Deal’s removal after a court order
prevented Deal from being dismissed because of his
statement. During a meeting of the FOP, one officer
threatened Deal by saying, “‘I’ll blow your head off.’”
Deal’s shirt was then torn off as he was challenged to a
fight by a fellow officer. Deal was then exposed to
constant harassment, such as being billed for tickets that
were not left on his vehicle, and his FOP emblem being
ripped off of his car. He also found bullet holes in the
window of the North Philadelphia branch of the NAACP where
he was President. The only problem with the department is
“the tone currently being set from the top,” Deal
contended; and “‘(u)ntil we are willing to stand up against
hoodlums in uniform or out . . . we won’t be taken
seriously as professionals.’”57 The tragedy of the Delbert
case is that this society will not prosecute people that
take laws in their own hand and “we as leaders cannot show
Blacks that justice prevails.”58
57 ,,Cory, A Close Look, p. 37.
58 Interview with Aiphonso Deal, January 29, 1981.
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Jury
The all-white jury used in this case was brought in
from Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, a small town
approximately two hundred miles from the City of
Philadelphia. The rationale of bringing jurors in was that
they would be more impartial since they were not constantly
exposed to the publicity and emotional aura of the
incident.59 There were originally two hundred people on
the juror panel, ten were Black and one of the Black women
had her Doctorate; all the Blacks were excluded through
peremptory challenges. It will be argued here that the
systematic exclusion of Blacks from the jury process is an
incidence of “(T)he badges of slavery (that) have never
been substantially, much less completely, eradicated.”6°
The legacy of the all-white jury is that it has
been used not only to railroad Blacks for crimes they may
not have committed, but in this instance, to liberate
whites from prosecution of crimes of violence against
Blacks. The Supreme Court held in 1880 that excluding
Blacks from jury service is a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; however, the
practice continued as exemplified in Norris v. Alabama in
59lntervjews with the court clerk, Harvey Clark,
reporter, and opening statement by Judge Kubacki in
reference to the jury, January 29, 1980.
60Feagin, “Slavery Unwilling to Die,” p. 190.
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611935 of total exclusion of Blacks as jurors. The
constitution merely forbids systematic exclusion from jury
panels, there is no requirement that one’s race must be
reflected in the makeup of one’s jurors. As long as Blacks
appeared on the original panel and were exempted through
questioning, the all-white jury cannot be challenged as
discriminatory.62 This practice was affirmed in Swain
Alabama when the conviction of a nineteen year old boy
accused of raping a seventeen year old white girl was
upheld. The court held that exclusion of Blacks through
peremptory challenges is not a constitutional issue since
it does not constitute systematic exclusion.63
Determination of whether the racial composition of
a jury is reflective of the population is made during the
selection of venire panel in the choosing of prospective
jurors.64 In police trials, it has been found that Blacks
were seriously underrepresented and that a large percentage
of jurors sat on more than one police trial often within a
short period of time. One problem noted was that jurors
are chosen from lists of registered voters and Blacks do
61Strauder v. West Virginia 106 U.S. 303 (1880),
and Norris v. Alabama 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
62Sheri Lynn Johnson, “Black Innocence and the
White Jury,” Michigan Law Review 83 (June 1985):1615 and
1655.
63Swain v. Alabama 380 U.S. 85 (1965)
64 ,,Johnson, Black Innocence, p. 1651
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not register in the same proportions as whites.65 A
prosecutor has a limited flumber of peremptory challenges,
however, a skilled questioner can obtain dismissals by
showing bias and prejudice.66 Defense attorneys for the
police tend to favor all white jurors for they tend to view
the police as “. . . respectable people performing a
difficult and necessary job.”67 A study found that Black
jurors in these types of cases usually resulted in hung
juries due to the different perception of democratic
society by some Blacks. The “. . . presence of black jurors
makes consensus more difficult because it inhibits the
operation of racial prejudice or other anti-plaintiff or
pro—police biases. ,,68
The Supreme Court has ruled that when members of a
defendant’s race have been purposely excluded from the
jury, the Equal Protection Clause is violated. In
addition, it reaffirmed that a “defendant does not have a
right under the Equal Protection Clause to a petit jury
composed in whole or in part of persons of his own
race. . . .“ The clause does forbid a prosecutor from
challenging potential jurors solely on “. . . their race or
65”Suing the Police,” p. 806.
66Sheila Marie Walsh, “Criminal Law/Peremptory
Challenges”, Illinois Bar Journal 71 (June 1, 1983):622.
67”Suing the Police,” p. 814.
68Ibid., p. 806.
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on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be
unable impartially to consider the state’s case.”69
Although this ruling does reflect the court’s sensitivity
to the issue, it is still a far cry from the elimination of
the all white jury. The exclusion of Blacks should be a
cause of the reversal of a conviction in that the verdicts
are as illegal as their composition.7° Aiphonso Deal found
it appalling that in the State of Pennsylvania an all-white
jury would be selected. “It’s clear that everything is
being done that justice will not reign as far as Blacks are
concerned. ,,71
MOVE 1985--Deadly Force
The number of officers and munitions involved in
the 1978 incident did constitute overkill, yet many
Philadelphians held the actions taken by police were
appropriate.72 In general, the police authorization of the
use of force is unrestricted, although they are not allowed
to use it maliciously or furiously. Further, the police
are implored to maintain a humane demeanor and circumspect
69Batson v. Kentucky 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986) in
Criminal Law Bulletin Vol. 23 no. 1 (January/February
1987)
70Miller, Police Function, p. 293.
71 Interview, January 29, 1981.
72 Forty—one percent of those questioned approved of
Rizzo’s handling of the 1978 incident.
217
in carrying out their duty.73 It is held here that the
absence of guidance in the use of deadly force in 1978 led
to the use of excessive military power in 1985. The bomb
that endangered an entire neighborhood was “. . . wanton
disregard for human life.”74 Contrarily, it was held to be
• . a sound, conscious decision . • . by all the experts
[and] professionals . . . (t)he unexpected part of that was
the fire itself.”75 The background to which such a
resolution could be made will be offered through the
history and status of deadly force. The activities on
May 13, 1985 will be outlined in order to coherently
analyze and illustrate the ineffectiveness of the MOVE
Commission as a mechanism to oversee misguided police
authority. Finally, the role of a Black a mayor in the
aversion to or abatement of police brutality will be noted.
The only criminal issue more pertinent than capital
punishment is that body of law which justifies homicide by
police officers; thereby rendering execution without due
process of law. One reason that this street level justice
is allowed is due to the dangerous aura given to policing.
73Terry, Policing Society, p. 93.
74 II
Charles Bowser, Philadelphia Special
Investigation Commission Report--Opinion of Charles
Bowser,” March 1986, p. 30.
75John Anderson and Hilary Hevenor, Burning down
the House: MOVE and the Tragedy of Philadelphia (New York
and London: W. W. Norton & Co., 1987), pp. 153-54.
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However, it has been found that police are “six times more
likely to kill than to be killed in the course of their
duty,” also, the popular conception of the dangerous nature
of police work has been exaggerated.”76 The term used to
identify one that has been slain by the police is
“decedent,” reference being made to the dual role of victim
and offender as the slain violated the law.77 There is a
disproportionate impact of executions without trial on
Blacks who account for one half of persons killed; yet they
comprise 12 percent of the population. Some argue that
this is not a result of racism but from “. . . community
characteristics such as the high general rate of violence
in the inner cities.”78
Prior to the fifteenth century, felonies were
punishable by death. The rise of institutions to house
those guilty of felonious crimes led to long prison terms
as opposed to execution. The police began using revolvers
in the 1850s after criminals began using them due to the
availability of army revolvers after the Civil War. The
rearmament of and increasingly hostile urban society led to
76Gerald D. Robin, “The Justifiable Homicide by
Police Officers,” Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and
Police Science, June 1963, p. 230.
77Ibid., p. 226.
78Arnold Binder and Peter Scharf, “The Violent
Police—Citizen Encounter,” Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 452 (November 1980) :1.
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official use of revolvers by the police to shoot fleeing
suspects who were posing no immediate threat.79 It has
been found that over the years the number of crimes
considered felonious has been increasing while the use of
the death penalty was contracted to treason and crimes
endangering life. These changes had a direct effect on the
number of situations in which a police officer could kill
80without trial.
The use of deadly force has been challenged as a
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual
punishment, the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and unreasonable seizure of the Fourth
Amendment.8’ In Mattis v. Schnarr the court held that
deadly force does not violate equal protection because
“. . . (T)he activity herein is not constitutionally
protected as there is no constitutional right to flee to
prevent arrest. The burden the statutes impose is on
,,82flight, not on life. The historical legalities
surrounding the use of deadly force lead to the conclusion
79Lawrence Sherman, “Execution Without Trial:
Police Homicide and the Constitution,” Vanderbilt Law
Review 33 (January 1980) :73-74.
80 ,, •Sherman, Police Homicide, p. 75.
81Binder and Scharf, “Violent Police,” p. 10, and
Sherman, “Police Homicide,” p. 73.
82 ,, • •
Sherman, Police Homicide, p. 74.
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83that the only appropriate action is to govern its use.
It has been found that Blacks are more likely to be
shot in cities where regulations relating to police use of
deadly force are vague as opposed to areas with more
stringent rules.84 The police do confront violent
situations and must protect their own lives and guard the
safety of others; therefore, the use of deadly force in a
situation of self-defense is highly legitimate. The
problem is that in the majority of cases the victim is
weaponless, usually in flight from an arrest or merely a
victim of an officer’s miscalculation. The guiding rule of
felony is used but when an officer is in the midst of an
immediate threat and has to decide whether to employ force,
he will not consider if the conduct is a misdemeanor of a
felony.85 In fact, “. . . police seem uncertain of the
nature and extent of their authority to use force in making
an arrest. This is partly due to lack of explicit guidance
,,86from the law itself.
Another problem is that legal decisions pertaining
to policing rarely are communicated to the officer on the
street and/or have little effect on changing daily routine.
83Mattis v. Schnarr 404 F.Supp. 643 (1975)
84Box, Power, p. 82.
85LaFaue, Arrest, p. 214.
86Ibid., p. 209.
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In this case, Tennessee v. Garner and Memphis Police Dept.
v. Garner, the court ruled that the police may still use
deadly force to apprehend felons if it is necessary and the
officer has “probable cause to believe the suspect poses a
threat to himself or others.”87 Justice White held that
the police may not seize an unarmed suspect by shooting
him, as it would violate the Fourteenth Amendment ban on
unreasonable seizures. Although this decision overturned
statutes in about twenty states that gave the officers
broad discretion, to shoot fleeing suspects, it left a
loophole which allows for the continuance of such
practices, i.e., the subjectivity of the officer to
determine if this suspect “appeared to be armed and
dangerous.”88 Most police manuals fail to distinguish
which felonies are in fact dangerous enough to warrant the
use of deadly force.89
Overall, the rules governing the use of deadly
force are vague statements housed in police department
manuals that in most cases are not correlated with any
standards of punishment for violation of said procedures.
87James Fyfe, “The Supreme Courts New Rules for
Police Use of Deadly Force,” Criminal Law Bulletin 22
(January—February 1986) :62, Tennessee v. Garner and Memphis
Police Department v. Garner 53 U.S.L.W. 4410 (March 27,
1985)
88”The Supreme Court Rules on Deadly Force,”
Newsweek, April 8, 1985, p. 87.
89Binder and Scharf, “Violent Police,” p. 11.
222
In determining whether a shooting was justifiable, a
balancing test is used of the state interests and the right
of the individual. If it is found that the state’s
interest was served, i.e., the protection of society, the
killing is justified and is thus deemed more important than
90the individual s right to a trial.
The court has held that police manuals, since they
contain rules and regulations guiding the activities of a
public agency, have the effect of a statute and must be
adhered to.91 Justice Neumann based his decision that the
manual must be upheld in order to prevent officers from
making arbitrary field decisions. The role of the manual
is very significant in that violation of said rules of a
public entity carries with it tort liability.92 In
Pennsylvania, the newly revised rules concerning the use of p
deadly force are summarily as follows:
He is justified in the use of any force which
he believes to be necessary to effect the arrest
and of any force which he believes to be necessary
to defend himself or another from bodily harm while
making the arrest. However, he is justified in
using deadly force only when he believes that such
force is necessary to prevent death or serious
bodily injury to himself or such other person, or
when he believes both that:
90Wiley v. Memphis Police Department 434 U.s. 822
(1977)
91Peterson v. City of Long Beach 24 Cal 3d, 328 Cal
Rptr 360 (1979)
92Wright, “Police shootings,” p. 428.
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(i) such force is necessary to prevent the
arrest from being defeated by resistance or
escape; and
(ii) the person to be arrested has committed or
attempted a forcible felony or is attempting to
escape and possesses a deadly weapon, or otherwise
indicates that he will endanger human life or
inflict serious bodily injury unless arrested
without delay.93
With this guide as the force of law in place, over 10,000
rounds of heavy caliber ammunition was shot into the MOVE
residence on May 13, 1985. The inhabitants had not.
committed a felony nor were they attempting to flee arrest,
in fact six of the persons were children. In the
aftermath, six adults and five children were killed.94
The six dead adults are: James Conrad Hampton, age
36; Theresa Brooks Africa, age 26; Raymond Foster Africa,
age 50; Rhonda Harris Africa, age 30; Frank James Africa,
age 26; Vincent Leapheart, age 54. The five dead children
are: Tomaso Africa, age 9; Katricia “Tree” Dotson, age 13—
15; Zenetta Dotson, age 12-14; Delicia Africa, age 11—12;
Phil Africa,age 11-12.
The Siege
The bombing and burning of Black neighborhoods is
not unique in the history of Blacks in America. As noted
in Chapter III, burnings of Black areas throughout the
93Pennsylvania Deadly Force Statute, 18
Pennsylvania Constitution Statute, sec. 508 (a) (1) (1982).
Margot Harry, “Attention MOVE! This is America”
(Chicago: Banner Press, 1987), p. 73.
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history of Philadelphia was an opportunity to riot. The
closest corollary event to that in Philadelphia has to be
the race riot in Tulsa, Oklahoma on June 1, 1921. It was
during this incident that a bomb was dropped in the Black
section which ignited a fire that engulfed thirty—five city
blocks. As the fire raged on, local officials observed and
took no action to extinguish it.95
The events leading up to the tragedy of May 13,
1985 are complex only in that they lend to different
interpretations. MOVE began to reinforce their house by
boarding up the windows and other openings, a bunker was
then built on top of the house which was heavily fortified.
MOVE began to use the bullhorn to demand that the city
negotiate the reconsideration of the conviction of the MOVE
nine.96 The Mayor holds that he was unable to negotiate
with MOVE, now deceased members had held that the Mayor
refused to negotiate with them.97 Charles Bowser holds if
it was any other person or group that the Mayor and city
officials would have made an attempt to review the
demands.98 Members of the Osage Avenue community had
95A Conspiracy of Silence: The Tulsa Race Riot of
1921,” Horizons, National Public Radio, 1980.
96”MOVE-ing Accounts of Osage,” Philadelphia
Tribune 11 October 1985, p. 1.
97Harry, “Attention MOVE!” p. 39.
98Charles Bowser, Special Investigation Commission
Report, p. 6. Note: This opinion was excluded from the
official MOVE Commission report.
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pressured the city to do something about MOVE in their
area, little did they know they were merely pawns used by
MOVE to force city officials to review the convictions and
by the authorities in their planned assault to rid
Philadelphia of MOVE forever.99
Mayor Goode had been aware of the MOVE members on
Osage Avenue and was alerted to the neighbors’ complaints
three and a half years prior to the incident.100 One year
before the confrontation Goode began the process of
formulation of an overall strategy to evict the members.
Goode had characterized the group as urban guerrillas bent
on psychological warfare. “MOVE [is] dedicated to the
,,101destruction of our entire way of life. The Mayor
contends that he adopted a hands-off policy that had
evolved from preceding administrations. This forbade any
city inspectors onto the MOVE property or any contact being
made with them other than through the police.102 That such
a policy existed was refuted by former Mayor William Green
99Jeri Africa noted use of bullhorn to pressure
government on “Mayor Wilson Goode and MOVE,” Issues and
Answers, WPVI-TV (May 19, 1985).
100
Ibid. Blacks were divided on the question of
netotiations as opposed to 83 percent of whites that held
violence could not have been prevented.
101,, “
Mayor Wilson Goode and MOVE, Special Report,
WCAU-TV (May 14, 1985).
MOVE Transcripts,” Philadelphia Inquirer 28
October 1985, p. C9.
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who held that “(a)llowing a MOVE buildup was dangerous.
,,103 City officials from the various departments of
Licenses and inspections, Water and Sewer, Human Services,
and Parole all testified that they were instructed not to
interfere with any operations concerning MOVE. The major
justification for the military assault on MOVE was the
bunker affixed on the roof; however, the city, through
Licenses and Inspections, could. have issued a stop—work
order one year before, which would have averted the entire
incident.104 It is clear that the city was stalling for
the appropriate time to launch an assault that was planned
in May 1984.105 The Mayor then gave former Police
Commissioner Gregore Sainbor and former Managing Director
Leo A. Brooks, a retired thirty year major general in the
U.S. Army, his authority to implement an overall plan to
safely evacuate the house.’06 Sambor then instructed now
retired Sergeant Herbert Kirk to develop a plan which
included the use of water to prevent anyone from emerging
from the roof and an entry device to penetrate the roof to
allow tear gas to be deployed. Such entry devices were
tested a number of times before the appropriate one was
103 Ibid.
104,, I,MOVE Transcripts, testimony of Raymond Tate
former Commissioner of Licenses and Inspections, sec. C8.




On May 10, 1985, Sambor met with Fire Commissioner
William C. Richmond, FBI representatives and two dozen top
police officials to develop what Sambor characterized as
the most conservative, controlled, disciplined and
safe operations we could devise.’~°8 Here, the legalities
involved in using the fire department should be injected.
The courts have held that the fire department as an
instrument of the state have to perform said duties.
Furthermore, they are immune from any type of liability in
the performance of difficult and urgent duties; ergo, the
fire department can be used in military offenses without
fear of recourse.109 The plan as developed by the
officials, submitted to and approved by the Mayor, was: to
execute five warrants for the adult members, use of water
and tear gas to force MOVE out, and the use of explosives
to put holes in adjoining homes to dislodge tear gas.’1°
In the early morning of May 13, over five hundred
people were evacuated from 125 houses as the police
suspected that gunfire might be used in the evacuation of
MOVE. There were SWAT forces, seventy—seven police
107
Ibid., testimony of Sgt. Kirk, sec. C8.
108”MOVE Transcripts,” sec. C14.
109Lichty, “Redress Against Sovereignty,” p. 14.
110,, MOVE Transcripts, sec. ClO.
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actually involved in the assault, and hundreds of police
and fire officials involved in other functions such as
crowd control, backup, etc. The environ was that of a war
zone, tense, unsafe, and very intimidating. Many officers
there were also involved in the 1978 siege including one
that was tried for the beating of Delbert Africa. Mayor
Goode had said that he asked Commissioner Sambor to hand
pick the officers exempting those that participated in the
1978 incident that may have some residue of negative
emotions, Sambor did not recall that.’1’ The police for
the most part chose their own artillery which leads to the
theory that they were “. . . invited to do whatever they
decided was necessary without supervision or direction.”1~2
Sambor testified that he “. . . did not restrict the type
,,113of weapon that was to be used. The decision on
weaponry was made by the tactical division and the firing
range staff. Sambor did add that he thought the weapons
were, in fact, inappropriate for that operation.114
A police report issued after the assault indicates
that the cops were equipped with a powerful
arsenal. Sixteen cops were assigned M—16s. .
Thirteen cops had 12-gauge shotguns with deadly 00
buckshot; two others were armed with .22 caliber
rifles equipped with silencers; and there were also
1111bid., sec. C14.
‘12Bowser, “Dissenting Opinion,” p. 28.
113,, .MOVE Transcripts, sec. C15.
sec. C14.
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Browning automatic rifles, 30.06 rifles with
scopes, and 357 magnums on hand. . . . Seven others
were equipped with Uzi submachine guns; there were
two M—60 machine guns and one .45 caliber Thompson
machine gun. There were also two .50 caliber
machine guns with arms—piercing ammunition
ordinarily used to take out jeeps or trucks. To
top it off, there was a 20mm antitank gun.
Significantly, many of these are war—fighting
weapons and are not normally found in city police
department arsenals. 115
The Commissioner over a bullhorn ordered MOVE to
vacate the premises; MOVE retorted with words that led
officials to believe they were not going to leave
peacefully. At that point tear gas was used followed by
automatic gunshots. Sambor testified that the gunfire came
from MOVE first; however, no automatic weapons were
retrieved from the area.~~6 The assault ensued with water
from deluge guns, tear gas, explosives, one of which blew
the entire front porch area off, and ten thousand rounds of
ammunition. The police were then concerned that the
bunker, still in place, gave MOVE a strategic advantage and
their plan was to explode a hole in the roof and remove the
bunker. Officer Klein composed the explosive devices
utilizing Tovex TR2 and one and a quarter pound block of C
4; a consultant later testified that double that amount was
actually used as Klein did not believe the amount was
sufficient. The bomb was then placed in a satchel and
115Harry, “Attention MOVE!” pp. 44-45.
116,, MOVE Transcripts, sec. ClO.
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taken to a police helicopter where it was dropped on the
roof of the residence.’17 An explosion followed that
merely shook the bunker and for a moment it was then
considered to drop a second explosive, but the fire
started.
The tragic decision was then made to “let the
bunker burn” by Commissioner Sambor, in which not only
MOVE, but an entire community was engulfed in flames while
the officials looked on. Their rationale was that they
believed MOVE was shooting and they did not want to
endanger the lives of the firefighters. MOVE was trying to
escape the inferno but the gunfire from the officers made
them retreat to a burning building for their own
118cremation. Sarnbor held that he did not believe that the
decision to let the area burn presented any real danger to
the occupants. He added that he did not try to find out
why water was not put on the fire after the bunker was
,,119dislodged (b)ecause it (was) not (his) job. The
provision of fire fighting apparatus and water supply is
exclusively for public purposes, thereby a municipality is
exempt from any liability for failure to extinguish a
117
Anderson and Hevenor, Burning Down the House,
p. 144.
‘18”The Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations,”
MOVE Commission, March 6, 1986, p. 20.
119,, MOVE Transcripts, sec. C16.
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120fire.
The aftermath of this incident divided opinion
nationwide. The action was commended by the likes of the
FBI Director, Attorney General Edwin Meese III, and Los
Angeles Commissioner Daryl Gates.’21 The Black community
was split, the majority of those outside the Philadelphia
area were appalled while many Philadelphians accepted the
action of their Mayor. Due to the uneasiness of
Philadelphia and its community at large, Mayor Goode, after
taking full responsibility for the incident, appointed a
Commission to investigate the actions of those involved.
Commissions have been formed in this country,
usually in the aftermath of some type of tragedy or scandal
with the purpose of fact—finding to array the fears of the
122public and preempt the spread of rumors. There are
basically two functions of the Commission, investigatory
and advisory, the MOVE Commission fulfilled both of these
roles. Other than the Knapp Commission that was appointed
in 1970 to investigate police corruption in New York, there
was little use of public inquiry commissions at the local
level.123 The Mayor had used his implied authority as
120Lichty, “Redress Against Sovereignty,” p. 14..
121Harry, “Attention MOVE!” p. 16.
122 MOVE Commission Report, p. 1.
123Carl E. Singley, “The MOVE Commission: The Use
of Public Inquiry Commissions to Investigate Government
Misconduct and Other Matters of Vital Concern,” Temple Law
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granted by the City Home Rule charter to establish the
Commission as he may appoint persons to act in an advisory
function, to receive and investigate complaints and his
overall responsibility to conduct executive and
administrative work towards the enforcement of law.’24
The Fraternal Order of Police challenged the
legality of the Commission on the grounds of the Mayor’s
authority to establish; its subpoena power and its exact
nature which would determine the extent that form
rulemaking procedures applied. All City employees were
asked to cooperate with the Commission by supplying
information and testifying if necessary. The Commission
was granted subpoena power in order to compel noncity
employees to testify. The Philadelphia Court of Common
Pleas had denied the request for an injunction by the
Fraternal Order of Police against the Commission. The FOP
hindered the investigatory function from the beginning.
After losing the bid to stop the hearings, they instructed
the officers involved to take the Fifth Amendment as they
did not know if what they said in the hearings would be
used against them in future criminal proceedings.
Regardless of the rationale used in its origin or
the obstacles it encountered, some still held that the
Quarterly Vol. 59, no. 2 (1986) :305.
1241bid., p. 313.
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Commission proved to be a “unique opportunity for private
citizens to participate in the quest for truth as holders
of the public trust.”125 Many at the outset felt the
purpose of the Commission was to whitewash the crimes of
the administration. The composition of the Commission lent
credence to this claim as it was made up of legal,
business, and managerial factions within the city. It has
been found that all the members were supportive of the
Goode election and of his administration as was expressed
through their heavy donations and verbal support of the
126Mayor. Some Philadelphians also believed that the
Commission was a waste of time and taxpayers’ money, as
they spent over one million dollars, conducted over one
thousand indepth interviews, subpoenaed records of thirty—
six city departments, and accumulated thousands of pages of
documents.127 Many still remain mystified by the overall
raison d’etre of the Commission in light of their
conclusions.
The Commission first concluded that MOVE had
evolved into an “authoritarian, violence—threatening cult,”
this thereby justified the lack of support given to the
125Singley, “The MOVE Commission,” p. 328.
126,, MOVE Transcripts, sec. C2.
survey found only 35 percent of those polled
supported this contention. Sixty—five percent believed
that the Commission was instrumental in revealing facts.
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group that was evident in 1978 and the tactics used to
remove them. The only evidence that such an evolution took
place was the erection of the bunker on the Osage
residence, and a statement by Louise James in reference to
her son that he seemed to be more aggressive and militant
in his demands. There was not much else to substantiate
their claim of violence, as a matter of fact MOVE had not
even brandished weapons as they did in 1978. It was also
held that they terrified their neighbors with threats of
abuse and intimidation; yet the Osage residents only refer
to the sanitation of MOVE and the use of profanity over the
bullhorn. These antics and activities are identical to
those utilized in 1978.
The conclusions of the Commission seem to indicate
that the activities of 1985 were haphazard, poorly planned,
and that other means in particular negotiations, should
have been employed with the attempt to apprehend the
members without a loss of life and property. The
Commission reached that conclusion because they believed
peaceful apprehension was the goal of the Mayor, federal
and local officials. Clearly if that had been their
objective, the subsequent tragedy of destruction of MOVE
and their children would not have taken place. Sambor
testified that he viewed the children as combatants, “The
prospect of a mind that could seriously consider armed
conflict with nine year old boys and girls is frightening.”
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The thought that such a mind existed in the police
conunissioner of a major American city is sobering.128
The Mayor was found to be “. . . grossly negligent
[as he] clearly risked the lives of those children” Goode,
former City Managing Director, known for his efficiency,
diligence,and thoroughness in any undertaking, makes it
highly unlikely that his actions were those of an
uninformed person that happened to act hastily and
129haphazardly. There were ample opportunities to remove
the children from MOVE, as they visited the neighboring
park daily on the basis of truancy and questionable child
care, but these actions were not taken. It brings to mind
the attack on the children in South Africa to prevent the
spread of revolutionary ideas to another generation. The
Mayor failed to halt the fire as he abdicated his authority
to the police and fire officials. Finally, “(t)he plan to
bomb the MOVE house was reckless, ill conceived and hastily
approved. Dropping a bomb on an occupied row house was
unconscionable and should have been rejected out—of—hand by
130the mayor.
The facts disclose that the material used in the
128Bowser, “Dissenting Opinion,” p. 18.
129,, . ,,
Findings, MOVE Commission, p. 18.
130 ,, •
Bruce Kauffman, in his Dissenting Opinion,
March 1986, agreed with the amount of force used to subdue
MOVE, in addition to 50 percent of the whites questioned.
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bomb were provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
months before its actual dislodgement and should not have
been in the custody of urban law enforcers. This gives
further credence to the theory that the 1985 incident was a
well-planned tactical procedure to annihilate MOVE. The
Commission further deemed the use of force by the police as
excessive, in addition to the use of fire as a tactical
weapon was unscrupulous.
In fulfillment of its role as fact-finder, some
conclusions had to be drawn and by asserting a moral
judgment on the incident, one would argue that they more
than adequately did their job. The Commission then went
one step further to make recommendations on how future
incidents of this magnitude should be handled.
Recommendations were made by the Commission in six
areas: operation of the city government and police
department; coordination between the police and fire; local
response to crisis; laws and regulations; disciplinary
action; and further investigation. For purposes here, a
few points have been extracted to support the contention
that their concern was that in the future such situations
should be handled more efficiently. First, a strategic
planning process should be engendered in order to monitor
all future violent confrontations with emphasis on non
violent recourse. To ensure that the policy comply with
the Mayor, a liaison of the Mayor should be assigned to the
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police. In addition, the appointment of a~Public Safety
Board that could review the policies of the police and fire
departments should be considered. A policy statement ought
to be developed “outlining the limited circumstances .
for use of explosives. The increased visibility of
minorities on the scene of racial incidents may reduce
tension. The police department preparation of tactical
plans for hostage or barricades should be submitted to the
Mayor for review after consultation with federal, state,
131and nongovernmental experts. Finally, as a disciplinary
measure, the Commission recommended that all city agencies
involved, that had initiated internal reviews, resume such
a procedure with the goal of “. . . diagnosing operational
shortcomings, instituting corrective actions, assessing
individual responsibility and initiating appropriate
132disciplinary action through standing procedures.
The consequence of these findings were negligible
in that the Police Commissioner and Managing Director
resigned before any criminal charges could be filed. The
death of the children was deemed as unjustifiable homicide
and was referred to a Grand Jury to determine if
substantial charges and an identifiable person on which to
levy charges for prosecution could be made. The testimony
131”MOVE Commission Report,” pp. 371—74.
1321bid., p. 375.
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in Grand Jury investigations is kept secret which hampers
public knowledge of said proceedings. However, “the state
need only present evidence sufficient to convince them the
suspect may be guilty and trial court will do the rest.”133
134
The Grand Jury in Pennsylvania focused on the
dropping of the satchel bomb from a helicopter and the
decision to let the fire burn to ascertain whether crimes
had been committed. They defined a crime as an act that
has a direct causal relationship to a negative result but
added that a state of mind of intent to do harm would have
to exist to fully substantiate a criminal act. Utilizing
such, the Mayor and other officials clearly committed acts
that had a deleterious result but they did not possess a
destructive state of mind at the time in that they were
merely reacting to a situation. It was “. . . the MOVE
members themselves, (that) played such an independent,
important and overriding role in bringing about the
resulting harm. . “~ The dropping of the bomb was
thereby justified within the realm of the use of deadly
force as proscribed by general provisions.136 The
133Long et al. American Minorities, p. 130.
134As of this writing the report of the federal
Grand Jury has not been released.
135,, MOVE Jury Urges no Charges But Condemns
Officials’ Actions,” Philadelphia Inquirer, Wednesday, 4
May 1988, pp. 1A, 18A, 19A, 20A, and 21A.
136Refer to pp. 226—234 of this study.
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officials that made the decision to let the fire burn were
exonerated because they did not foresee that MOVE members
would make an “irrational” decision to return to the
inferno, and in essence commit suicide.
These basic findings were housed in a 279 page
report and were accepted by a 16—4 vote after a two—year
investigation inclusive of 125 witnesses. Although two
police officers perjured themselves on the extensive use of
C—4, an explosive chemical, they were spared criminal
charges because of the ordeal they had undergone in 1985.
The conclusion reached by the Commission that police
prevented MOVE members from exiting the burning house was
dismissed by the Grand Jury for lack of evidence.
Therefore, one of the major contentions of the MOVE
Commission as a basis for criminal indictments of the
police was thus nullified. Fire Commissioner Richmond
commented that the findings of the Grand Jury reaffirmed
137his faith in the judicial system.
The investigation should have focused on proper
procedures by the police Commissioner by the tactical teams
that launched the assault and prevented the MOVE members
from exiting the premises. In addition to examination of
the breakdown of communication, the Police Commissioner and
the Mayor should have been ~held legally responsible through
‘37News report, KYW-TV, 3 May 1988.
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litigatory efforts for premeditated murder. The only real
tragedy in the eyes of the Commission and city officials
was the destruction of property which was redressed through
construction of new homes by the city. MOVE was held
responsible for their own death through their efforts as
evidenced by the trial of Ramona Africa after the event,
who was sentenced for seven years for conspiracy and
rioting. MOVE was referred to as terrorists and defined as
perpetrators as opposed to victims.’38
Black Mayor
in the city of bells and love
for certain brothers,
a negro
plays white and mayor,
makes history in america
by disregarding the bill of rights
while dropping bombs on
who he used to be.’39
The role of Black elected officials has
historically been a sign of Black advancement in this
system as a means to address the interests of a voiceless
minority. History has shown however that most Black
elected officials are virtually powerless in the
advancement and protection of Black people either through
the nature of the infrastructure and/or lack of inclination
138Harry, “Attention MOVEI” p. 143.
‘39Hakj R. ~adhubutj, “Moves for Wilson Goode,”
Killing Memory, Seeking Ancestors (Detroit: Lotus Press,
1987), p. 41.
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to do such. Indigenous officials throughout the Third
World have been used as a smoke screen to hide the
continual rape and exploitation of a people. They
obfuscate the major issues and lead the people into a
stupor of confusion as they look for these leaders to
deliver them in the face of increasing oppression. In
fact, Black mayors have a detrimental affect on community
140agitation for change as faith in the system increases.
Such is the case in Philadelphia, as evidenced by the
conspiracy of silence in the aftermath of a tragedy. Most
Black Philadelphians gave Goode a pledge of their
confidence and support, he also managed to gain the support
of whites who viewed him as “not so bad” after all.14’
Daryl Gates of the Los Angeles Police Department, said that
Goode is an “outstanding mayor” and an “inspiration to the
,,142nation.
It has been believed that Black mayors could be
used to end the problem of police brutality by making
police officials accountable for the actions of their
subordinates.’43 However, the record of Black mayors
140Moss, Black Political Ascendency, p. 141.
141Coinment by Florynce Kennedy, in Harry,
“Attention MOVE!” p. 191.
142”Mayor Wilson Goode and MOVE,” Issues and
Answers, WPVI-TV, May 19, 1985.
143 Remark of Sam Evans, head of Black Family of
Leaders in Lynn Washingtons’ “Police Abuse of Citizens is
Widespread,” Philadelphia Tribune 7 May 1977, p. 16.
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throughout this country reveals their lack-of control over
the policing functions. Carl Stokes, former Mayor of
Cleveland, noted efforts to control police as a failure.
Police defiance and racial practices toward the Black
144community that even he as mayor was unable to prevent.
In Los Angeles, Mayor Bradley has had little control of one
of the most abusive police forces in the nation as
evidenced by massive litigation against their tactics. In
this case, Mayor Goode abdicated his authority and turned
the matter over to the police without specific guidance
and/or direction.’45 “If the mayor does not have effective
control of the police the people do not have effective
control of the police. If the people do not have effective
control of the police, freedom is dead.”46
Goode took full responsibility for the bombing and
burning as “. . . almost in a fit of pride, or almost like
dancing on the graves of the children and the people who
had burned to death and had been shot,” he then added that
“. . . he would do it again.”147 Justice would have been
more properly served to the race if there had been a known
144 ,, .T. Jones, The Police in America, p. 29.
145Bowser, “Dissenting Opinion,” p. 11
146Ibid., p. 22.
147Response of C. Vernon Mason, in Harry,
“Attention MOVE!” p. 197.
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148racist at the helm. Since Goode is Black, the
acceptance of this action was forced on the people as they
had to “. . . swallow this message of terror without
protest and resistance.149 The confusion spread by this
incident and the divisions within the Black community are
evidenced through lack of emphasis by the press on the
heinous nature of this crime in a free society.
In order to gain insight into this observation the
opinion of Philadelphians was assessed through a survey.
In defining the overall nature of MOVE, the majority of
both whites and Blacks viewed them as a disruptive, radical
cult, only 20 percent of the Blacks saw them as a peaceful,
back to nature organization. It was believed by the writer
that the media was largely responsible for instigating the
conflict through the negative portrayal of MOVE that the
public absorbed as reality. All of the whites disagreed
with this position; yet one-half of each group based over
80 percent of their opinion on media accounts. This query
was based on the presupposition that public perception was
a primary criteria in how the group was treated.
MOVE dominated the scene in Philadelphia and
paralyzed efforts of Blacks to focus on other political
148Response of Jitu Weusi in Harry, “Attention
MOVE!” p.
149Response of Carl Dix, in Harry, “Attention
MOVE!” p. 194.
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issues in 1978 and again in 1985.150
In 1978 the Black community was more willing to
aide MOVE in their struggle with city officials as opposed
to 1985 when that tactic had been almost completely
abandoned. This proposition is difficult to test because
in 1978 Rizzo was mayor and his name was synonymous with
police brutality.151 There was strong anti-Rizzo/police
fervor amongst those who mobilized after the barricade was
erected. The historical environ and the disadvantage of a
time lapse clouds the cause of the MOVE/police encounters,
87.5 percent of Blacks held MOVE’s behavior was a reaction
to police provocation as contrasted to 80 percent of whites
who believed MOVE had threatened public officials as a
means to exhort their philosophy and gain attention. In
1985, only 44 percent of Blacks surveyed held that violence
could have been avoided through negotiations; whereas in
1978 the major effort of Black community leaders was
through negotiations.
Conclusion
For those who regard litigatory pursuits as the
effective vehicle to redress police misconduct, the
eviction of MOVE constituted excessive force and a
150 Comment by Florynce Kennedy, in Harry,
“Attention MOVE!” p. 190.
151 One hundred percent of Blacks agreed to this
position in survey yet 78 percent of whites disagreed.
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violation of substantive due process through unreasonable
seizure. However, the rule of law is inapplicable to them
as they are considered an aberration in the realm of human
behavior and are certainly to blame for the circumstances
of their fate.
MOVE was somewhat progressive in the sense that
they had brought attention to the injustices of the
capitalist system. However, this effort was counteracted
by the negative portrayal of their personal habits which
made their critique appear as some form of psychosis. In
addition, MOVE’s appearance as an aberration of sorts,
created a vacuum in the transformation and applicability of
their critical philosophy and termination to the Black
community at large. By 1985 their focus was constricted to
the fate of their membership which made them static and
ineffective. MOVE of itself is an example of reactionary
politics of some Black organizations; however, within the
historical legacy of violence on Blacks, the MOVE
experience highlights those methods used to suppress
recalcitrants.
The efforts lodged against MOVE culminated in a
military attempt to stifle resistance to the status quo.
It also served as a strong message to any future
contemplators of rebellion. The MOVE massacre is not
unique behavior of the Philadelphia police and fire
fighters, only in the methods employed. “The fact is that
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no one controls the Philadelphia police except the
,,152Philadelphia police.
152Remark by Stanley Vaughn, in Harry, Attention
MOVE!” p. 204.
SUMMATION AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to examine the
historical evolution and status of police violence on
Blacks in this country. The hypothesis under investigation
was whether brutality is sanctioned through legal
mechanisms that appear to provide punitive and preventive
measures to end such systemic abuse. The determinant
variable, sanction, was tested through the absence of
misuse of existing guidelines governing the use of force
and litigatory efforts that favor the violators as
maintenance of the status quo. This theory was illustrated
by an analysis of general policing and brutality in
Philadelphia which showed the legal mechanisms, internal
police structure, and external vehicles implanted to
oversee police as mere reform efforts to provide an
illusion of eradication. The significance of this total
endeavor, particularly MOVE, was to explicate the
continuing trend toward nullification of protection from
expansive police power and the extent of force as a
commentary on future revolutionary movements.
The theoretical premise as developed in the review
of the literature was the dialectical nature of Blacks and
violence as prescribed by the economic order of capitalism.
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It was held by many that the police function was linked to
the maintenance of the socioeconomic order to repress and
control labor, legitimated by the politicolegal structure.
There is an “. . . umbilical connection between formal
legal rationality and capitalism; indeed, that it is
precisely the combination of formal legal equality and
extreme economic inequality which is the distinctive
characteristic of the liberal state.” The function of
policing as a tool of the state is evidenced by the
historical efforts by the working class to control police
which only “worked to restrict anti-working class police
activity, never to redirect the police against the
bourgeoisie.”2 Crime control tactics work to doubly
exploit the workers as they are not protected from crime
and they are closely monitored by the police.3 Some
members of the police force have actually joined the
lumpens as professional criminals which further inhibits
any inclination towards the elimination of crime in these
areas.4 The problematic of the demand of increased police
protection, coupled with increased protection from the
‘Isaac Balbus, Dialectics of Legal Repression (New
York: Russel Sage, 1973), p. 5.
2Sidney Harring, Policing Class Society--The
Experience of American Cities 1865-1915 (New Brunswick:




police, makes the likelihood of resolving the tension
between civil order and civil rights slight.5
Particularly, if, as it has been argued, that depressed
economic conditions precipitate violence which serves to
proliferate police violence, than wider socioeconomic issue
will have to be addressed in order to solve the overall
problem of abuse.
In the second chapter, the status of police abuse
was determined through the actions of the federal
government as provided by Supreme Court decisions,
legislation, and lack of executive initiation on this
issue. The codification of Black rights as an amendment is
verification of the fact that Blacks are merely an addendum
to this country’s constitutional foundation. This tenet is
reflected by the myopic view of Blacks by the court,
especially the offender, as superfluous to this society,
evidenced by the lack of prosecution of those that commit
violence on Blacks. This theory is further substantiated
by the constraints on litigation as a means to actualize
civil rights in a society that regards the
juridicopolitical process as qualifiable democracy. The
tests used by the courts mirror their perception of Blacks,
for the measurement of the extent of brutality and which
5Block, “Support for Civil Liberties,” in Harlan
Hahn, ed., Police in Urban Society (Beverly Hills: Sage
Press, 1971), p. 122.
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evidence should be included are moot points as the cause
6and nature of such illegalities should be abolished. The
Rizzo ruling barring injunctory relief reflected the
court’s unwillingness to view police misconduct as an
institutional, as opposed to an individual, problem. There
is also a need for an understanding of the internal
structure and mechanisms through which the “. . . structure
induces patterns of constitutional violations.”7 The
failure of the court in formulating specific rules to
discern police brutality and the limitations on sec. 1983
which cannot be invoked to compel officials to implement
reform has exemplified the absence of a constitutional
imperative to eliminate abuse.
All efforts aimed at attaining relief are positive
but working through the system will not be totally
effective for its goals are diabolically opposed to the
interests of minorities. This decade has not only
witnessed the erosion of civil liberties by an ultra
conservative court in this area but also the limitation of
access to federal court. Some civil libertarians have
stopped taking cases to the Supreme Court and are now more
inclined to stay in state courts, that were once avoided,
6”Rethinking Federal Injunctive Relief Against
Police Abuse: Picking Up the Pieces After Rizzo v. Goode,”
Rutgers-Camden Law Journal 7 (1976) :533.
7lbid., p. 532.
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as they are more hospitable to civil rights claims. Black
petitioners have found that they may fare better through
legislators, state houses, and lower courts for answers to
this unending battle.8 If the federal government would
make an effort to intervene and address racially motivated
violence then that would demonstrate a federal commitment
to stem the tide of racism for the goal of complete freedom
to all of society.9
Other avenues for redress were examined in the
third chapter that focused on police brutality in
Philadelphia proper. It was found that the civilian review
board, District Attorney efforts, and U.S. v. Philadelphia
were acts taken by the ruling forces to further manipulate
Black oppression for political advancement. The grass root
efforts yielded some positive results; yet, there is a
current lull in activities even after the MOVE massacre,
which speaks to obfuscation of the issues and apathy among
the majority.
MOVE exemplified that not only will the system
react to rebellion by a show of force, through
sophistication of tactics, but also the consolidation of
federal, state, and local levels to counteract it. It also
8Diane Camper, “And Justice for Women?” Black
Enterprise Vol. 15 no. 8 (March 1985) :55.
9Jones, “Federal Protection Against Race Crimes,”
p. 690.
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served as a message to future rebellions, ~f the intensity
of a rebel can be adjudged by the force used to repress,
the fate of MOVE was clear to any semblance of a
revolution. “Every instance of collective violence
confronts political authorities with certain crucial
decisions——involving varying modes and degrees of
repression and/or reform which help determine the future
11,10course of the protest below.
By way of prescriptive remedies, all efforts
towards eradication of brutality have some redeeming value
in that quantitatively they may add up to a qualitative
change. In litigation, what could be tested is a class-
based institutional brief which would concretize a linkage
between department hierarchy and daily patterns of police
behavior. The perspective of the judiciary needs to be
altered to relate the “. . . requirement of the Equal
protection doctrine to the organizational realities of
police work.”~1 One misinterpretation of the court has
been that federal intervention in this area would impede
upon the autonomy of the states. What is needed is
“creative federalism . . . that would help police social
and economic problems that neither private action nor state
10Balbus, Dialectics of Repression, p. 2.
11 IIFrank Anechiarico, Suing the Philadelphia
Police: The Case for an Institutional Approach,” Law and
Policy 6 (April 1984) :239.
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and local governments can solve alone.”12
Departmental policy making and police
accountability continue to be the focal points of reform
and encompass the major legal issues involving police. The
authority of the police to select enforceable laws, gain
access to information about violators and violations,
disciplinary measures, and constraints on personnel
recruitment practices need to undergo scrutinization and
subsequent change.13 There is a mistaken belief that
individualized justice produces a more equitable result,
however, it has only equated increased oppression of Blacks
due to the discretion of law enforcers.’4
Police investigations through internal review
boards are ill—equipped to redress concerns of the
complainants. The overall effectiveness of civilian review
boards has been difficult to determine due to their short
life term and subjugation to police commanders. One
critique of such boards is their lack of professional
knowledge on policing; however, even the police are miffed
on their overall role and extent of power. Acker has
12Ronald W. Walters, “Federalism, ‘Civil Rights’
and Black Progress,” Black Law Journal 8 (Fall 1983):226.
13
Alvin Cohn, ed., The Future of Policing (Beverly
Hills: Sage, 1978), p. 124.
14 ,,Taunya Banks, Discretionary Justice and the
Black Offender,” in Blacks and Criminal Justice, ed.
Charles E. Owens, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1977),
p. 37.
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suggested the use of social scientists to examine law
enforcement to determine standards relevant to their
prescribed function which would lead to the amelioration of
many problems.’5 Chicago’s police made a step towards the
unification of civilian review with professionals in their
Office of Professional Standards which hired civilians,
trained them on policing and constitutional rights, and
assigned them the task of adjudging police misconduct.
Yet, “the final decision on discipline is left to the
Superintendent.”16 The viability of review boards is
dependent upon the local governing apparatus, its relation
to, and the attitude of the police, but most importantly,
the extent of community concern.
The disposition of the Black community is the most
important determinant for redress and eradication of abuse.
The evidence of crime in the Black community cannot be used
to justify abusive tactics used by the police. Although
Blacks are perturbed with increasing street vice, the
community must not relinquish all control to policing; for,
violence on criminals has a spill—over effect on the
average law—abiding citizen. Therefore, the full
15See James R. Acker, “Social Sciences and the
Criminal Law,” Criminal Law Bulletin Vol. 23 no. 1
(January/February 1987) :49-79.
16Sloan T. Letman, “Chicago’s Answer to Police
Brutality: The Office of Professional Standards,” Police
Chief 47 (January 1980):16—17.
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parameters and nature of this problem must be addressed.
Some Blacks need to be deprogrammed from the binds of
cultural imperialism and break the chains of mass
consumption to assess their true status in this system.
The very nature of this study shows the citizenship of
Blacks in this country, with all the rights, privileges,
and protection thereof is as questionable now as it was
when Dred Scott approached the bench. The mystification of
the Black bourgeoisie heralded as individual mobility has
projected the illusion that Blacks are accepted as full
fledged Americans. Blacks need to be educated on continual
exploitation and convert the aims of existing organizations
to a revolutionary basis to effect civil treatment. The
accommodationist view that focuses on the government to
acquiesce liberty has to be abandoned, if only in part.
Blacks have to look to themselves for an end to violence
and to advance the cause of humanitarianism.
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APPENDIX
RESIDENTIAL SURVEY ON POLICE BRUTALITY
IN PHILADELPHIA AND MOVE
The following questionnaire has been designed for use
solely in a research paper. It would be helpful in
collating data to know more about the participants from the
following questions:
A. Please indicate street address.
B. Please give number of your political ward.
WARD ____________________
C. What is your age?
Black White
27 50 1. 30 or under
36 33 2. 31 to 45
0 17 3. 46 to 60
37 0 4. 61 or over
D. Your sex.
Black White
64 50 1. female
36 50 2. male
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E. What is the highest level of formal education you have
completed?
Black White
o 0 1. Some high school
54 50 2. High school graduate
27 25 3. Some college
9 17 4. College graduate
9 8 5. Advanced degree








4 4. Other Lithuanian
G. What is your political affiliation?
Black White




10 5. Non Partisan
H. How long have you lived in Philadelphia?
Black White
18 33 1. One to three years
0 8 2. Four to seven years
9 0 3. Eight to eleven years
73 58 4. Twelve and over
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1. In regard to police abuse, i.e., use of excessive
force by the police, please indicate whether you
agree or disagree with the following statements.
Check the box in the appropriate column.
Black White
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree
10 90 22 73 a. Abuse cases only
involves people
suspected of crimes.
70 30 64 36 b. The problem of abuse
involves a large
number of people.
78 22 36 64 c. Minorities are
primarily involved
in abuse cases.




100 22 78 e. Frank Rizzo’s name
is synonymous with
police abuse.
10 90 73 27 f. Media is responsible
for exaggerating
abuse issue.
10 90 18 82 g. Police abuse is no
longer a concern.
2. What percentage of your opinion of MOVE is based on
media accounts?
Black White
22 9 a. 20 percent
22 27 b. 50 percent
44 36 c. 80 percent
1 27 d. 100 percent
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3. For each definition of MOVE please check the one
that is closest to your opinion of what the group
is.
Black White
20 0 a. Peaceful back-to-nature
organization
60 83 b. Disruptive radical cult
0 0 c. Religious cult
10 0 d. Terrorist organization
10 17 e. Other (please describe)
4. In 1978, a barricade was constructed in Powelton
Village to force MOVE members from their home
because of health code violations. Please indicate
if you agree or disagree with the following
statements relating to the incident.
Black White
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree










40% 60% 44% 56% c. MOVE wanted to be
left alone.
25% 75% 0% 100% d. MOVE has the right
to bear arms.
87.5% 12.5% 0% 100% e. MOVE’s behavior was
in reaction to
police provocation.
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50% 50% 11% 89% g. The police stakeout
and use of munitions
was a waste of city
funds.
5. In your opinion of the televised beating of Delbert
Africa during surrender/apprehension, would you say
the police
Black White
0% 58% a. acted accordingly due to the
nature of the situation
100% 25% b. overreacted and in fact
abused Delbert
0% 17% c. other
6. Concerning Delbert Africa and the manner in which
he was apprehended, I think the officers involved
should have been
Black White
20% 38% a. left alone as they were only
doing their job
0% 15% b. commended for bravery
20% 32% c. suspended from the police
force
40% 0% d. imprisoned for aggravated
assault
20% 15% e. other
7. In May 1985, MOVE members and city officials had a
confrontation on Osage Avenue in which the area was
destroyed. Please rank the conditions in the order
in which you believe caused the incident: 1 being
most important, 2 for secondary importance, and 3
for least important.
Black White
22% 42% a. MOVE’s construction of pill
box and warlike atmosphere.
1% 16% b. MOVE’s demand for release of
imprisoned members over the
bullhorn.
67% 42% c. Osage residents’ insistance
that MOVE be evicted.
p jIp~
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8. Please indicate whether you agree~or disagree with
the following as they relate to the 1985
occurrence.
Black White
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree




22% 78% 75% 25% b. The fire department
was used to perform
police functions.
88% 11% 18% 82% c. Police overreacted
in the use of
firearms.








50% 50% 73% 27% f. MOVE Commission was
instrumental in
revealing facts in
order to make the
city accountable.
